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PEACE DISCOURSE IN POLITICAL LANGUAGE

PEACE, DISCOURSE, AND OPINION IN ISLAM

A Master's Thesis

Presented by

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to

the Graduate School of Social Sciences
of Middle East Technical University
in Partial Fulfillment for the Degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

in

SOCIOLOGY

MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

ANKARA

February, 1993

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences



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
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
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ABSTRACT

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M. Sc. in Sociology

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal Nalbantoğlu

February, 1993, 320 pages.

This study is an attempt to reproduce a mapping of the Islamic movements in Turkey, striving to adapt to the modern apparatus of opinion –in economy, politics, media and the like. The Peace Discourse is particularly referred in order to reconstitute the role of legitimation processes in the opinion society to which the political Islam today tries to adapt itself. Within this scope, the theoretical issues that emanate from taking language as a grid of analysis are discussed. Lastly, Islam's hesitant adaptation to modern opinion and the tension between its religious status and 'opinion-making' activity are discussed. Opinion here refers to the specific socializing activity that produces identity and inserts the subject to the life. The main thesis of the study is to reveal some preliminary theoretical frameworks in the study of narratives, of public opinion and communications.

Keywords: Islam, Islamist Movements, Language, Narrative, Spinoza, Hermeneutics, Exegesis, Interpretation, Homely, Peace, Rhetorics, Religion, Superstition.

Science Code: 211.03.01.

ÖZ

SİYASAL DİLDE "HUZUR" SÖYLEMİ

İSLAM'DA HUZUR, SÖYLEM VE GÖRÜŞ

BAKER, Ulus

Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Sosyoloji Anabilim Dalı

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Hasan Ünal Nalbantoğlu

Şubat, 1993, 320 sayfa

Bu tezde, Türkiye'de ve dünyada modern iktisadi, iletişimsel ve 'görüş toplumu'na ait siyasal bir hareket olarak beliren İslamın söylemsel haritası üzerinde kendini modern dünyaya uyarlama çabalarını gösterilmek isteniyor. 'Huzur Söylemi' bu açıdan sözkonusu uyarlanma çabasının iç gerginliğini ve olanaklı tek 'meşrulaştırıcı' başvuru işlevini yüklenmektedir. Bu bakış açısından, 'anlatıların' ve bir 'görüş' toplumunun kuramsal çerçevesini oluşturmak amaçlanmaktadır. Buna bağlı olarak, modernliğe yeltenen bir inanç sisteminin karşılaştığı tutarsızlıkların bazı yönlerine dikkat çekilmekte, kimlik oluşumunda 'görüş' ilkesinin rolü vurgulanmaktadır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: İslam, İslami Hareketler, Dil, Anlatı, Spinóza, Yorumsama, Tefsir, Yorumlama, Barış, Belagat, Din, Hurafe, Görüş, Kanı.

Bilim Dalı Sayısal Kodu: 211. 03. 01

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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

The "Peace" appears as the condition of possibility of world and life. It has a specific relation with a semantic network in which Silence, Wisdom, Security, and Labour are spinning to reconstitute the conditions of a homely life, a life best fitting to the conditions of modernity. The semiotic order whose dominant term is Peace, shapes and reshapes the Chaos to give it an Order whose variables are so legitimate in themselves that any attempt to change them recursively appears to bring harmful effects on the constitution of life.

The discourse of Peace is Hobbesian in its essence. Or, better, we would say that its best formulation can be found in the work of this philosopher. This pre-modern or rather, proto-modern philosopher who lived in an age of disenchantment, made security the precondition of the political life of modern Polity, and Peace the principle of the Order. This means that, for Hobbes, the conditions of war make impossible the political order and the life itself. Peace and War are therefore incompatible universals. Despite the distance he kept between himself

and the Greek political philosophy, Hobbes seems to accept the Aristotelian premise of "possibility": Philosophy is possible only through the Peace of Mind, Politics is possible only through the controlled Peace emanating from the structures of Sovereignty, and Life is possible only through the peaceful development of the organism in the order of the world.

Peace henceforth became a pre-condition of social life as society is identified with polity. The project of modernity is thus found encrusted in Peace, a Pax that refers to the international order of nation-states and nations struggling to become states. Therefore, Peace does not exclude Warfare, but subordinates it to its own premises, making out of it a principle of a transient eventuality, a political means (Clausewitz). It is in this sense that the famous formula "warfare is the continuation of politics and diplomacy" became possible and effective.

The semiotics of Peace is modern. It can be found in archaic societies only in its subordinated form, in the sense that it is a special "function" of tribal or archaic politics and diplomacy. In modernity, Peace does not belong to the same order of functions (whether of the State or society) since there are no special bodies to ensure the maintenance and conservation of Peace –internal or external– except the field of the so-called "diplomatic

bodies" which are characteristic of modernity and appeared as late as the middle of the twentieth century. The "go-between" in modern international order is the task of great powers, economically, militarily and politically and not of special bodies whose vocation would be the preservation, or rather "creation" of Peace. Kissinger's invention of "shuttle-diplomacy", pretending to become a characteristic form of international diplomatic relations is nothing but a translation of the semiotics of Peace into the loose sphere of a technocratic emergency state in world affairs. Peace is no longer the outcome of an effective diplomatic prudence, since it is allowed by sure means as security forces, armies and political menaces. The best understanding of this fact appears clearly in the attempt to establish the New Order by means of operations through the intermediary of UN.

Ethnologists, on the other hand, were the only ones who warned against the "presuppositions" of modern Peace. The excellent 'contra-Hobbes' of Pierre Clastres shifts the attention towards a realm -possible among many others- of 'primitive warfare' where war is not postulated in the Hobbesian form of 'absolute negation' of the possibility of political life. In segmented societies, warfare is part of the political career of a social type, of the "warrior", and is an integral part of the configuration of the social order and of its continuity. (Clastres, 1974a). The

experience of warfare in the cultural world of Ancient Greece too is strongly encrusted to the dynamics of political continuity of the Polis in the geography of a colonial, "thalassocratic" (Thucydides) world. This experience was itself in Greece the greatest public enterprise. The historian of Ancient Greece, Moses Finley estimated that every two years in the world of classical Greece saw a war that occurred between two or more cities. (Finley, 1981: 43-47) Cultures and "Empires" also show the evidence that warfare and military machines with their specific economic, social and technical orders are inseparable from the order of political and diplomatic prudence (if this word could be accepted) orienting these hordes against the "peaceful", archaic states.

Therefore, one of two things: either the historical role of warfare contradicts the assumption that Peace is the silent precondition of the social; or Peace, whatever its semantic order and signification, is nothing but a semiotic regime of discourse that covers real conditions of warfare and exercise of power, working on them as a special justificatory agency. This, I would like to call 'security' discourse the major function of which is to legitimate the political order as a function of the desirability and acceptability of Peace.

The second case leads us to confront a "Peace discourse" constitutive of the structures of modern life with its urbanity, politics, familial life and media and whose origins can be traced back to the Hobbesian political philosophy. The Peace discourse has therefore a genealogy that has to be tested in every life-experience of modernity: notably in religious discourse, in the structure of capitalist economy, and in the structure of modern State.

In these three fields, I will proceed to an exposition of three discursive orders: the religious understanding of "Huzur", either in 'this-worldly' political experience, or as an 'other-worldly' "requiem" that shifts the direction of discourse towards the experience of death and its "domestication", and the political motives of Peace discourse hiding an "emergency state" and the play of political and military forces via a system of repression and relations of power may belong to both at the same time..

These three examples could equally be analyzed in the political sphere of Turkey in the full complexity of the roles they assume, within the hybrid discursive terrain established between a modernist, reactionary Islamism (mobilized around the order-word, "Peace is in Islam"), an authoritarian military regime referring to an identification of Peace with national security and integrity, and a rising

mediatic world of consensus, seeking the Peace and its guarantee in the recent rise of a consumer society.

In these three fields, the Peace discourse constitutes a "topography", in the sense used by Ernst Jünger in his period of "*die totale Mobilmachung*", a "total mobilization of forces", before his curious shift into a "philosophy of Peace". (Jünger, 1966) It is a "topography" that shapes and covers the circulation of narratives and discourses in the political sphere, constituting the groundwork of the Turkish opinion that has already begun to 'discuss' "postmodernism".

There is a new "topography" that submits itself to a play of transformations through which Turkey will seek her "future" in the larger topographies of the world (the new structures and institutions of world capitalism, the political system of alliances in economic, political and ideological domains). As a preliminary observation would make them appear, this topography englobes the Islamists, "conservatives", social- democrat 'conservatives' and "legalists", and as a constitutive network of enunciations, like the Özal "Vision". It appears that this topography is instituted on the field of a regression of the 'leftist' discourse and ideological narrative whose "economy" failed, not inseparably from the collapse of world socialism.

I do not mean that the "Peace Discourse" is primarily important in the shaping and transformation of this topographic order, but placing it into "perspective", it could be possible to trace the origins of this topography that is not exclusively "Turkish" and to predict some probable transformations in the future. This requires the development of a semantics of history, satisfying also the regional semantics and topographies and which tends to show the articulations among the economic and ideological processes, the order of things and the order of actions.

This study is no more than an attempt to design the theoretical device in order to constitute the grids of this topography by referring to the Peace Discourse, with special reference to a certain "sociology of languages" (inaugurated exactly with Mannheim's "Ideology and Utopia") as a particular field of analysis of the emission, transmission and circulation of political enunciations and narratives. A further project could be the manipulation of the huge data of political narratives since 1980 in terms of a "hermeneutics of opinion" that would enable us to proceed into the understanding of "religious", "political" and "economic" spheres. Through such analysis, one could open the wide prospect of the actual ideological crisis of Islam in its 'trial and error' march in modern society of opinion. The thesis of Peace and tolerance works the Islamic discourse on many fronts, bringing it to the same plane

with great political narratives of our time –liberalism, socialism, modernism and positivism. Thereby, Islam felt itself forced to adopt the rules of opinion-making, a creation of the Enlightenment and Occidental philosophy.

Nothing shows better than this status of the Islamic Discourse the relationships between the constitution of opinion and Peace, the latter assumed to be the principal condition of the former. Here, I would like to develop my thesis on certain examples presented by the hesitant process of adaptation to the new world as the fundamental experience of an archaic religion in the modern world. My thesis is that Islam, in its adaptation efforts, appeared to be forced to leave, at least partially, the essential motives of a religious system –the transcendental truth, the word of God, the culture of the sacred, and the arts of interpretation and writing. The crisis emerges at the very core of this tension between the two aspects of modern Islam: the aspect of a political movement striving to challenge the world system at the level of opinion, and the aspect of a millenarian religion based on the divine truth and sacred scripture. This was recently revealed in the effort of the Diyanet to 'modernize' the interpretation of the Koran, sustained by a large section of Turkish opinion. Turgut Özal, the President of Turkey and a Nakshibendi, for example, was one of the

partisans of this 'rewriting' of the Koranic exegesis on the foundations of 'modern sciences'.

The ideological construction of this process of adaptation is revealed in the discourse on Peace, and in peaceful Jihad (which is conceived as the Sunna of any Muslim) both constituting a fruitful point of entrance of the Islamist intellectual into the modern world. This entrance is used, until now, by many Islamist scholars, converted from Marxism, or by those benefiting from the radical heritage of decolonialization. Their discourse is developed on a narrative of Peace, supposedly rooted in early Islam (the *Asr-ı Saadet*), an era assumed to have deployed all aspects of modern democracy, tolerance and freedom in their 'ideal' forms. This reference frame operates asymptotically in the presuppositions of a system of Pax, divine in its essence: a fore truth, a sacred system, a cosmology assumed to explain everything, through the metaphors of a passage from the chaos to the order. The order and the Pax, as the divine order, are ideally identified with each other. The homely life, a life style pragmatically obedient both to Islam and to the exigencies of modern life becomes the sociological expression of the projection of the process of adaptation into concrete life situations.

The formula of "Peace", taken at the level of its semantic unity (its signification) is 'neutral' before being captured into the semiotic regimes of religious, political and mediatic discourses. This neutrality is that of the "arbitrariness of the verbal sign" (Saussure) and of the "empty word" (Bakhtin). This neutrality enables the constitution of semiotic regimes taking their departure from the word "Peace", with or without its proper, concrete utterance. Or, I would like to introduce, instead of adopting such a neutrality of the word, a semantic grid of references that enables the word Peace to fit the anchoring point of "presuppositions". We know that the labour regime of capitalism requires the conditions of Peace in effect, that is, in presence. The procedures of "collective bargaining" refer to the elimination of conflicts in the standing of the work and its capitalist organization. All happens as if the 'work', the 'labour-force' exists by itself before its commodification, i.e., its becoming part of a semiotic regime of exchange, and the "negotiation" on salaries (the sole instance of conflict of opinions) is the exchange of words whose absorption into the "communicative action" (Habermas) would be a total misunderstanding of what happens in the regime of semiotic exchange. The "Huzur" Discourse of Islam, referring to the modernist setting of opinion, subordinates the entire semiotic order of Islamism and its heterodoxies to the 'this-worldly' practice of political struggles,

transforming the religious vision of world into a politics of reaction. Even the utterance of the order-word "Peace is in Islam" during an electoral campaign betrays the evidence that not only the word Peace (Huzur) but the form of order-word, its syntax and semantic constitution are "imported" from another discursive order or another place of the topography of the actual opinion. We will say that the word "Peace" is not neutral but has its specific value in the Islamic discourse in terms of its presupposed status in the opinion. The same "generative process" (Chomsky) is realized by the military which seized the power by force in 1980 when they declared that they acted "in the name of Peace and security" (*Huzur ve Güven Ortamı*). Such a motto had its roots already in the opinion of the period 1977-80, under the conditions of martial law, betraying an immanent relationship between Peace and state of emergency. The same discursive pattern is used in actuality in emphasizing the political and national integrity of Turkey and in the legitimation of the slogans emitted in justifying the police involvement in fighting terrorism. The political arena of such utterances at the local level is, interestingly enough, the community places of popular culture, football stadiums, funerals, and of mass expressions of opinion. Lastly, the Peace is made part of the strategic unity of the Home, of peaceful consumer life-pattern. It becomes the major asset to be sold and bought on the market, to be promoted by

advertising, with strong emphasis on the purity and security of the family life, of the 'speed' as the exigency of modern informatics and capitalist circulation of goods and services. Here too, the semantic form of such an advertisement as "living in the Peace and security of X", where X being a product or a service, is imported from the same topography, conveying the word with a different meaning: the worldly Peace can be acquired only through buying it.

There is no need for the enunciation of the word Peace at the semiotic background of Peace discourse, since Peace belongs to the order of presuppositions at this level. It is presupposed as in Hobbesian discourse, as a "generic command" to life, with the specific force of language to perform the action of presupposing. As we will see, "presupposing" is the illocutory act par excellence, commanding the Life to make the choice of "good living" by the equalization and identification of the word Peace with a series of other, "positive" and "justified" words.

A second aspect of the problem of opinion refers to the burning question of the formation of identity. The idea that the opinion 'constitutes' or 'forms' one's identity is very old, already present in Greek philosophical medium: You are what you express to be, and expression is essentially opinion (*doxa*). In the *Philebos* of Plato, I

would like to uncover not exactly a dialectics of writing like Derrida (Derrida, 1966: 67) but the identity producing force of the opinion, at the moment when it is expressed: there the Socratic thinker attempts to relate opinion to the future, to anticipation and intention -Socrates says: "It appears to me that the conjunction of memory with sensations, together with the feelings consequent upon memory and sensation, may be said as it were to write words in our souls. And when this experience writes what is true, the result is that true opinion and true assertions spring up in us, while when the internal scribe that I have suggested writes what is false, we get the opposite sort of opinions and assertions." (quoted in Derrida, 1981: 175) This is not a devalorization of opinion before knowledge (*episteme*); on the contrary, the philosopher speaks of the opinion as part of the feelings of expectation, related to the future: an opinion is not a passive apprehension (to have an idea); it is an expectation from the future whose boundaries are defining the identity of the opining subject.

How identity is produced by the opinion? To this question a sociological approach should be called to answer: Gabriel Tarde, the great sociologist of opinion attempts to show the sociological and epistemological misunderstanding emanating from the assumed priority of 'being' before 'having': philosophers have based their

theories on an ontological problem -the fundamental question according to Heidegger- of Being. Transposed into the domain of sociology, the priority of being is reflected in the search of identity in terms of 'being': what is man (the anthropological question of Kant)? What is society? (the sociological question); a question that might be asked for everything, and lacking any answer under the mode of being. The essential reformulation of the question by Tarde is characterized by the priority of 'having' over 'being'. The problem of identity is more related to what one owns, possesses or 'has' than to what one is. You have an identity when you express your opinion -there is a value-system of modern bourgeois reality whose major critique has been Nietzsche: what matters is not to have value-judgments, the essential matter is to question the value of oneself through his value-judgments: there is an immanent measure of morality in everyone's identity.

Hence, the formation of identity is a consequence of a pluralist dialectic: expression of the opinion, generalization of the value judgment, and a *prise de position* in the chaos.

CHAPTER II: LANGUAGE AND ITS POLITICS

2.1. The Rhetoric of Gods

The author of *Leçons de linguistique générale*, Ferdinand de Saussure seems to transcend many visions he tried presumably to reduce language in his Magnum Opus. These perspectives of transcendence appeared notably in *Anagrammes*, which opposes "poetic language" to the formalized language of linguistics. The burning question, which was an internal challenge against all formalizing and logicizing tendencies, was put apparently as follows: What makes a verbal message a work of art? It is true, the question was part of our modernity, and in specific manner, as put in consonance with the Russian formalist poetics. And as part of our modernity, the question favored in a certain manner some traditional distinctions between spheres of language, those of literary genres, that of ordinary languages, of scientific language etc. Suddenly, it has become question of theorizing in a more general context, that of "semiotics", intended to constitute so wide a project to become the "language of human sciences" (Kristeva, 1977). Suddenly, literary criticism had to become

"scientific", a part of human sciences, leading to what was termed by Paul Ricoeur as "the decline of rhetoric" (Ricoeur, 1972). All these meant that a specific line of project triumphed over the other, of "*Leçons*" over "*Anagrammes*". The fact that some philosophies of language, impregnated so long by philological traditions, kept their distance from this tendency of scientization and formalization was not a serious obstacle against this demystification and de-cognitivation of language. Structural linguistics was a revolution, a genuine revolution in the modern history of thought.

But, it has to be kept in mind that there exists, even at the initial moment, a tendency, an internal constraint, for transcending the element to what language was reduced: a formal system, constituted by hierarchical systems (or sub-systems) of relations, all of them assigned to signification. I don't mean that the "structuralist revolution" was betrayed like the corresponding socio-political revolutions of the epoch. Russian formalists and poeticsians, gathered around the Leningrad review of *Poetika* intended to duplicate the political revolution as to give way to a revolution of poetics and of language. In this sense, the revolutionary project became a part of the long historical adventure of Logos, in the coming of an age of sciences. Or, all supra-historical existence, particularly the Logos, is profoundly marked by a burning ambiguity, leading to

ambivalent appearances, whose *Aufhebung* was by no means an "end of history", settling accounts with the problems of certainty and perfect knowledge. This was the specific teaching of the famous Sapir-Whorf hypothesis stating that language was irreducible part of culture, shaping both a closed world of language and an open world of differences¹. The historical adventures of Logos, no need for a Heideggerian search for origins, can constitute a specific manner of discussing language. And the so-called "post-structuralist" revolution cannot be brought to its end without recourse to this long history of the rhetoric of Gods, of which, we are here only able to trace some lacunary, but strategic examples of inflexion through the history of thought.

The first "linguistic philosophers" were evidently the Stoicians in the sense that, despite their excesses in 'language games', they attempted for the first time to elaborate and transcend the Platonic identification of language and thought. Clearly, the Sophist of Plato proposes us the distinction between "thought" (*dianoia*), judgment (*doxa*) and phantasm (*phantasia*), the last referring to a judgment expressing the "sensible thing", i. e. what "appears" (*phanetai*).

The "*dianoia*" is defined in the Sophist as identical with discourse, in the sense that it refers, however, to the

internal and silent dialogue of the mind. It appears that for Plato, the *dianoia* and logos being identical, the thought and discourse (or language) are the same thing (*tauton*). But why is there here a distinction which Plato tends to operate at a lexical level, incorporating an irreducible difference between thought and language? Plato operates this distinction in order to show that *dianoia* is the silent, interior dialogue of the mind with itself while the "logos" is the vocal flow (*reuma*) emanating from the mind, emitted by the mouth. Thinking (*dianoeisthai*) on the other hand, "is a discourse of the mind during its examination (contemplation) of the objects"; it is nothing but a specific form of dialogue, through which the mind addresses to itself questions and answers, affirmations and negations. At the end, there is a state of "fixation" of the "doxa" (opinion or judgment). This is a kind of internal discourse, expressed by the man to himself and not before others. This is a logos which is not orally expressed, failing to be part of the "dialogue" of the City, while claiming a "doxa" of its own, different from that of Sophists.

The neutral "sense" of the word "logos" in Plato, on the other hand is based on its definition as "making one's thoughts clearly visible by the articulated speech in verbs and nouns". Hence logos and *dianoia* are two "discourses" doted with an articulated structure (a proposition), whose primitive form is the "*sumploke*"

(juxtaposition) of a verb and a predicative expression. But the verbal discourse, the speech is also an "image" of the interior discourse of the mind, having as its function the expression, the manifestation and communication to another human being the "doxa" which is the result of the internal dialogue of the mind.

It appears that Plato is vividly preoccupied with the mental mechanisms generating the "doxa" and the "episteme" (the end product of dialectics). His theory of language obeys to the premises similar to those "post-structuralist" semioticians like Julia Kristeva, referring to language as a means of production. (Kristeva, 1977) The social world of the Polis is made visible through the Platonic debates in the Sophist and Theatetus: a world where each citizen is a pretender, a producer and holder of the opinion (internally in the first case, externally in the second). This mode of expression of the opinion opposes all partial opinions at the public center of the city. Through the structure of the opinion, a nature is designed for man, situating him "between animals and gods". (Vernant, 1990: part 3)

In Sextus Empiricus, the theme of the "linguistic nature" of man is found as much more stressed, in opposition to the standpoint of dogmatic Stoicians, since man's nature is defined as a capacity of immediate seizure

of the articulation of signs. "Since the sign itself takes the form of 'if this, than that'."² That is to say, the "sign" (*semeion*) is constituted at the point of articulation of nature and the constitution of man.

2.2 The Language of God

The art of rhetoric –termed by Aristotle as the counterpart of dialectics" (Aristotle, *Rhetorika*, 2156b)– is traditionally brought at a position which constituted the basis of the "Polis". Part of the Greek "*koine*" as it was, the rhetoric, as specifically "human language", was carefully restricted and agenced. The rhetoric was not only "good-speaking", it was co-extensive" with the "political", and as such, part of the entire project of "*paideia*". The access to "freedom" was only possible through the right to speak, shared "equally" by all citizens, irrespective to the power of Logos, then, so important for the pre-Socratics, and especially, for Heraclitus. One important point here is to retain: for the Greeks, there exist a dangerous tension between the "right to speak" and "the power of speaking". So the "rules" of dialogue, which even tend to abolish the possibility to speak, as it was the case with the Socratic dialectics: the attitude of Socrates to reject a priori all possibility of "answering". The dialectics is a need, deeply founded in the possibility of the Polis, but the "truth" belong to another Logos, impossible for men to speak

about. Here, we already encountered a mutation of Logos. To relate Logos to Aletheia is virtually made impossible by the Socratic dialogue, the agenced explosion of the opinion. It is, or instance, an erroneous attempt that we saw in Heidegger to neglect the other side of the Logos, assuming that Greek Logos was "autochthonous" but not the Logos, the speech of re-competing citizens (Heidegger, 1973). The neglected point appears in the necessary and apparent distinction between the teaching of Heraclitus and that of Parmenides. For Heraclitus says: "Listening not to me but to the Logos, it is wise to agree that all things are one"³, while the Goddess of Parmenides' poem teaches him to make his speech correspond to truth. For Heraclitus, his logos is in opposition with Logos while in Parmenides, two logoi are identical. The distinction between two spheres of language traverses the entire classical period of Greece.

What are, then, the consequences to derive out of this duplicity of language, appearing as early as pre-Platonic thinkers? One may apply to it the Platonic distinction between "*diegesis*" (narrative) and "*mimesis*" (imitation). The opposition is clearly made between epic and drama, the first based on "relating" and the second, of "representing" (Faye, 1976). The Greece is the homeland of the "spectacle"⁴. But there are various forms thereof: the epic poet or the historian "relates"; the tragedy and drama "represent". Even the human logos is not unitary. But for

Plato, "relating" is more dangerous than representation, which, at last instance, can be controlled under the great project of *paideia*. It is interesting to see Plato, the first writer on "politics" incorporating a chapter on "poetics" to his work. *Diegesis* has a particularly important relation with ruling, governing, the "hegeomai". What is dangerous is this relationship: Whether true or not, the act of "relating" can change the face of things, the life of the people, and can put into question the harmony of the "Polis". Poets relate falsifications about the true nature of gods and of things. Jean-Pierre Faye remarks that in a totally different context, in 1788, Abbé Mably, in full expectation of the coming Revolution "relates the same abominable power of the narrative. The coming revolution -it is anticipated, therefore not within the order of reality- can recursively be led to the stories of Hunnic hunters. These young Hun hunters, hunting in bands around Azov Sea, following a deer, found themselves suddenly, through a passage piercing an unknown swampy space in an unknown country of miracles. Following an ecstatic lapse of enchanted contemplation, they felt the urge to "return back to narrate" to their people the marvels they had encountered in this unknown country. And "these stories", relates Mably, "would change the face of nations" (Faye, 1977: 181). We are today able to trace one step forward more than Mably, still in anticipation of the revolution, a movement that will shape the fate of nations this time from the West to the East.

There is no need to go back to Greeks, as the entire play of language is present in this "most terrible people in history". Attila, their chief, "acts" in exchange to the stories told by the hunters. And he acted, "ruling" his terrible army/people. He acted, according to the description he got from the hunters, who pretended to have seen the marvels of this unknown country, of which, the hunters brought nothing but their voice, their logos. In contrast with the language of bees, there was no need to bring something in order to initiate "communication" (Faye, 1977: 183)). What is more striking, Attila was aware –more than Sartre of "Les Mots" and the Heidegger of the Logos– of the fact that these stories could not bring even a lesser part of the reality existing out there. Hence, the need to act. An entire picture of language is traced in this parody of history before our eyes, so blinded both by our subjectivist attitude towards language, and our formalistic attitude towards linguistics as a "science". Is it possible to not to see some of the motives of Plato to eliminate the Poet from his City?

In this example, we touch upon one of our central themes of discussion throughout this work: the points of contact between language and action, that is, the problem of pragmatics. But we are not yet at the point of elucidating another, virtually deeper and challenging problem: the relation of language to "truth".

As to the problem of "truth", an entire field of classical "hermeneutics" is opened before our glance. The epic poetry, the narratives of historians and the Logos of Heraclitus... But the greatest "pre-Socratic" thinker of language was, interestingly enough, a poet, Pindaros. For the Arcadian Poet filled his poetic discourse with allusions to a "language of Gods" that has probably a kinship with the Phrygian and Hittite tradition of "magic word". Apparently, this language of gods consists exclusively to words/things, that is, to substantives if we have to rely upon a linguistic description. This means that everything had two names (*noumen*), the one is essential and the other, "spoken" (*legomen*). The language of Gods had evidently a further relationship with the "magic thought", if we still can rely upon such concepts. The concept of taboo is essential here: It is known that the blasphemy is related, in its most archaic and general forms, more to the "utterance of names" than to simply "saying something". Human ordinary language is deprived of taboo, and as such, cannot incite any kind of blasphemy. Today, blasphemy or euphemy, the "juron" appear to a secondary category among our world of signs, especially in linguistic field. Originally, blasphemy is related to essences: the original blasphemy is not a degrading assertion "about" religion or divinity. Its mode is not that of a sentence, or a statement. Jesus commits blasphemy by calling himself

'Son of God' (Benveniste, 1974: 136). In this sense, the blasphemy belongs evidently to language, to human language. However, it is related more to a central motive in religious experience rather than to a lexical category. As observed by E. Benveniste, this original blasphemy consists in replacing the name of God with an outrageous expression. As such, it emanates from the biblical interdiction of uttering the Name of God. Why? Since the "God giveth not account of any of his matters."

I have uttered that which I understand not,
things too wonderful for me, which I knew not...

Wherefore I abhor myself,
and repent in dust and ashes... 5

The first negation of this taboo of transcendence hence comes with the words of Heraclitus: "the wise is one only. It is unwilling and willing to be called by the name of Zeus."⁶ The logos of God is not only preserved, but even achieved a greater degree of autonomy and coherence, a process expressed in the words of the "Goddess" in Parmenides:

"Come now, I will tell thee –and do thou hearken to my saying and carry it away– the only two ways of search that can be thought of... One path only is left for us to speak of namely, that It is... or thou canst not know what is not, that is impossible– nor utter it; for it is the same thing that

can be thought and that can be... I shall not let thee say nor think that it came from what is not; for it can neither be thought nor uttered that anything is not".⁷

Heraclitean/Parmenidean wisdom offers an autonomy of thought, a correspondence between human and divine languages: while in the former these two languages are opposed, in the latter, on the contrary, they are identified. The formula of original blasphemy is reversed: the language becomes "motivated", appended to the need of "saying the truth". Blasphemy becomes "empty speech" on the plane of rhetorics and oratory and not at the level of blasphemy, as the utterance of the name of God. Language here is a model of access to the "free community" of citizens, and with some token, takes the form of free dialogue. For this reason, it has to be controlled and subjugated to the requirements of saying the truth. This led evidently to the development of a full-scale "organon" by Aristotle, leaving free for the first time the "empirical science" to constitute the genuine "episteme".

As to "blasphemy" whose linguistic forms are profoundly analyzed by Benveniste and Mikhail Bakhtin (Bakhtin, 1933: 74-96), it is, as we said above, an utterance of the Name of God in an outrageous manner. It takes, through Middle Ages, the utterance form of the "*sacramentum*", the only "true" way to reach God with

speech. According to Biblical doctrine, men possess of God only his name, and in accordance to what Freud was calling "the ambivalent attitude towards profanation of the sacred"⁸, the blasphemer is "motivated" to utter this name while "repression" works the utterance in the way of a "metaphor" or of a substitution of an injurious name for God. Bakhtin, on the other hand, puts the blasphemy in its genealogy, referring to an original identity of the two "kinds" of sacred, which were distinguished through history: In societies without State, the center and the periphery, the heavenly element and the lowly element, that is, all binary oppositions the ones evaluated as good the others bad were equally sacred" (Bakhtin, 1933: 53). The blasphemy tends to appear as an emancipatory agent only in the societies where central State structures, social classes appeared, and when religious thought valorized one part of the sacred, devalorizing the other, inferior, fleshy parts as the profane.

The language of God, appearing in monotheism –as well as in "*muthos*" or in polytheistic religions– becomes expressive only within a political framework of domination and power, whether in mystic utterances of brotherhoods, in traditional, priestly hermeneutics, or in the form of "motivation towards the truth".

2.3 The Biblical Hermeneutics

"I am now writing a treatise about my interpretation of Scripture. This I am driven to do by the following reasons: 1. The Prejudices of the Theologians, for I know that these are among the chief obstacles that prevent men from directing their mind to philosophy, and therefore I do all I can to expose them, and to remove them from the minds of the more prudent. 2. The opinion that the common people have of me, who do not cease to accuse me falsely of atheism."

The aim of Spinoza in writing his "*Tractatus theologico-politicus*" is formulated in the preceding paragraph: it was to combat the "Prejudices of the Theologians" and to free philosophical knowledge from the "excessive authority and imprudence of the preachers". As it was shown by Antonio Negri, in the age of Spinoza metaphysics was revealed as the sole manner of doing politics for the philosopher (Negri, 1982: 45-6). But what is more interesting is the fact that the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* is a work on hermeneutics, denouncing the theoretical forms of Biblical hermeneutics, that of the Jewish, and evidently Christian theologians. The first part (Chapter One) is on the word of prophets, "of Prophecy"; the Chapter Two, "Of Prophets", and the Third, "Of the Vocation of the Jews, and Whether the Gift of Prophecy was Peculiar to Them". These three first chapters give to Spinoza the occasion of

postulating his own exegetic method and of denouncing the presuppositions of the traditional biblical exegesis.

Spinoza denounces a "genealogical process" which tends revelation towards institution throughout the first chapter. He tries to show how revelation is institutionalized and corrupted into superstition and fanaticism. In the following chapters the analysis shifts into the terrain of the historical role of "imagination" and to its constitutive function, as to falsity and illusion. Imagination here appears as a "fluctuating meaning" that operates throughout history as a transcendental force.

Keeping this "program" in our minds, we can determine some fundamental aspects of the discussions carried by Spinoza through this complex terrain of study.

In the first chapter, "Of Prophecy", Spinoza criticizes the traditional, theological conception of prophecy, revealed in the example of Judaic religion. He negates any specific ontological statute of prophetic truth. It is true that every "truth" was to find at its basis, while every prophecy "took place by the power of God", "but this would be more trifling, and no better than explaining the form of a singular thing by a transcendental term". For everything takes place by the power of God: "Nature herself is the power of God under another name, and our ignorance of

the power of God is coextensive with our ignorance of Nature..." (TTP, Chapter 1) As a consequence, the horizon of prophecy cannot be anything other than the terrain of mere imagination, of pure abstraction:

"Imagination does not, in its own nature, involve any certainty of truth, such as is implied in every clear distinct idea", but requires some extrinsic reason to assure us of its objective reality: Hence prophecy cannot afford certainty while prophetic imagination is conceived as an expression of "directio Dei", the decree of God, merged with truth value (TTP, Chapter 1).

Prophecy is then reduced to imagination, and there already appears, to initiate the first chapter, a clear distinction suggested by Spinoza, between faith and reason. This distinction is between "faith" and "reason", the former pertaining to imagination (as necessary illusion) and the second to "truth". Suddenly, this distinction reveals the entire project of Spinoza in Tractatus to dissolve the inadequate mixture, propounded by Biblical exegesis, between the elements of truth and the elements of faith and revelation. Prophecy, revelation, is "under the power of God" only in so far as it is related to mere imagination. It is a "necessary illusion". And as such, revelation is to be distinguished from the questioning of truth, possible exclusively within the perspective of reason. Hence, this

new horizon has to be depicted by a historical differentiation of truth from falsity. This is the basis of the Spinozistic hermeneutics.

Spinoza insists on his distinction between faith and reason even in the initial perspective he points out in the Preface: There are two manners of teaching the truth. The first addresses itself to reason, and the second, to human experience. Or, there are only a limited number of people in societies able to possess the necessary degree of training their reason to understand reasonable demonstrations by "*lumen naturale*", the natural light of reason. The second address, mainly to human experience thus becomes necessary for teaching something to the multitudes (*multitudo* or *vulgus*). Herefrom, we have at hand two discourses, or two languages, the former based on rational demonstration and opted for rare trained people, and the latter for the vulgar. But are they really the two forms of teaching the "truth", in such manners of being at first direct and at the second hand metaphoric? No! For Spinoza underlines that reason and faith, philosophy (or theological philosophy) and Scripture can maintain by their own force their spheres of action, their respective realms without the necessity to pass their proper limits, either for servility or domination. According to Spinoza, these fields have their power active only in their own terrain. Or, evidently,

history is full of transgressions, tending to make one discourse to dominate over the other or vice versa.

Spinoza, on the other hand, suggests to dissociate between these two spheres, that of faith and that of reason? Is he pleading for "reason", as he believes to be dominated by the Christian doctrine of "faith-reason dialectics"? In a certain way, yes. But, he also suggests a reading for Scriptures, which elucidates the scientific way of interpretation: "I may sum up the matter by saying that the method of interpreting Scripture does not widely differ from the method of interpreting nature, in fact, it is almost the same. For as the interpretation of nature, consists of examining the history of nature and deducing from its definitions of natural phenomena based on certain facts, so scriptural interpretation proceeds by reconstructing the history of Scripture and inferring the intention of its authors as a legitimate conclusion from its fundamental principles"(Todorov, 1974). Therefore, "the knowledge of all this, that is, of nearly the whole contents of Scripture, must be sought from Scripture alone, just as the knowledge of nature is sought from nature alone": it will be the "lumen naturale" which will guide such a reading? (TTP, Ch. 5) The reading of Scriptures through Scriptures alone will be then a "linguistic" technique of interpretation. But Spinoza adds to this reading a second technique of analysis, namely, the typical reduction of the single books

of Scripture to a general argument, corresponding to a mostly modern hermeneutics, and finally, as a third sphere of study, a contextual/historical and cultural analysis.

Hence arises our linguistic object of interest in Spinoza's work: A text must at first hand read "within" itself, secondly reported to its historical conditions, and following these two hermeneutic moments, its "truth" must be established only "under the natural light" of reason. What is the meaning of all these assertions, then? That Spinoza rejects any truth-value to be imputed in the Scripture, as a compilation of imaginary texts, that, while in the "power of god", this address to human experience, the vulgar experience takes the shape of a necessary illusion: "We must necessarily inquire how the prophets became assured of the truth of what they perceived by imagination, and not by sure mental principles". The object of the second type of discourse, that of Revelation and Scripture is expressive, it is true, only in the mode of imagination: Its truth is not "intrinsic" to the word, even to the word of God or of prophecy. The imagination is inadequate, confused and indeterminate. But it justifies its being (historically) by molding itself in the natural "*potentia*", in the development of human "*operari*", in the making of men and society. At a first level, which is static, the imagination proposes a partial, but positive definition of its own contents, and at a second level, which

is dynamic, the movement and effects of the imagination are validated as a function of ethical constitution of the world. It is the political use of the theological which gives the truth to imagination. Spinoza is not skeptical towards this truth, which is a second order of truth, quite different from the eternal truths of reason and nature, expressed in the discourse of philosophy and sciences.

We have hence to expose the argumentation of Spinoza as follows: At the beginning, he states that a "truth" can be taught in two ways: by an address to reason, available only for a trained few, and by an address to human experience, available for the many, for the "multitudo". However, through the following steps of his argumentation, he depicting that the object of the discourse of faith, is not the "truth" but only a superstition. According to Spinoza, all forms of historical religion are "*superstitio*" and vain religion (*vana religio*). What is, then, the object and mode of being of this necessary discourse, revealed in Scripture? Spinoza is very clear on this point: While the rational discourse has the task of depicting adequate truths, through demonstration taking the shape of a production, distinguishing the true from the false, the task of imaginary discourse is a testimony (*testimonia*); the testimony of "obedience" (*obedientia*). Weak in knowledge, Scriptures possess the overwhelming efficacy of affecting human beings, convincing them in the most unbelievable of

superstitions. The discourse of Scripture is made for the couple "obedience/disobedience" and not "knowledge/ignorance". It is apparent that the teachings of the Apostles can be reduced to very simple and few principles, and at the last instance-this is core of Spinoza's argument- to one primary principle: "That the divine law has in this sense come down to us uncorrupted is an assertion that admits of no dispute. For from the Bible itself we learn, without the smallest difficulty or ambiguity, that its highest teach teaching is: Love God above all things, and one's neighbor as oneself"(TTP, Ch. 2). Thus it appears that "prophets and Apostles speak using expressions adapted to the understanding of ordinary people, since the object of the Bible is not to make men learned but obedient"(TTP, Ch.4). That is why the discourse of Scripture addresses itself to human experience, to create effects of obedience: "It follows that faith do not demand that dogmas should be true but that they should be pious; that is, they should lead the spirit to obey". The function of obedience is thus clarified as follows: "Each man's faith must be judged pious or impious only with respect to its truth"(TTP, Ch.3). But, Spinoza's standpoint is not negativistic, "how salutary and necessary this doctrine is for a republic in order that men live together in Peace and concord; and how many and how great causes of disturbance and wickedness are thereby cut off, I leave everyone to judge for himself!"(TTP, Preface)

At this point, it becomes important to trace Spinoza's twofold critique launched against two examples of Biblical criticism, performed respectively by Al Fakr and Maimonides. The first, Al Fakr, is an example of making faith to dominate reason in Biblical hermeneutics. Spinoza criticizes him for subordinating reason to the discourse of Scripture, since he compares the ambiguous passages of the Bible with other, clearer passages (for instance, when God is termed in plural, while it has been more certainly and clearly asserted that God is One), to decide that the ambiguous expressions are metaphoric.

On the other hand, Maimonides subordinates Scripture to reason, affirming that all passages which contradict the natural light of reason are metaphoric. According to Spinoza, these two opposite types of interpretation are, while diametrically opposed, share a common erroneous conception: Central to both hermeneuticians, there is the presupposition that Scripture cannot say "nothing but the truth". Or as we have seen, its discourse, addressed to human experience only, to produce effects of obedience and not of producing truth, has nothing to do with "truth" and "falsity" (*vera et falsi*): as based on imagination, shared by the ordinary men, Scripture is filled with "fiction" (*fictio*)(TTP Ch.6).

Here, there appears the revolutionary importance of Spinoza's distinction between "meaning" and "truth". One has to proceed, under the natural light of reason, by the sole examination of the text of Scripture, to reconstitute its "meaning" from its interior, the text has to be understood through the text itself. Only after the establishment of this "meaning" one may convert it into the analysis of truth, through rational means of reflection. A text must be submitted to a linguistic analysis at first, to become aware of its meaning; however, "meaning" is not the "truth" of a narrative; the truth of ideology lies elsewhere, in obedience, decrees, commands and testimonies. It is in this sense that Scripture has to be reformulated, in function of its meaning, in the form of a simple, coherent utterance of a central principle, under the form of a "law" or "decree". All what is required for the theologian-philosopher, then, is to bring this meaning under the rigours of rational scrutiny, to establish its truth or falsity.

Under such a critical mode, some remarks of Spinoza on the extrapolation between opinion and language could be highlighted: The oppression exerted by the sovereign cannot directly shape the minds, it can only lead to a polarity between what is thought by the subjects and what is overtly expressed in their discourse. But it is a state of instability, which is, at the last instance, returned

back with an explosion, putting under cause the entire basis of sovereignty. A "totalitarian" State cannot survive, since it is founded upon a false paradigm of "mass society". Against the pre-modern Hobbes, the anti-modern Spinoza disables the entire chain of the "discourse of modernity". The word of God, the Logos can only be ontological: under its discursive modality, it is only opinion.

2. 4 The Adventures of Structuralist Linguistics

The "hermeneutics" of Spinoza forced the "meaning" to divorce "truth". But, what about the "truth" of language? Does language (or discourse) "signifies", "means", "informs" or "communicates"? The modern extensions of the Spinozistic answer to the problems of Biblical hermeneutics tend to deny any attempt to reduce language in a pure form destined to "signification" and/or "communication". We have said that structuralism was a revolution. However, a number of postulates, of linguistic origin, limit the powers of this revolutionary attempt to give to the language its constitutive role in modern analysis.

Deleuze reformulates these postulates as follows: 1. Language is informative and communicative; 2. There is an abstract machinery of the language, not appealing to any "extrinsic factor"; and 3. There are constants or universals of language, which permit to define it as a homogeneous

system (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980: 124). All these three postulates, can be found, more or less profoundly emphasized, in the initiating works of modern general linguistics: Saussure, Jakobson, Benveniste... The denunciation of these principles were also present in the period co-extensive with the evolution of structuralist linguistics, and of its "applications" into other fields, into psychoanalysis by Jacques Lacan, into ethnology by Lévi-Strauss... The "pragmatists" -incarnated in the famous "theses" of Austin- and "dialogists" as the Leningrad School of M.Bakhtin and his adepts.

It is now apparent that, through these three hypothesis, modern linguistics articulated its field of study at the price of undermining almost totally a considerable part of the realm of language; I mean the Saussurean distinction between "langue" and "parole". The obvious result of this distinction was to confine the concrete emergence of language into the inarticulate field of "language use", open to "free" or "bounded" subjects: linguistic abstractions are assumed to be impossible in the field of "speech", so a systematic linguistic analysis should be confined to the determined, abstract field of "la langue".

Or, the paradox is already present in the formulation of the distinction between language and speech: Labov remarked on the contradiction of this attitude; the


"language" is defined as the "social part" of the language, while conveying the "speech" in individual variations; but the social part, as closed onto itself, it proceeds necessarily that a single individual could claim right for studying the "langue", independently of any external data, while the "speech" would be discovered only in the social context: "the social aspect of language is hence studied in the intimacy of the academician's office, while its individual aspect requires a research to be carried at the hearth of the society"(Labov, 1979: 231). The paradox, denounced by Labov, the sociolinguist and Bakhtin-Voloshinov, literary critique, persists from Saussure to Chomsky.

2.5 Langue et Parole

At the core of the Saussurean distinction between language and speech, lies the basic tenet of conceiving the structure of language as an interplay between a code (la langue) and discourse (parole). The adepts of this distinction, notably R. Jakobson and N. Chomsky, ascribe the possibility of formalizing the field of speech only in the form of informative and communicative functions. Two theses denounce sufficiently their perspective; the former, launched in opposition to R. Jakobson's "information scheme" by Bakhtin/Voloshinov, denounces the "communicative" subscription of language (speech) and the

latter, through the theses of Austin and J.Searle, denounce the "informative" firmness of discourse.

It is well known that the "informative scheme" of communication has been developed by two young engineers", in the workshop of Norbert Wiener, the cybernetician, in 1946: it is known as Shannon-Weaver model. In his essay entitled "Linguistics and Poetics", Jakobson adopts this formal model, which can be semi-graphically represented as follows:



This model of communication, known as "telegraphic message model" is assumed by Jakobson to help to formulate propositions concerning "any verbal event", an event of language as well as of discourse, including the answer to the question "what makes a verbal act a work of art?" (Jakobson, 1963: 238) Nothing more useless than this, according to Bakhtin, since "discourse does not maintain a uniform relation with its object: it does not "reflect" it, but it organizes it, transforms or resolves situations" (Voloshinov, 1973: 45). Betraying the engineering

motive of such a theoretical construct, there lies the deduction of "language" into a simple "code", whose contextual use by subjects is based on sending and receiving a message whose content is "informative". The model harbours evidently some useful applications. The reading of a "myth", for Lévi-Strauss, an adept of the great Russian phonologist is reshaped on the basis of the assumptions surrounding this schema: As the message has to be sent "against noise" it has either/or to be "redundant", or codified in various fashions. And since "history" is nothing but a "noise" for these "cold" societies-without-history, the "savage mind" tends to send the Word through "redundant" and "variant" patterns: within the plurality of the myths, a unique message emanates for generations. It appears that however, if the distinction between "language" and "parole" is untenable -as we will try to demonstrate- the model at least partially fails.

In the Jakobsonian model of communication "redundancy" and "multicodification" are the "strict minimum" for sending a message against the "entropic" erosion of its informative content within a medium of noise. But in the context of our argument, stating that the content of the message is nothing but an "order" or an "act of obedience", the scheme must be internally reversed: this time, it is the information itself which comes to play the role of a "strict minimum" to ascertain the emission,

transmission and observation of orders and commands. Such a strict minimum is necessary, even at the phonetic level, to make sure oneself for not being misunderstood adequately. Even the "code" itself, as the "phonetic", "grammatical" and "semantic" layers, so absolute "a priori" for structural linguistics are, in a sense, nothing but parts of this "strict minimum" as "informations about the commands of language".

That information is only a "supplement" to orders is apparent at the level of Bernstein's analyses on "codes": "elaborated" and "restricted" sharing the complicity with the "prison house of language". In the domain of its "limits of possibility", language might be structured in the form of an "innate a priori", as Hjelmslev and Chomsky tend to believe: but outside these limits, we have to give pens, papers and grammatical rules to pupils at schools, to establish the strict minimum necessary to confine them in the domain of ordered life, of the life to be shaped under orders and commands. As Ducrot shows, language is "socially consecrated to create the subject's responsibility"(Ducrot, 1984: 34).

One consequence of Faye's "Hunnic stories" can be reformulated at this level of analysis: And his point is against J.P.Sartre, the Sartre of "Les Mots" who insists (or expects) that a philosophical discourse could only be

convincing if its discourse relates the truth in a direct mode: When I say "table", the signified must be the table, the wooden table, standing there, with dishes onto it. There must be nothing between the word and its referent. Nothing? Attila is more aware than Sartre of the teachings of linguistics. For a moment of grace, or silent enchantment of the "stories of hunters", comes the moment of disenchantment. He knows that these are mere "stories", the effect of the voices uttered by his compatriots. Of the marvels of this unknown countries, no corporeal examples are brought: only words are sufficient, however, to create in his mind the "mental picture", if not a panorama of the unknown country. In order to "get" the picture referred, one has to move, make a journey -in his case a "conquest". Words incite action (Faye, 1977: 210).

Some supplementary observations are required at this level: What distinguishes human communication from the language of bees, so carefully analyzed by E. Benveniste? The famous "dance" of the bee, who discovered a fertile source of pollen. The dance uses even the tropes, the metaphors and metonymies, to describe the exact direction and distance of the source. But Benveniste insists on the point that this is not a "language" -here in the sense that it is not "articulated"-: since the communication cannot start or even be attempted unless the dancing bee, disposing of an organic encoding and decoding capacity,

have brought particles of pollen, unlike the Hunnic hunters: "We were unable to observe that a bee who received a message could transmit it to others, in the form of relay"(Faye, 1977: 203). Bees don't possess language, since they are capable to report that they have lived, experienced or seen.

What is, then, the "nature" of human language, in opposition to this "non-language" of the bees? It is not simply, as defended by Benveniste, that human language is articulated. Benveniste, referring to the studies of Von Frisch on the language of bees (Benveniste, 1974: 122), affirms that this language has a "signification": "This language signifies, since it can force out, and incite a behaviour which verifies the signifying pertinence of an action, a "geste". In return, if I perform a movement for opening a book, this is a useful act, but it does not signify, since "it has no a conceptual dimension". Certainly, Benveniste affirms the communicative value as a signifying system of this organic gesticulation of the bees, since it is capable to use tropes. But, in a sense, metaphors and metonymies are merely the effects, which belong to language only in the cases when they presuppose a discourse, a "primary language" which cannot be, however, established as the "origin of language" -since language presupposes language, discourse presupposes discourse, but which is established between two or more discourses. This

is called "indirect discourse", whose importance was realized first by Mikhail Bakhtin, which he studied for the cases of Russian, German and French (Voloshinov, 1973, 174-6). What Bakhtin terms as "quasi-direct" discourse, whose "pure" description could be a "peculiar mixture of direct and indirect discourses", is a hybrid "primary language" which "derives its tone and word order from direct discourse and its verbal tenses and persons from indirect discourse. But to talk about "mixtures" at this level is inadequate, according to Bakhtin, since it appears that indirect discourse constitutes the primary language as such, as we said above. It becomes appropriate, then, to accept the human language, and this not in the sense of an inadequate mixture, in terms of its "style". This "style" is termed as "indirect free discourse" since the famous nineteenth century French philologist Bally. To assume the existence of intermediate, transitional "mixtures" as types of discourse is of course, a linguistic fiction.

It becomes evident, then, that what distinguishes human language from the language of bees is that the former is established between discourses, at least two of them. Human beings, in contrast to bees, cannot communicate what they have seen, but only what they have heard of: language is always an act of "reporting": not of sentiments or impressions, but of words that are already "present" as "uttered" in an unlimited variety of discourses.

We don't believe, then, that speech consists in communicating what has been experienced or observed, but to transmit what has been heard, what is "related" by another person: it is only in this sense that there is no outside of the discourse.

And the language don't cease to go from the first to the second discourse, but it is necessary to take again departure from the second to a third, and so, to the infinity. Orders, commands, testimonies, questions, whose substance could be isolated as "signs only through a semiotic abstraction, are necessarily transmitted. A word in the indicative (constative) mode, as relating an experience or an information can remain in silence, it can not be uttered but as such, exist in the mind of the subject even in its verbal form; but an order, a testimony, an affirmation or negation cannot remain in silence: to exist, it has to be uttered. That is why "pragmatics" is a greater revolution than structural linguistics (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980: 122-3).

However, we have not yet shown in what sense the primary functions of pragmatics are co-extensive with language, in the sense of a socially agenced system used in the transmission of orders. We have here to refer to the famous theses of Austin, in his "How to do things with Words?", re-evaluated by John Searle, and in a different context, by Oswald Ducrot (Ducrot, 1972: 41-6).

In the example given by Faye in the context of "Hunnic narratives", the action remains disconnected from linguistic expression. Truly, the "description of a picture" is by no means a "transmission of orders". It is in the indicative -constative mode, as it is assumed to give, through direct speech, informative-descriptive contents. In this case, Austin, in a transitory remark, seems to accept that a statement can "describe" an action on a constative mode, or, using the imperative mode, you can provoke such and such action etc.(Austin, 1963: 34-55). But in a deeper context of argumentation, Austin goes on to center his attention around some "intrinsic" relationships between discourses and actions, whose "truth" don't lie at all in their "correspondence" -the idealistic conception of "truth" as the identity of word with reality- but in their co-accomplishment. These acts are mainly of two kinds: certain acts "can be accomplished only when they are uttered": I marry a woman when I utter in the Church the words "I do", I make a promise uttering "I promise to..." etc. This type of speech acts is called as the "performative". And there is also a more general type of performative: notably, the acts performed simply through utterance, through speaking. This broader category is called as "illocutory": I make an act of interrogation by uttering "what?.."; I promise uttering "I love you..." and I command by using the proper morphemes of the imperative.

Evidently, these acts are not external, but internal, intrinsic to speech: the statements exemplified here have immanent relations to the performed acts. In this sense, Oswald Ducrot, referring to Benveniste, can call them as "implicit" or "non-discursive" presuppositions of language. It is more than apparent that by saying "I promise to come...", I announce on the one hand that I am accomplishing the act of promising (as always when I use the personal pronoun "I" in combination with a verb which is both active and used in present tense of the conservative). However, it is also apparent that by the same token, I accomplish also an act of promising: I do what I do say to do (Ducrot, 1980: 54). There is here a specific trait which identifies speech with action.

Or, without using the word "performative", Benveniste arrives, independently from Austin and his followers, to a similar point, when he states that the existence of "performative" statements is nothing but particular category of manifestation of "subjectivity" in language. He takes departure from the "performative", to reach, by extension, the "illocutory". In other words, Benveniste argues that the "illocutory", the act performed by discourse, is only an extended form of the performative, the act accomplished with the proper utterance of what is to be accomplished (Ducrot, 1972: 263).

However, such an extension is betrayed in the argumentation of Benveniste, who tends to attribute the "performative" to the specific characteristics of some semantic or syntactic categories of the "la language". He insists on the existence of a subjectivity in language. But this means only that expressions designate their "referent" only with relation to, and more exactly, within the "instance of discourse where they are employed"(Ducrot, 1972: 265). Hence, according to Benveniste, the performative do not refer "to the "acts", but rather to the specific property of a category of terms, as lexical elements, incarnated in language: he calls them as "self-referring units" (*éléments sui-référentiels*). These are called notably as the category of "shifters" in linguistics: the genuine personal pronouns "I", "thou" and "you"... The performative is conceived here as a specific linguistic effect of the combination of the first two personal pronouns with the "present tense". It is well known, since Roman Jakobson, who forged the term "shifters"(Jakobson, 1963: 53), that the "referents" of these syntagmes can be determined only in respect to the context, or discursive situation: the "I" uttered by Peter and John, designed different persons.

The merit of Benveniste is that he traced the continuation of the argument, stating that the "referent" of the performatives is characterized only as an element of

the discursive situation; it does not only "correspond" to it, but it is defined as intrinsic to it: the "I" is the one who says "I"; and Benveniste identifies him as the one who "announces himself as the I". Correspondingly, the "present tense" is the "present" of who speaks, as he speaks at the same movement (Benveniste, 1974: 31).

However in Benveniste, these "self-referential" qualities of the "I" and of the "present tense" are maintained as the foundation of the performative character of the "I promise" for instance. Evidently this character do not appear in neither of the cases "he promises" nor "I promised", and even nor in "Peter promises", when uttered by Peter himself. According to Benveniste, only the subjectivity of discourse can make possible such an identification between the announcement "I promise" and the act of promising. A whole Kantian subjectivity is disguised behind structuralist linguistics.

But, as Ducrot has profoundly remarked, he fails to show in a detailed fashion how the subjectivity produces performativity. There is no a better chance of argumentation when accepting that "subjective communication" is a better model than the Jakobsonian "ideal information" (Ducrot, 1984: 43).

Ducrot, relaying the scheme proposed by Benveniste, finishes at the end by reversing it: It is not the "self-referential" quality of some terms which create performativity; it is just the contrary, the fact that "certain statements are socially destined to the accomplishment of certain acts" (Ducrot, 1972: 34). Hence we are merged totally, up to the neck, within society and its agencies, discredited by modern linguistics as the "individual variations" of "la parole". Ducrot, in an ever profound instance of analysis, shows that to speak about "performative" or "communicative" action is not a good way of thinking the issue, since every act of speech, at the last instance, is no less than an action. It is communicative, and only in some cases performative. On the other hand, Benveniste starts by dissolving the notion of "illocutory". After all, even Austin, the forger of "performatives" is led to dissolve the category of performatives within a much broader domain of "speech acts".

In such a broader context, every speech act has to be conceived as a specific psycho-physiological activity, in the sense of selecting and combining the ideas, to find out their lexical and grammatical correspondents, and writing or speaking as necessary acts. Austin calls them as "locutory acts". But this has nothing to do with performatives. For the locutory, there is no necessary implication for a "specific announcement" of the performed action.

At a second level, Austin develops the category of the "perlocutory acts": here, speech becomes the instrument of action. You can talk someone for consolation, to enjoy him, to flatter, to create admiration for yourself, or to struck him with fear, or, again, to incite love for yourself. With the perlocutory, we encompass the entire field of instrumentality of language, as a "means towards ends". But even at this stage, the instance of performatives cannot be derived out of perlocutory acts".

What specifies, then the "performative"? It cannot be, as we have shown, a condition of possibility of speech -it is the "locutory" nor a secondary effect, extrinsic to the action -it is the "perlocutory". What specifies the "performative", for its "intimacy" with the speech act", is called by Austin as the "illocutory". It is what is done by speaking: promising giving orders, questioning, celebrating affirming are illocutory acts. We face once more the list sketched by Spengler (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980: 126).

But, once specified, the field of illocutory, as responsible of performatives, appear as more general, since one can promise without saying "I promise", by a simple movement of head, or a simple variation of the tone of his voice, by intonation; one can give orders or can interrogate without uttering the words "I command" or "I

ask", using specific morphemes of the imperative or interrogative: "Do it!", "What ?" etc. The implicit or non-discursive presuppositions are situated by Ducrot at this level: the "performative" is a specific case of the "illocutory", since the announcement "I presuppose that..." is by no means a performative. In every "motivated" act of speech, an order, a question, an affirmation or a testimony can be "presupposed". If a wife, at the evening, says to her husband "the lamp in the kitchen has been broken", there is the "implicit", "non-discursive" presupposition here which could be termed explicitly as "repair it!".

After establishing that the performative is explained by the illocutory, and not the opposite, we can try to reformulate what we mean by this "broader context". The illocutory, as we have said, constitutes the implicit or non-discursive presuppositions in language. In the utterance of the morpheme "What ?...", the act of interrogating is presupposed. But what are the broader instances which determine this function of presupposition? It is the genial rigour imposed onto the analysis by Ducrot that opens the entire field of the "social context" of language, particularly on the chain of "performatives".

We have already argued that in the performative, the action and speech had an intrinsic relationship. That is action, therefore? Ducrot defines it as "all activity of a

subject when characterized with reference to the modifications that it has brought, or intended to bring, in the world" (Ducrot, 1984:65). These modifications could be physical, corporeal, or social, concerning the order of the world or the state or situation of the acting subject. In this sense, the same set of movements can thus be described both as "pure activity", or as the "action" of an agent, in the sense that a subject changes his relationship to the world by accomplishing it. This is a very Spinozistic point of view, as the reader could grasp it as the negation of any a priori "subject-object" relationship, in the worldly involvement of human beings. There are always two standpoints in determining the constitution of the action: the first, the modification brought into the order of things by "pure activity", and the second, the transformation of the situation of the subject to the world, his environment, which is nothing but that of a relation of a "composition" or "decomposition".

At a second level, Ducrot distinguishes a specific type of action, which is, in Althusserian terms, a "juridical action"; a *de jure* transformation of states of affairs. This type of action is to be conceived when the activity is characterized by a transformation of the juridico-legal relationships existing between concerned individuals. A juridical action appears "when an activity is described as criminal or meritory," as an act of authority or a

recognition of obligation. As broadly stated, the couple "Modification-transformation"⁹ has to be conceived in relation to Spinoza's couple *potentia-potestas*.

More specifically, one may talk about a particular case of "juridical action," which can be distinguished as "juridical act." This new notion is applied when we consider the transformation of legal relationships as the primary effect and consequence of the activity, and not as a consequence of an effect that would be logically, or chronologically, anterior to it. To designate an action as "crime" robbery, abuse of conviction, murder etc. is not as such, in the sense we give to this term, to present it as an "act"; because the juridical situation of criminality, which defines the crime, is conceived to be the outcome of such or such other consequences of the described activity: an activity is said to be punishable since it is harmful for another person, for the established order, for the society etc.

Let us have a closer look to a "juridical act": the announcement of a sentence by the judge can be more easily conceived as a "juridical act", since there are no other effects or considerations which comes to be inculcated between the speech of the judge and the transformation of the suspect into a convict. Here, what condemns is only the speech. All the other instances of discourse, whose

function was originally described by Michel Foucault –the psychiatric, or criminological discourses, or the entire discourse of "morality"– while appearing as such, in their proper domain of reference, as intervening agencies, are "smaller" performative acts, are not on the other hand a "genuine" juridical act, which can only be uttered by the judge. "I condemn you...". The juridico-legal discourse seems to determine the entire history, in a sense, though with different ways, corresponding to various "discursive formations": For the Roman, the famous Roman law, based on a logic of "topos" i.e. the specificity of a juridical situation-, even before being a "code", was a "*carmina*", a word, as was the case with the Greek "*nomos*". It constituted the intimate legal bondage of a contract. In "topos" modality, the law is binding not as axioms emanating from a preestablished code, but as topical acts of jurisdiction emanating from the uses of performatives: "*Spondeo!*" -I promise... . And it is not surprising to see at the core of the "law of market", or of the "civil code" as axiomatic codification of the juridical ritual, the juridical speech act which transforms the situation of the individuals in the society, with assuming them as the subjects of their acts, and at the extreme, their thoughts and morality. Language is a medium which produces and ascribes responsibilities, duties, obligations, through orders, commands and queries. And at the core of these operations lies the logic of the social destination of the "illocutory".

Moreover, Ducrot refers to the "*Essai sur le don*" of Marcel Mauss, asserting that it constitutes the best example of our discussion, within the field of "total social facts". Language, just as the gift, is a "total social fact", in Durkheimian sense. But it can be conceived as such only with reference to what we have intended to elaborate the logic of a "juridical act". Its prototype, according to Mauss, is the gift as the primary creation of an obligation, as a "juridical act". This prototype is already and totally present in the institution of potlatch of the American Indians. However, under the light of the logic of speech acts, this feast-reception offered by a tribe to another tribe, is to create, for the invited people, the "obligation of a counter-invitation". Potlatch is obligation. What is the meaning of these words of Mauss? That there is nothing which interferes as intermediary processes or agents between the invitation and the creation of a duty for the invited tribe. The performative appears in this example in its fullest strength. Out of our "policed" modernity, interrupting the totality of the "social fact", through a series of mise-en-scène which parcels it into fragments of supposed scenarios of motivations, the analysis of the performative shows the essence of the obligation in a primitive community. Our scenario goes on as such, through the insertions of supposed "subjectivities" in the agency of action "X makes a gift for Y- therefore, X wants to please or impress Y- so, Y

has to feel gratitude towards X- hence he has to made a gift for X". Subjectivity in these matters is a pure figment. Beyond all these injections of subjectivity, the potlatch is for Mauss a kind of finality which provides the individuals with the possibility of making someone indebted to oneself. It is a creation of obligation, just as the hammer of the judge creates punishments" (Ducrot, 1984: 32).

As a direct result of these examples, face to the claims of pragmatics, the linguistic distinction between "la langue" and "la parole" is untenable.

At the end of our previous discussion, we arrived at a point which indubitably refers to "collective agencies" of language. The analyses of Ducrot were central in this context, as they question the notions of "information" and of "code" on the one hand, and of "communication" and "linguistic subjectivity" on the other. The language proceeds through "presuppositions", or through non-discursive implicits, since the "discursive implicit" is still in the domain of a code of language, detachable from the social context. Ducrot tends to constitute a pragmatics which penetrates the entire field of linguistics, and which tends to a study of discursive agencies, which could be considered from "juridical", "polemical" or "political" standpoints (Deleuze&Guattari, 1980: 145-7).

In different perspectives, Bakhtin and Labov too insisted on the social character of discourse, opposing the "social context" both against the subjectivism of the German School (the classical hermeneutic tradition, from Dilthey to Husserl), but also against the "structuralism" since the latter is doomed to failure by relating the system of "la langue" to the comprehension of a *de jure* individual, and the social factors, to the *de facto* individuals who are speaking.

The notion of "collective agencies", on the other hand, finds its significant role in the analyses which permitted to Deleuze/Guattari to recreate the "immanence" within the particular sphere of language: "Between the statement and the act, the relationship is internal, immanent, but it is not that of an identity (Deleuze&Guattari, 1980: 126). This relationship is rather that of a "redundancy". That is the primary logic of the "media effects" to proceed through redundancy: as they are destined not to "inform" the public with the "news", but rather to create an "opinion", which amounts to be the "orders given to the life", to institute social obligations for the individuals, the media messages are to be redundant, performing both an announcement and an act. As with the project of public education, they try to teach us "what we ought" to think, to retain, to wait or to do. As Spinoza profoundly states, this language operates at the register of "obedience/disobedience". And the internal misconception

debated by Spinoza with respect to the classical Biblical exegesis is all the more present in the presuppositions of the "modern opinion". They tend to proceed as the "engineering" methods, to validate at the core the presupposition of an "ideal model of informatics", in which the "maximum ideal information" could be safely proceeded against noise. In this model, the redundancy is conceived as a simple limitative condition which diminishes this "theoretical" maximum to recover the lacunas created by the "noise". Or, it appears that, in this genre of discourse, the redundancy is of a central importance, if conceived as the act redounding with speech, to allow the "transmission" of the commands. According to Deleuze/Guattari, the information, on the contrary is the minimal condition for the transmission of the "commands", while the noise, "rather than being opposed to information, refers to all kinds of "indisciplines" which work out the language, as opposed to the commands as discipline or "grammaticality"... It is not a matter of "undistorted communication", as if there exist a pure model of communication.

It can furthermore be explicated that the redundancy has two forms, that of "frequency", which creates the "significance" of the minimum of information, and that of "resonance", creating the effect of subjectivation. But it appears that, as observed by Deleuze/Guattari, both information and communication, as significance and

subjectivity, are determined by redundancy. All these categories are mere "effects" of language, not its "immanent" parts. The language cannot "signify" unless there exist dominant systems of significations ("sign regimes") and there is no subjectivity independent from an established order of "subjectivation". Here appears the importance of the notion of "collective agencies", more particularly destined to make out of language, and before communication or signification, an enterprise for the transmission of decrees and commands. A "collective agency" can be defined as the condition of possibility of statements, within particular spheres of discursive formations, to adopt an old word used by Foucault. There cannot be individuation of a statement, or a subjectivation of the announcement, without a social expectation, which remains as such as an impersonal "collective agency". This social expectation is conceived by Bakhtin as a determining factor in the modality of "free indirect discourse". It is not the distinction between the subjects of discourse which could explain the logic of "indirect discourse", but on the contrary, it is the agency of social expectation which tends to distinguish between subjects, both of discourse and of the announce. For Bakhtin, "the dialogue" is always prior to the "monologue", the "style" to "informative content", and the context to the message. He opposes his scheme to the Jakobsonian model as follows:

BAKHTIN	JAKOBSON
Object	Context
Speaker—Utterance—Listener	Sender—Message—Receiver
Intertext	Contact
Language	Code

Against the formalism of Jakobson, Bakhtin/Medvedev proceeds as follows: "What is transmitted is inseparable from the forms, manners, and concrete conditions of transmission. The formalists presuppose tacitly, however, in their interpretation, an entirely predetermined and fixed communication, and an equally fixed transmission". This "interindividual" character of discourse requires that "meaning", as "signification" or as the "expression of the beautiful" in a literary work, answers to a "question". The following fragments refer to a Bergsonian questioning of the "question", as it is deployed in a linguistic sphere (Deleuze, 1962: 14):

...we are not dealing with the isolated words as a unit of language, nor with the signification of this word, but with the completed utterance and its concrete meaning, the content of this utterance. Isolated signs, linguistic systems, or even the text (as a semiotic entity) can never be true or false, or beautiful, etc. Only the utterance can be accurate (or inaccurate), beautiful, just, etc.,... I call meaning the

answers to the questions. That which does not answer any question is devoid of meaning for us... The answering character of meaning. Meaning always answers some questions.

All these assertions mean that we are expected to be "meaningful" through a command of a pre-given social agency. Bergson, his contemporary, who questions the notion of the "answer", in the sphere of non-linguistic philosophical wisdom remarks on a similar way that "language gives us ready-made questions we have to answer". It is its mode of being. And we presuppose that the "truth" or "falsity" lies in the "answers", not in the "questions". Hence, what is required of philosophy is to generalize the problem of truth in the sphere of posing the questions, not in the Kantian sense of imputing the "truth" of the questions to their capacity to have an answer (answerability as "intelligibility") or not, but in the sense of that intuitive wisdom of grasping the immanent value of "true questioning". It is all the more evident that great speculative problems in the history of thought are solved at the moment when they are posed. There is in this formulation something of Marx who was stating that "every epoch poses to itself only the questions it can solve".

We can go even further by asserting that, if we take for granted the primacy of "indirect discourse", we can only give answers to other answers, to challenge the

dominant discourses which poses to us the pregiven "question" expecting from us the answer -behavioral, discursive, ideological. Direct challenge to the "questioning agency" being impossible, for extrinsic to our capacity of transgression, our real challenge can only take the form of "giving answers to answers". The polyphony and "dialogism", granted to us as a central concept by Bakhtin, are the essential features of this "indirect challenge". They articulate the entire field of linguistic competence, not in the sense of Chomsky who has lost his way in the "mere conditions of possibility", but at the level of the actual, fragmentary utterances, inculcated in the immanence of the social totality in language.

However, we are still at a "nominalist" level of analysis. What is the nature of the acts of immanence. The reading of Stoics, presented by Deleuze in his *Logique du sens*, as well as some preliminary remarks we derived out of Spinoza provide us with a much more general definition than the pure nominal one. We have once more to ask on what perspective falls Ducrot's analysis of the "juridical act" as a specific case of "speech act" so as to give way for an adequate understanding of the "collective agencies of language". The first philosophers of language in history, the Stoicians have developed the problem of linguistic agency in their doctrine of "physics". For them, as in the Platonic-Aristotelian modality, the logic evidently played the role of

an "organon". As Plato has developed an entire thematics based on the distinction between *logos endiathetos* (internal language corresponding to "dianoia", thought) and the *logos prophorikos* (external language corresponding to the "voice", the matter or language, its substance, its corporeal -physical part- the *soma*), and after Aristotle's formalization as a pure "form" of syllogistic reasoning, the "logic" becomes, at the hands of the Stoicians, not merely a tool, but a general system of attributes to the physical world. Central to their questioning was the famous doctrine of "non-corporeal transformations". Their system of thinking was partially applied to the social context of language, when he was discussing the case of "juridical act", in the dimensions of the parallelism between the "modification" of the physical or social order of the world, versus the "transformation" in the faith of the "condemned" individual. These "transformations are non-corporeal, in the sense that they define not a change in the body of the convict, of the society or of the prison at the moment when the 'speech act' of the judge intervenes". However, the "sentence" is evidently a "real" transformation, in the sense that it is attributed to the "body of society", or of the "condemned person". Foucault has remarked on a series of practices "attributed" on the "body of the condemned" (not that of a person which would be condemned in its "essence", since what is "condemned" is nothing but the body- at least in the explicit modalities of corporeal punishment), within the

"collective agency" of the ancient juridico-legal system (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980:121). The genial merit of the Stoicians was to use the word "body" (*soma*) in its most general sense: there are physical bodies, but our "phantasms" are no less bodies than the physical ones. Cleanthes once defined a "body" as "all that matters". In this sense, there are moral, political, conceptual bodies, and "the soul (*pneuma*) is a body (*soma*)". Spinoza's "pantheism" universalizes this conception of "body": The Substance (*Deus sive Natura*) has two conceivable affects: the "*extensio*", attributed to the sphere of "modifications" of the substance, and the "intellectus" which attributes to bodies only some "incorporeal transformations". There is evidently an infinity of actions and passions which can affect the order of bodies, even of finite modes; but one has to distinguish between the order of these "actions/passions" and the "acts", which are to be conceived as non-corporeal attributes ascribed to bodies. Now, according to the Stoicians, the "act" is always "the one which is expressed in a statement". In this sense, an "act" can transform a "body" as being a "non-corporeal attribute" to it; but it cannot "modify it". As the "expressed" of a statement, the "acts" or "events" are the attributes to bodies, as individual totalities or totalities of individuals. Let us to recall what was referring Ducrot when he was talking about "acts", with distinction to "actions" or "activities": his example was juridico-legal, based on that case of the "sentence of judgment", which has

transformed the accused person into a condemned person. In fact, the Verdict, the act of judgment, in its instantaneity, distinguishes between a past and a future. However, what has happened in the past, that is, the crime of the accused person, its harmful effects on morality or on social order, and what will happen in the "future", the execution of the sentence are actions-passions affecting the bodies (the body of morality, of the order, of the property, or of the victim in the past, and the body of the condemned, the prison-body in the future.) But the transformation of the "accused" into a "condemned" is a pure, instantaneous act or an incorporeal (non-corporeal) attribute, which is the "expressed" in the statement of the judge.

But how is it possible to not to see in every example of events "acts" to be considered in the same manner; when one talks about a "social contract", as in the case of Rousseau envisaging it as a sudden, incorporeal transformation which distinguish a "past", defined as "state of nature", and a "future", as the "civility". The composition of the individuals within society remaining unchanged, the "society" is created all of a sudden. And, in the "rites de passage", the "noncorporeal transformation" reaches the strength of a "total social fact". These are "acts" which modify both the body politic and the body of individual. It is in this sense that Pierre Clastres sees in the "writing"

on the "body" the insertion of a memory, as was perceived by Nietzsche, of a "law of identity", operating as the distribution of individuals within the social environment (Clastres, 1974a: 243). "Rites de passage" operate through acts, in their proper social agencies, determined by the collectivity: evidently, bodies have an age, there is the strength of youth, the "beauty" of the female or male body, and the debility of the old; in the biological nature, there is a continual process of modification, actions-passions affecting the bodies. As Bataille puts it, the younger elements, the foolish, the female, the slave have the "right" to reach an "ecstasy", without violence and humiliating rituals, to rejuvenate the society at large (Bataille, 1963-I: 202) . But as emanating from collective agencies, the "rites de passage" are system of control and rehabilitation. During these rituals, noncorporeal transformations are immediately attributed to bodies, through torture and corresponding incantations.

The "writing" is not here a mere "supplement", as contested by Derrida, but the "incorporeal transformation" itself. Writing on the body of the laws, parodied by F.Kafka in his "Penal Colony", and realized by the "flagellants" in history of penalty is not a supplement, it is co-extensive with the state of affairs executed by the act of transformation. Stoicians were aware of the fact that "the spate cutting off the flesh" do not modify the substance of

the body; it is merely an action-passion affecting the nature of the flesh (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980: 135); but its "meaning" lies elsewhere; in that, it creates an "incorporeal transformation" in the situation. After a *rite de passage*, one becomes an "adult", a "major" as it is termed in our juridico-legal terminology. This enables one to perform some acts which he could not perform one minute before this blind moment, which operated as a "jump in place" And it also gives the right to others to recall all the time to oneself his "obligations": "You are no longer a child..." (Deleuze&Guattari, 1980: 134)

As another type of "rite de passage", marriage is, against the "love", more an "act of non-corporeal transformation" than an affection of body and soul. What matters here is not to distinguish between sexuality and law, or even marriage and love, to ask, as the feminist literature is filled with, whether marriage should or should not correspond to the relationship of love, or even of sexuality. Love is a pure mixture of bodies, not distinguishing between the "organism" and "soul", for both, in accordance to Stoicist doctrine, are equally bodies. The distinction lies elsewhere; "marriage" is not an "expression" of "love" or even its "distortion", since it can be declared by the declaration "I love you". By the same token, the "love" transformed into a promise, or better, into an obligation for the lovers. The function of the declaration "I

love you" is not that of a signification are even a representation; a heart pierced by an arrow could at best represent the love, as a "mixture" of bodies. Or marriage, whose "expressed" part lies in the words uttered as "I do" before the priest or any other agent of the "collective agency"; the system of marriage is entirely different from the system of love, since they are attributed to different sorts of bodies, transforming them in different ways. Originally, as part of the "kinship system", especially in primitive societies, the marriage is destined to establish a "gift" relationship between kin-groups or lineages. Love is by no means a pre-condition to this type of engagement. As a contract between lineages, the inter-societal investment of power should pass through marriage relationships; that is why the Church intended to control the marital relationships, conquering the right of enacting legitimate marriages as a system of control over the society (Deleuze&Guattari, 1980: 140-5).

Religious practices too are performative; as they are profoundly invested within the sphere of "non-corporeal attributes" and "transformations". To eat bread and drink wine during a communion is a pure mixture or composition of bodies; to make communion with Christ, even when he is an image or a phantasm, or even a concept, is still a mixture or composition of bodies, this time, not of physical, but "spiritual" bodies. But the

transformation of the bread into the flesh and of the vine into the blood of Christ is a pure "non-corporeal transformation"; it is the pure expressed of the statement of the prayer of communion. The "Passion of Christ" is not a "metaphor" or better, is a "metaphor only as the effect of the "collective agency "which invests the "signs" to perform some functions -this time, of religious sort- within the body of society. The boundaries of all spheres of social activities is traced by the "illocutory" complexes (Deleuze&Guattari, 1980: 135).

To sum up, language is socially determined, through the operation of collective agencies, to create subjects- it is not only the peculiarity of "ideological interpellations", but that of language in its totality as determined by the "illocutory" instances that are capable to produce effects of "social obligation". Contrary to the Lacanian-Althusserian argument that language, as a system of symbolic representation, creates "subject" capable of representing their identity within of "subjectivation" worked through "illocutory" acts creating social obligations for the subject. And contrary to the assumptions of "subjectivity" in language, we may assert that the function of "subject" as the locus of "social obligation" does not emanate from its "subjectivity", but out of the collective agencies at work, in concrete instance within a given social system.

These agencies are mobiles in any society; they don't cease to change their configuration, form of institutionalization and are themselves obeying to transformations. In his "inaugural discourse" in Collège de France, Foucault tends to show the instances capable to produce the effects of discourse, via the "illocutory". A performative speech act is nothing outside the circumstances which assign to it to become performative. If an individual, a laymen says "I declare state of emergency", there is no place for him for the "future" of his statement than the asylum. Hitler was not a mad; or better, he was a "mad" who had the adequate circumstances to pass his word as "performative" at the moment when he declared "*die totale Mobilmachung*". The discourse is "agenced", not from the exterior but from the "interior", and this is what produces its signification. An utterance like "I declare war" is not performative outside its socially agenced context, just as the utterance "I love you", whose subject and object remain always unknown if not attributed to the "bodies" of the involved individuals or totalities. Hence the variety of the "meanings" of the words "I promise" not only differing with respect to the subjects but also its reference to the context: in the school, in family house in the court, the oath or promise are different that it is in love or in a secret society.

Ducrot traces back this order of language to a specific type of "piety" towards the Logos: this is a matter of a communication which is deployed within a society or a social agency which imposes to the act of speaking certain norms, termed as "laws of discourse" (Ducrot, 1984: 45). At the other pole, we meet the empty speech, the impossibility of motivation in discourse. We are habituated by the social agencies of language to avoid assigning any "meaning" to a speech "without" a motivation. Man's "dwelling in language" is rightful and appropriate if his discourse fits these norms: every speech should answer to a question, for having a signification at all; that every speech has to be "motivated" in the sense of having as its aim the accomplishment of an end. That why "mental illness" is closely linked by both psychiatry and psychoanalysis to the specific linguistic behaviour. We are again at the point objected by Spinoza against the "normative" structure of classical Biblical hermeneutics; subordinating reason to discourse or discourse to reason.

However, the required field of discussion is so wide that we cannot, at least for the moment, to sketch out the entire terrain of problems emanating from these perspectives. For instance, we have stated that "language is socially consecrated to the transmission of commands and orders", which are not external to its content. But there are as many modes of "transmission" in human psychology: the

"communication of the unconscious" has been, for example, the central theme for a while for Freud, and still unresolved, became a central theoretical figure in Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis. What is interesting, is that one prospect for the discussion of this problems comes from Elias Canetti, who intended to show, under the period of emergence of the Nazi regime, some specific psychological consequences and effects of the commands and "orders", that we defined as specific figures of the language. A command, an order "forms a kyste in the brain" he says; it is eternally conserved, and the recovery is possible only by its transmission to others. The "hierarch" is not the presupposition of a "command" or an "order" but its consequence. A specific "mass-psychological" reaction in this case is not to constitute a "hierarchy", as a structure to cope with the circulation of decrees, but to constitute a "mass", to share the "kyste" in question with other people. But, already some effects of the "command" are present: especially in the curious sense of "oblivion" created and legitimated at once by the presence of the "kyste" produced by the command or order. This appears in its most curious fashion in the historical piety of the Nazi executors, incarnated as an absolute sentiment of innocence: "The executor don't accuse himself, he accuses the "kyste", the foreign instance in his mind" (Canetti, 1971: 267). What is the role of the word of command here? Masses and each individual can feel themselves as its victims: It is therefore

true that the men who acted under commands feel themselves as perfectly innocents. The "amnesia" or even the "aphasia", contrary to the remarks of Jakobson who attached them to some specific state of non-correspondence between the code and discourse are manifestations of a very dangerous capacity of the "illocutory" act of giving orders and commanding, whether this amnesia is Stalinian, or the aphasia the perturbing presence of Nazi chiefs before the trial at Nuremberg.

In this respect, neither the collective agencies, nor the psychological effects of the acts of order should not be mixed up with the functions of language. They are instead its conditions of possibility, since they direct both the discourse and the world in a certain direction. In the Nazi Kampfplatz, Jean Pierre Faye profoundly investigates these directions: The "narrative topography" of the Weimar Republic presents to us a world in which the men were believing to live in a world of classical rationality, in a state of "common sense", which, in a Cartesian expression is the "best equally shared" in the universe, based on the assumptions of information and free communication. Or this was a manner to disguise, if not for justifying it, the redoubtable faculty of conveying the directives of the "commands". The Nazi 'topography' will not be established as a pure abolition of the system, for the simple reason that such a system of "common sense" democracy is, at the

last instance, nothing but a dispositive to assure the infiltration of the orders to be given to masses, at once to constitute them and to lead them to their "ends". Faye observes that all started under the appearance of "ambivalent" terms, such as the Jungkonservativ or National-Bolshevik; passing through the "commanding" words as "order", "family" and "metamorphose", the heavy signs of the Nazi lexicon. It is evident that the famous Nazi minister of "propaganda", Goebbels, was a genius in linguistics: he observed that there was an internal dislocation of the propaganda narratives in the provinces, before the punch, and after the seizure of the political power, in Berlin, "where four millions of souls pulsate by the rhythms of the emotional language of Nazi propagandists" (Virilio, 1972: 4). Moreover, pretending to become the father of audio-visual techniques in Germany, Goebbels wanted to defend "written propaganda" in favour of the audio-visual procedures. The "totalitarian language" invested in Nazi Germany -distinct from the Mussolinian "fascism"- is not an ideological system which corresponds to a "real totalitarianism", in the sense of a political/economic order, but it appears as commands or directives which put in a resonance all cellars of the nation: it is a redundant system which signifies nothing (nor the "illusions" nor the "paradoxes" and not even the "distortions" of reality) but the circulation of "commands". That is why such a "totalitarian language" corresponded to a regime with minimal economic

interventionism, opting for a pure "Warensprache", the language of commodities. The narrative topography postulates an economy of language, working through the "speeches" of the Fuehrer, to create a specific type of redundancy within German society, transformed at the moment of utterance of "Nationalforschung" into a "Nation", and at the utterance of the "die totale Mobilmachung", into an Army. The precious Nazi terms a "völkisch", "metamorphosis" and "totale Mobilmachung" are not mere signs but directives, commands and orders, operating through a resonance of the Nazi Kampfplatz... (Faye, 1972)

2.6. The Politics of Language

As we have seen in the linguistic/narrative investment of Nazi Germany, language is "political" in its essence. That is why Spinoza discusses it in a work entitled by the attribute "political", the Tractatus theologico-politicus, and Plato inserts a discussion on "poetics" within his book on Politics.

How, then, to conceive of the "political element" in language. Clearly, even Stalin was aware of the fact that language was universal and could not be deployed in the political affairs. Again, the Stoicians produce the answer. This answer, whatever its distance from political issues (Stoicians preached a life indifferent against political

matters), at least as agents of the first linguistic philosophy, have constituted a "politics of language" of their own. Thus, they could not even hope to escape, face to a tradition, since the sophists, keeping language, rhetorics and even political courtship in a unity with the order of the "polis", valorizing the "concord" against "discord", unity against disharmony. Of course, they preached for harmony in their own sense, not the partial, restrained image of harmony of the "polis", but of the totality of Being, of "phusis". All these doctrines, confined within the limits of cultivated circles or sects-religious as well as philosophic- preached for the "apolitical" only in the sense that they tended to exclusive bondage to the "*nomos*" of polis. But they were more adequately integrated into the Roman "*imperium*", whose horizons were in a sense "common" with the imperial territory and the "cosmopolis" preached by the Stoicians. With Seneca, Epictetus and Cicero, Stoics found themselves as politicians, rhetoricians and orators, and have been incarnated as the Emperor with Marcus Aurelius.

Now, "language", as the formal subject of their philosophy -a seemingly "partial" subject together with ethics and physics- had to become the agency of their relationship to political life: they had become orators, good speakers. And as the essence of the political, language had to obey to the rules of a rational rigour, to the limitations of both nature and culture, and more importantly, to the rules

which governed "good speaking". Their foolish "language games" were not simple tools of diverting and surprising the people, but the strategy to renovate the entire field of political life.

Under this new light, their doctrine of the "noncorporeals" has become central to the political issues, and once for all, a "politics of language", even in the modern sense of the word. It is important to note that political history, with its dates as conditions of its historiographic possibility, is a proliferation of the "non-corporeal transformations" attributed to the body politic of societies. This is not that "history is nothing but a myth" as Lévi-Strauss objected to Sartre, but that its "reality" consists in the non-corporeal attributions of periodic states, as more or less enduring qualifications of the periods. "L'histoire sérielle" of Fernand Braudel is in a sense a particular case of the history of "non-corporeal transformations". And the "political history" is the field in which such transformations are best represented.

An overwhelming example lies in the field of the formation of "Bolshevik" statements in the political field of Russia, at the moment when Lenin published a pamphlet whose title was very significant for our purpose (Deleuze&Guattari, 1980: 134): "Concerning slogans". A slogan, it is known, a performative which takes mainly the form

of an ambiguous "word of order" a command invested to the political field, in relation to the corporeality of the streets, destined to direct masses of people in certain directions. However, the pamphlet of Lenin is concerned both in the analysis of the role of slogans as performatives, while constituting itself a slogan which intervenes into the historical flux or events. In 1917, the 1st International comes to "invent" a totally new type of class: "Proletarians of all countries, Unite!" Does it refer to a modification of the "body politic" of proletarian classes? At the moment of uttering the slogan? Not at all. The slogan and its power lies in a non-corporeal attribution, as the implicit presupposition to the "collective body" of the proletariat. This slogan was operative in constituting a rupture from "social-democrats creating an "avant-garde", pioneering the "Party", a new type of party, which is a "body politic" itself, but whose constitution is operated through the performative act of its declaration. The slogan constitutes the moment of the non-corporeal transformation, derived out of the body of the proletariat; and with renewed efforts, to constitute later on a new transformation of the same kind, with "all power to soviets". Now, it has been detached, through the act of the non-corporeal, a body politic which was "really" established. Lenin was asserting that "all power to Soviets" was valid only between 27th of February and 4th of July, being adequate for the "peaceful development of the Revolution", but was no longer valid

for the State, under the conditions of war. This passage, translated in the field of "body politic", emerges as a modification in the long run by a movement from the directing proletariat to a directing avant-garde. And exactly the 4th of July, the "all power to Soviets" was no longer valid. The war, the revolutionary "gesticulation" are mere relations of forces, activities, gestes and movements, which had no nothing to do "with meaning", having no signification unless they are deployed, "expressed" in the field of Revolutionary and counter-revolutionary statements. But these "statements", in return, have no direct influence, except the performatives, that is, the slogans as the primary forms or "formulations" of the revolutionary narratives in the territories of the Revolution. Lenin asserts that "All slogans and maxims have to be deduced out of the sum of all particularities of a determined, concrete political situation".

And if one objects that all these issues are event concerning politics and not the linguistics, the answer is that to see how politics can effect, in an implicit manner, the content and configurations of the statements (the semantic register) as well as the circulation of the "lexical" units, and even the structure of all concerned elements, including the style, intonation and forms of expression. There existed once upon a time in Russia a perfect political grammar, whose conditions of possibility lied in

the political context of Revolution, i.e. the circulation of revolutionary narratives.

Even the "ordinary language" gives orders to life. And the orders are implicitly embedded in the flow and circulation of narratives, rumors and if you want, "media messages" in their general context. But "significance", the play of the signifiers as the internal organization of signs would only be possible by the specific articulation of all these "non-corporeal transformations" operated in the illocutory complexes. This is what Deleuze/Guattari have called "sign regimes" or "semiotic systems". But in a sense, "ordinary language" is not "political", or is not generally accepted as such in the sense of its relation to what has been traditionally accepted as "politics". "Semiotics is the study of lying", stated once Umberto Eco, only in the sense that language is not denatured but created through "politics", if we take into account the deployment of centralities of dominant signifier within a society at a given moment. And as a result, if we distinguish in a given social formation the totality of the corporeal modifications from the totality of non-corporeal transformations, while both totalities are internally differentiated, we can see that there are two types of formalizations, the first consisting in the "content", and the second to the "expression". The opposition here is not between content and form, but between content which has its proper formalization, and the

expression which has its own form. The form of the expression is what we call "language" in the largest sense within the capacity of the extension of this word. It was the merit of André Leroi-Gourhan to trace the double polarization of couples "hand-cool" and "face-language". In the context of the evolution of human species, two couples of functions have been distinguished in the anthropians (Leroi-Gourhan, 1989-I:45-55). The hand is deployed in functional technicality (grasping, prehension, launching) while the face (with the mouth which is no longer used by human species for grasping, prehension or transportation) is constituted as the other pole, that of the expression (Leroi-Gourhan, 1964).

NOTES

¹ For a discussion of Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, see (Benveniste, 1974: 17-25)

² See Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Mathematicos*, M. 8, 275-6 =SVF II, 223=LS

³ cf. the 'Cosmic Fragments) G. S. Kirk, 1956: 56

⁴ It is Foucault who observes the contemplative nature of Greek life, in terms of the patterns of tragedy. (Foucault, 1981: 245)

⁵ Isaie, 21-3

⁶ cf. G.S. Kirk, *op. cit.* pp. 32-34.

⁷ cf. Diels-Kranz, III.2, pp.32

⁸ quoted in (Benveniste, 1974: 171)

⁹ For a detailed analysis of the correspondence between modification and transformation, cf. Deleuze&Guattari, 1980: 124-5 and Deleuze, 1969: Ch. 4

CHAPTER III:
A PICTURE OF ISLAM IN TURKEY

The journalist Cüneyt Arcayürek recalls the "boomerang effect" arising out of the manipulation of the "religious life" by the regime after the military take-over of 12 September 1980, referring to a booklet of 331 pages published in October 1981 by the initiative of the General Secretariat of the National Security Council, entitled as "Before and After 12 September". In the book, the question of "religion" was discussed in a space not exceeding only one page. And this page was attempting to generate a counter-propaganda, against the "enemy" number one of the political conjuncture: not against the Islamist movement itself, but merely against the image of "ugly politician" which was shared by all political movements, in the eyes of the military regime's leaders. The introduction comprised some words "about secularism" by Atatürk, and the text written by the Secretariat of the Council about Islam was not exceeding 29 lines, entitled as "Religion and Politics".¹

The observations in the booklet were restricted in the field of the mere opposition against the share of the "holders of the clandestine aims for constructing a

religious regime" in the political life of Turkey before 12 September, legitimating the latter as the event which saved the "integrity" of the country. The elections of 1973, giving rise to the National Salvation Party as an important political force of Turkish political life were criticized for creating a climate helping -outside the leftist-rightist struggle- those who expected to constitute a "theocratic State" opposed to the secularist ideals of the Turkish Republic: "It appears many periods in the political history of Turkish Republic that the political parties have tried to abuse religious feelings and ideas for exploiting more chances during the elections. However, these efforts to exploit the religious beliefs of the people appeared as opposed to the basic tenets and fundamental principles of our country, who belongs to the way of developing the modern, contemporary civilization...After the elections of 1973, these efforts for using the religion as a political instrument have gained force, despite the binding and sanctioning measures of the Constitution, and the religious beliefs were far more intensively exploited while attempting to bring religious ideas as a part of our state order. These outlawed attitudes and efforts appeared intensely in the programs of some political parties, their responsible leaders and the speeches and declarations of some deputies, and the attempts to create a convenient public opinion were being charged upon our press and public organizations..."

The rise of Islamic movements during the first years of the military period, that is, between 1980 and 1982 has been masked from the eyes of the Turkish and foreign public opinions due, on the one hand, to the excessive and traditional reticence and prudence of the Islamists, and on the other hand, to the repressive regime which did not allow to the press and general opinion to get information about such semi-political issues of the country.

However, the ascendance of the movements was very easy to observe -even for the foreigners who began at that time to fear from a new mode of Islamic resurgence, experienced by the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979- as a great transformation was being occurred in the sphere of the popular religion of the masses, reinforced manifestly by the political power to set up as an ideology capable to compete with other extremist and leftist ideologies. Hence we can read the following passage in the pamphlets extracted from the ARV Channel TV Program of West Germany, delivered in 26 June 1983 about the rise of the Islamist movement in Turkey, and the role played by the political regime of the time: "...Diverting the principles of Atatürk for the first time after his death, the political regime of Turkey allowed the development of a "restricted" Islamist movement.

Evren attempts to establish a kind of alliance with the Islamic fundamentalists. However, it is probable that this attempt would be transformed into a "boomerang"...

The notions of secularism and republicanism, emphasized by the leaders of the military regime as the true expressions of "Atatürkism" -different from the Kemalism which did not entailed the significance of any kind of political and economic dependence on the West- were conceived in fact as the direct control and use of the religious ideologies by the state, as well as by the ruling classes which found profitable means of expansion through the state of affairs sketched up by the suspension of the democratic rights after the military take-over of 1980, reducing considerably all possibilities for all types of political opposition.

What is called as the "rise of Islamism" is in fact a rehabilitation of forces, outstanding from the decline of the colonial era, appearing especially in Arabic countries. However, this rise was not in fact marked necessarily by an Islamism of a shariatist kind, if we take into account the decolonizing processes which tended to create a very wide range of various types of nationalisms in Arabian as well as in other Moslem countries.

In some of these recently decolonized countries, the secular nationalist central state apparatus were modeled according to the images of the western countries, which have long been established during the last two centuries; or these new nationalisms, especially those governed by the Arabian political version expressed in Ba'ath structures in some countries like Syria and Iraq, as well as in Egypt or Pakistan, have rather tried to perform this process in a few years, causing to some malformations and conflicts all over these countries.

Turkey has also confronted similar conditions, while she was more fortunate than the Arabian countries, having based her State structures upon the long heritage of Ottoman Empire, whose "secular" political traditions already began at the middle of the nineteenth century.

However, against all attempts to repress and reduce to silence the shariatist Islamism, it survived throughout all the history of Turkish republic, evidently on clandestine and outlawed forms, through officially banned religious sects and brotherhoods. The first rise of the religious movements as political activity was experienced after the Second World War, by the transition into pluralist period and the victory of the Democratic Party, allowing to the sects to be organized (not explicitly as free brotherhoods or sects) but within the body of the

Party. Or the form of state strongly determined by the Republican People's Party regime in the past, set obstacles before the aims of enlarging religious freedoms, and the DP regime had to renounce some of the concessions it prepared to provide to the Islamists.

Or nowadays, after a military period whose leaders pretended to save the country from the shariatists organized as political parties and active movements by "exploiting the religious feelings of the people", we see a Turkey where, at the end of a few years, the government is presided by an old member of the "clandestine" Nakshibendi brotherhood, the President of the Republic signing the agreement with a shariatist international organization, Rabitat-ül Alem-in İslam, to delegate to them the payments of the Turkish imams in European countries, and the ascendance of wildly "shariatist" movements, with motives similar to those of the Khomeinists of the Islamic revolution, if not envisaging the rehabilitation of the Islamist parties of the years before 1980, despite the "effective" coup de force said to be given by the military regime during the period 1980-1983.

The "turban affair" of the years 1987-88 has marked the first explosion of the slow process of accumulation, seemingly developed from two origins: first

a reactionary attitude of the popular Islamists, increasing their "intellectual abilities" during the period of "failure", and second, the development of an Islamic consciousness as the outcome of several different motives, embodying the Iranian revolution, the reaction against the pretended sponsorship of State over religious affairs and feelings, and the attempts for constructing political control over Islam, anticipating to use it as an instrument of politics against the left and democratic upheavals.

A relative "latency period" followed the explosion of "turban affair" until a very recent past after which the Islamic themes reappeared in their fullest strength as related to the new dimensions of both internal and external politics: the political tension increased after the suppression of the Motherland Party during the municipal elections of March 1989, followed by the explosion of the problem of Bulgarian Turks, the reemergence of the "turban affair" in its full strength, the debate over the "death sentence" sketched by Iranian religious dictator Imam Khomeini. All these events were also paralleled with some global changes in world affairs: the disintegration of the Warsaw Treaty, the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict in Soviet Union, that ascended to reach the level of a violent intervention of the Soviet Army into Azerbaijan.

All these events provided with a comfortable climate the Islamist ideologies to be articulated on various occasions, even in the most extremist forms, sometimes charged by an excessive chauvinist character, if not articulated at the level of an appeal for a complete and total insurrection for Islam all over the world. We have also observed the ability of the Islamic thought to divorce the "traditional" right at many instances, to give rise to the "anti-capitalist", anti-imperialist, and anti-western political positions, rupturing from the prudent "aggiornamento" of the traditional populist Islamism, putting into question all spheres of life as it is in actual conditions of Turkey and in the world.

Dr. Beşir Ayvazoğlu² relates the actual problematization of the "Islamic revival" to a larger context defined by five fundamental events of the recent past: 1) The Iranian Revolution; 2) The Turban Affair; 3) The Rabıta Affair; 4) The Question of Salman Rushdie and "The Satanic Verses"; and lastly 5) The application of Turkey for full-membership to the European Community. While all of these topics, grounding the context of all actual debates on the subject of Islam are not treated at the same level, or on a common ground by the discussing parties, their inclusion into the controversy is essential and merits to be carefully analyzed. However, another dimension must also be added to them; a sixth

one, as that of "Islamic terrorism", as the most acute of them, and which seemingly will occupy the agenda of the public opinion in future more than any other through increasingly revealed relationships between Islamist movements and Kurdish separatism, as well as with Middle Eastern originated Islamist organizations of terror³.

It could be said that, between the years 1987 and the end of 1989, the perspectives of an "Islamist resurrection", related especially to the "turban affair" had a period of decline, after the failure of the Motherland Party, the powerful defender of this "natural right" of the Moslem girls. All passed as if the rise of Islam was related only to some superficial attitudes and positions as reactions appearing as moderate, a little bit resenting manifestations", or to the activities of some closed circles, aspiring to the rights of the so-called "turbanists", a new gift of the events to the political jargon about the "perverts" of actual Turkey.

Evidently, this "decline" was also apparent in the fall of the credit of the Islamists, denounced as not having the possibility to compete with the actual conditions of Turkey, despite the fact that the municipal elections of March 1989 brought an increase in the votes, credit and strength of the Welfare Party. However, the decline of the "Islamists" was also a consequence of the

"periods of rise", relative to the circles of "seasons" of Hejir, and the rhythm of the scholar years of universities and other schools. It would not be a true interpretation, then, when the leftists attested the real strength of the organized Islam, not only in schools, not only in the press, but also in the sociological spheres of urban centers, as well as -and especially- of the countryside.

3.1 The Changing Attitude of State

It might also be said that the words "shariatist movements", "pro-Iranian, radical Islamists", and "Islamist terrorists" are increasingly more pronounced by state officials and the spokesmen of the security organizations, while they were in a complete "silence" during what we may call the "first resurgence of Islamist movements". There is no a significant reason for that the "terror activities" appeared only during the "second rise", very recently, since it cannot be easily proved that the terroristic organizations of the Middle Eastern countries, or those indirectly supported by them were not existent and active in the Turkey until 1990's.

It might be said in respect to the evident fall of the Motherland Party, in terms of its popularity and leadership structure (first the ostracism applied to Keçeciler and his group, and the long-standing conflict at

the top of Çankaya power between Korkut and Turgut Özal), that is the case since the elections of March 1989, the exalted controversy over the anti-secularism of the Motherland party has still played an important role in the attitude change of the state officials towards Islamist movements. However, as evidenced also by the debates appearing in the center-leftist press, about the possibility of a military take-over which would be, this time, carried out under the pretext of the Islamist revival and terrorism, there are many reasons to believe in that the "exaggeration" of the presence of Islamist movements (as terrorist organizations this time) is not only an indisputable reality, but also a motive for causing the augmentation of political tension in the country. Nevertheless, we see today in its full emergence as caught up within political struggles of the actuality.

3.2 Islam in the Middle of Political Struggle

Really, another important phenomenon we observe today is the fact that the religion is involved more in the sphere of political struggles than in any other times. Even during the period of 1974-80, the Islamists, under a climate of a perfect chaos of terrorist activities, were the most prudent movements among other groups, the leftists and the neo-fascist extreme-right (while they had also some Islamist tendencies, the fundamental

terrorist element in this movement was the "nationalist-chauvinist" ideology). The only active Islamist movement at the middle of this chaos was the "Akinjilar", referring to Muslim warriors of the borders of Ottoman Empire, who were not engaged, if not necessary, to terroristic acts⁴. Their motives were first and foremost ideological, and they were directly depending upon and bound by the political line of the National Salvation Party.

Or, today we may observe the presence of "Islamists" among the first ranks of the politically active groups in Turkey: outside the traditional religious sects like the Nakshibendis, Nourjis and Suleimanjis, which are the most active and numerous brotherhoods in Turkey, there are actually many active groups, fractions and connections centered around well organized centers and leadership structures. The sects and other groups have actually more clearly defined political objectives, first and foremost those centered around the will to access to the state apparata, in preference from "below", profiting from the long-run changes in the political conjuncture of the country and the region. Apart from the sects and traditional brotherhoods, a great number of religious vakfs and other charity organizations are established, and in connection with their political purposes, as we mentioned above, they are engaged in activities of education and communication networks, profiting also

from the legislation brought under military regime which purported to control the religious movement, but confronted by the "boomerang effect"⁵.

This kind of political association, subjected to many criticisms that also were addressed to the State and government (as supporters of the anti-secularist organizations and movements) by the social-democratic press was in fact an age-old tradition of the period since 1950's, but which failed under multifaceted constraints of the regime, as well as because of the inherent "division of authority" between the political powers and the religious groups. In other words, the Islamists never had an easy access to a genuine experience of the political organization until 1970's; and this time they failed under the coups of the political conjuncture of the period.

The adequate conditions for developing such a kind of subtle politics were created -unwillingly perhaps- by the military regime, allowing the religious education to be carried within the sphere of secular education. But the role of the military regime has not to be much exaggerated as it is generally declared by the secularists of our times. There are many other reasons for this increase in the ability of the religious circles to be organized in this manner they had never experienced and enjoyed before: The essential role in this development

was played by the Motherland Party, disposing a considerable electoral base from the Islamist circles, and whose leader was a Nakshibendi brother, whose brother is still a representative of the international Islamic big business circles. It was under the Motherland Party rule that the traditional sects increased their power both in financial and political fields. Turgut Özal, who was an ex-candidate of the National Salvation Party (to which he gave his brother as a minister) and -thanks God!- who was unsuccessful in the last elections before 1980, which would otherwise place him among his political counterparts banned from political activities by the military, was in fact the manager of the placement of the Islamist-conservatist cadres in the State Planning Organization (DPT), and during the period he was the president of the institution, and continued this politics of consolidation after being appointed as Counselor of Prime Ministry.

Later on, we will see the Islamist "forces" of the brotherhoods being consolidated within the Party established by Özal and his friends, victorious in the 1983 elections; and to become segregated as the one (and probably the first) group out of four groups that sought refuge in the Motherland Party -The Saint Alliance. This was a significant turning point in the history of Islamist movements in Turkey, in the sense that, the traditional

Islamism joined for the first time in its history the big business circles and the higher bourgeoisie, while not rupturing at the same time from the middle provincial bourgeoisies, which were the addressees of the National Salvation Party and the traditional Islam before 1980. The latter party, failing to be organized and to have acceptance during the elections of 1983 saw its base to join directly the Motherland Party, whose problem of internal stability became soon the problem of stability for the whole of Turkey.

3.3 The Threat of "Fundamentalism" and the Problems of State in Turkey

Since mid eighties, due to the syndrome of Iranian Revolution, and recently, with regard to the rise of "fundamentalist" movements in Algeria, Egypt and other Muslim countries, one of the questions posed concerning Turkey was that of the force and extension of fundamentalist-integrist tendencies. Such a questioning was oriented towards to the "architecture" of "Kemalist" Turkish State, its secularist component and the position of Islam in the institutions of civil society. On the occasion of the recent events in Sivas, ending with the assassination of 37 people by fundamentalist revoltees, I would like briefly to put the questions freshly on account

of the place of Islam in the public and political life of Turkey, its extensions and visions.

3.4 A Short Historical Sketch of Islamic Fundamentalism

The Orientalist perspective made either a powerful image of "rising Islam", or, on the contrary, constantly referred to its weakness in becoming truly a consistent theologico-political system answering to the needs of modern life and world. For the second attitude, which on certain limited points I would like to agree, the Islam appears as a "reactionary" religion, a religion of "resentment". This argument reveals the substantial inability of pure religious systems to endure in the modern world as socio-economic and total ideological visions of world. It can also be added that a religion in state of ascension needs to develop and proliferate its heterodoxies, endowing the believers with a kind of plurality of ideas and a special texture of civil society.

It is interesting, on this account, to read a "liberal" Islamist intellectual, Ali Bulaç, who ascertains that the Islam, even in ottoman Era, was constrained by the political reasons of state, inherited from the Abbasid and Byzantinian statecraft, while, unlike the actual configuration of Turkish Republic, the state allowed the free unfolding of religion in the civil society, in the

form of the sharia. There are reasons in believing to the partial truth of this thesis, in so far as the constant social tension during the Kemalist period and afterwards (since 1940's), took place between a Muslim "civil" society and an authoritarian State, imposing the rules of modernization from above to the society. However, this is rather both a simplistic and outmoded account of the architecture of modern Turkey, where the attribution of "civil" to the Muslim society lacks foundation and where the identity of "Muslim" is not solidly defined as a pure religious identity.

3.5 Political Press and Islam

The political press, too, except the publications of the Islamist groups, parties and vakfs, seems since a few months ago, to be very interested in the debate over the "rise of the Islam". While there exist among them some daily newspapers, journals and reviews which have always been careful and consistent in their attitude towards the Islam, there are many others which are changing their attitudes towards it, as a result of an evident change in the mode of explicitation of the Islamic beliefs today. Some are fluctuating in their attitude, like the "coloured press", which have not hesitated to increase the tension in Turkey, presenting the events of Bulgaria and Azerbaijan not only in terms of human rights, but also

as attempts to suppress the "Islam" and the "Turks" from the world, even including appeals to the Muslim community for direct support (this was the case of Tercüman, the moderate pro-Islamist, conservatist newspaper) to the Islamic warriors against the "religious enemies and evil".

However, it is impossible to map the events that have led the "political secularist press" to problematize insistently the "Islam", since we cannot perceive, outside their discourse, the presence of the Islamism on the scale they have depicted, taking apart the political press of the Islamists. As evidenced by the severe criticism made recently by Iranian radio broadcast against "secularist press" in Turkey, the interior Islamist groups, too, are more engaged in their "defense" against this section of the press (which constitutes the great majority of Turkish media). The polemics between the Cumhuriyet and the "Private Finance Institutions" emerging at the beginning of this year, concerned mainly with the connections of Korkut Özal with Al Baraka and Faisal Finances, the debate over Islamist terrorism shown as the responsible of the murders of Muammer Aksoy and Çetin Emeç, the serial interviews published by the most influent daily newspapers as Cumhuriyet and Güneş (the latter even proposed to constitute "civil intelligence services" apparently against "Islamist terrorism") have charged the

political agenda of the media with the themes of "Islamist danger" during the last two months.

3.6 "Turban" Affair Again

The strife for the freedom of "turban", that constituted one of the most important manifestation of the rise of Islamist movements, among the youth, as well as among the intellectuals and state authorities cannot achieve its term, neither positively nor negatively, despite the fact that the attitudes of principal political movements, parties and currents have all explicitly shown their positions related to this subject. Why this question remains still, then, far from a solution in either direction? The solution, it might be put as such, does not depend on the "freedom" or "human rights", but on the ever-changing relation of forces between various camps and forces, at many instances of the civil society and state apparatus.

In 1987, after the end of the demonstrations for the freedom of turban, the accounts were not at all settled; it was rather an attitude of reticence and prudence on the part of the most "wise" leaders of the Islamic movements, envisaging that the balance of power was changing on behalf of their counterparts. The social democrats, who claimed the right of being the first party

able to talk wisely about "human rights" has severely opposed the "freedom of turban", referring to the "secularist principles" upon which Turkish republic was founded. Secondly, the debates over the turban affair brought within the Islamist movements themselves some discussions which would create a series of divergences and disputes, since there were some groups who claimed that they had the right to represent the "turban wearers", on the basis of an enduring struggle against the rigid attitude of the state, and others, more prudent and traditionalist in their attitude (those outside the radical Islamist circles, centered around the Welfare Party and traditional large brotherhoods) denied to continue to the manifestations.

An Islamist critique to the over-all discourse over the "turban" affair supposed to be launched by the "westernist" and "orthodox laicist" circles, remarked that these public opinion representatives have changed their discourse, asserting now that "there is no a direct relationship between the turban affair and human rights". Whether it be true or not, there are some radical laicists, even the pretenders of the radical left who declared that the turban affair is by no means the indicator of the human rights in the country since it belonged to the essence of a strategy developed by the ruling powers, which have tried to abuse the religious feelings of the

people in order to implement its regime, while on the other hand trying to deceive the same people about its radical "laicist" attitude, finding in the "turban interdiction" the basic means of deception and hypocrisy.

However, the attitude of the "social democrats" remains indivisibly against the freedom of turban, as it is expressed at various levels of the party: Erdal İnönü, the leader of the Social Democratic Populist Party, states the importance of maintaining the freedom of study which is far more essential for universities than the "freedom of turban", as a discourse incited by some obscure circles all over the country.

The Türk-İş trade unionists and representatives of the employees had rather an ambiguous attitude and interpretation of the "danger of integrism". The representatives of employees asserted that there is a serious danger of "religious integrism" in Turkey, while the trade-unions representatives have observed that such a danger cannot be claimed to exist in the sense asserted by their counterparts. Refik Baydur, President of TİSK, Yalın Erez, President of ITO, Uğur Yüce, President of Chamber of Industry of Aegean Region have asserted that in Turkey there existed a serious danger of failure of secularism, in the sense that the State does not protect the status of the distinction of religious affairs from

governmental affairs. On the other hand, Şevket Yılmaz and Hak-İş President Necati Çelik have asserted that the "irtija" is not the primary important affair of Turkey, before workers rights and freedoms and terror. According to the trade union leaders, the affair of turban cannot be understood in terms of irtija, but only as the freedom of expression of religious beliefs.

Last and not least, it should be remarked that the Superior Studies Council delegated the decision-making authority concerning the freedom of "turban" to the Universities rectorates.

3.7 Islam versus Secularism: Perspectives on "Westernization, Modernization"

A radical version of Islamist intellectualism, gathered around the review "Türkiye Sorunları" (open also to the representatives of unorthodox leftist intellectualism) seems to hold the most detailed and profound questioning of subjects relating to the Islam, Turkey, the Western World, and their over-all historical perspectives both in the past, in the present and future. The discourse -of both leftist and Islamist intellectuals- of the review is based upon the perspectives of "Westernization" and "modernization" of Islamic as well as other Third World countries, as constituting some "perverted" ways in

the original flow of history in these countries, and marking serious and troubling "hunchbacks", in a word borrowed from Mustafa Çelik, for the life of the society in these countries.

Mustafa Çelik argues that "For the societies which have been dominated by the Western world, the question is not to deny these "consequences" of this asymmetrical interaction, but to try to create other new syntheses in their own conditions, capable to compete with the West". According to most of the "intellectual Islamists", the elaboration of this new synthesis must pass through preserving the national existence and cultural identity "in spite of the West". There is also a theoretical evaluation of the leftist critique of the "modernization thematics", Levent Köker from the Gazi University Economics Department: "The modernization theory assumes the western mode of political-social organization as an ideal model to which all societies are supposed or must acquire. This assumption, in itself emphasizes the ideality of the western Status Quo, while in fact assuming also the role of effectively constructing the hegemony of the West over other spheres of society in our world..."

Mustafa Çelik also points out on the fact that the process of "westernization" had always a close relation with the model of "bureaucratic modernization", giving to

the political power a status "above" the civil society, that the subjected Islamic countries have no longer achieved adequate possessions to be instrumentalized in order to liberate themselves from this strict, bureaucratic form of State authority. According to Çelik, while the Western countries, as the genuine creators of these bureaucratic institutions had more "experience" and ability to restrict in turn this unlimited abuse of political power, in other countries like the Muslim states, those which were not able in their essential dispositions to modernize their political institutions in the similar manners, have failed into trouble, and their "modernists" have always preserved a "scholastic" viewpoint of modernity.

3.8 The Problem of Saint-Sofia

The church-mosque Saint-Sofia had been transformed by an edict validated in 1934 and undersigned in person by Atatürk, into a museum. Today, there is an ongoing discussion, 56 years after this edict, under the rule of Turgut Özal, to retransform it into a mosque again, with respect to the "judgment" of Sultan Mehmet II the Conqueror.

This debate over the transformation of Saint-Sofia into a mosque has been constantly and periodically generated repeatedly since the beginning of the

Democratic Party period in 1950's. And this discussion gained importance again a few months ago, and it seems to preserve its efficacy and effects especially in those sectors of Turkish Public opinion which is close to Islamist circles.

First the newspaper Türkiye initiated a campaign in favour of the transforming of Saint Sofia into a mosque and its re-opening to religious practice; and this campaign was also actively supported by a number of Motherland Party deputies. As a consequence of this preoccupation of some Motherland Party deputies, the problem have soon reached the level of the government, where some members have asserted that they would sign the regulation once prepared, while others rejected this change. The attitude of the "idealist" Minister of Culture, Namık Kemal Zeybek was trivial, in that he only contented himself in saying that they had not yet prepared such a draft-project for the reopening of Saint-Sofia to religious practice and its transformation into a mosque. And another group of Ministers hesitated to answer concerning what their attitude would be on this subject.

As a matter of general information, it should be reminded that since the fall of Constantinople in 1453, at least 42 Byzantine religious buildings -churches, chapels

or monasteries- have been transformed under Ottoman rule to mosques or mesjids. And 17 of them are being now completely damaged, 2 of them surviving as Museums (Saint-Sofia and Kariye Churches) and the one being used as a hostel and reformatory for a private Koranic course. Today 18 of these old Byzantine buildings are still used as mosques or mesjids. According to the report of Turkish Art Historian Professor Semavi Eyice 4 of these buildings are preserved as ruins today.

The political problematization of the re-opening of the Saint-Sofia to religious practice have reached its pike when the campaign have reached the possibility of presenting to the Grand National Assembly a request signed by 1 million of persons, through the engagements of the Motherland Party deputies involved in the "Islamic real politics".

3.9 The Structure of Islamist Movement in Turkey

The geographic and social conditions of the countryside enable the religious sects and groups to diffuse without difficulty their publications and message. Hence, it appears that the geography plays a very important role in the strategy and tactics of the religious sects, trying first and foremost to acquire facilities in the provincial regions, where indeed, the majority of the

people is actually organized in a spontaneity of "communities", charged by traditional values, out of the reach of the state apparatus and the social values of the modernity.

There are, however, many reasons to believe in that the activities of the Islamist sects, classical in their tradition, like the "Nourjis, Nakshibendis, Kadiris, Biberis, Tijanis and Suleimanjis" (as was explained during a briefing of the Army 18 years ago, in 1972) have considerably changed their strategy, and became more active under current conditions in their demands for a theocratic state and an Islamic order they expect to be soon established in Turkey. These age old "Sunni" orders and brotherhoods, while most of them being co-extensive with the perennial history of Islam, are in a sense the product of the Kemalist regime, which banned all "normal" channels for the expression of the popular will of the Islam. All vocations related to Islam were thus carried out by clandestine sects, which continued their activities in the multi-party period in alliances with strong rightist parties.

In every occasions, therefore, of being depressed by political conjuncture, the sects have the possibility of enforcing their chances for expressing prudently their beliefs, under the constraints of the State forces and

political opposition of the left, incarnated by the social-democrats today.

After 1980, we see these traditional Islamisms to be opposed by some new emerging Islamist radicals and fundamentalists, rejecting the classical politics and strategy of the brotherhoods; the sects, in turn, had to adjust their strategy, in a more or less active degree, in accordance to the transformation in the political conjuncture. Out of 73 brotherhoods active in Ottoman period, the most strong have survived, and acquired important political positions in republican Turkey. Hence, the activities of these "tarikats" have drastically augmented in provincial regions, and attained such a strength to transform the panorama of the ordinary life of an increasing number of provinces, towns and even urban centers.

An example of this situation was Doğanhisar, a small province of Konya, which have shown since two years a drastic transformation. The ordinary life of the town, calm and industrious as it was in the past have emerged in its new picture as the image of a perfect Islamic community, with the events that took place during the demonstrations at the public place of the mosque, where the militants of a sect cried out slogans

of Shariatist regime, and many persons were arrested for violating the laws of "secular, republican regime".

3.9.1 The Brotherhood Nakshibendi

The most important of the traditional sects is the Nakshibendi brotherhood established in Buhara in the XIV. century. Its founder is Muhammet Bahattin Nakshibendi. In Turkey, after the constitution of the republican regime, the natural means of representation of all sects, that is the "tekkes" and "zaviyes" (places of reunion and common religious practice) being abolished, the Nakshibendi brotherhoods carried clandestine activities; and like the Nourjis, they expected the independence of the Kurds for a long period, until the republican regime destroyed the revolt of Dersim in 1938. Today, the Nakshibendi are the largest and the most expanded sect in Turkey as in the world: one of the most eminent "Sheiks", Sheikh Nazım lives in Northern Cyprus, his return to Turkey being forbidden, and for many times arrested also by Turkish Cypriot authorities. Some other leaders are living in European countries, showing that the activities of the brotherhood transcend the Turkish boundaries. They are organized as small groups, gathering together through clandestine reunions for performing their rituals, and militant groups, apparently engaged in publication activities and the organization of Koranic

courses, establishment of religious vakfs and student's hostels.

3.9.2 Nurjuism:

One of the most powerful sects, established during the years of the decline of Ottoman Empire and the rise of Turkish nationalism was the brotherhood organized around a Kurdish Islamist intellectual, Said-i Kürdi, whose name was hereafter changed to Said-i Nursi.

Said-i Nursi became the "sheik" of the brotherhood, on the basis of his oppositional teaching defending the Islamist, shariatist values, appearing to the new nationalist of the Kemalism as the "alter ego" of their own struggle. Arrested and imprisoned many times, Said-i Nursi was dead of a crash of plane, the evidence being unknown, or his brotherhood survived and developed through time. Many debates over Islamists occurred after his death, on the point that he did not claimed to establish a religious sect, but that his brotherhood, being expanded throughout all Turkish territory, especially in Eastern and Central Anatolia has been later transformed into a religious sect.

The Nourjis, like the Nakshibendis were affiliated to a political line of attachment to the strong rightist

parties that governed Turkey since 1950. Their interest in politics augmented especially after 1980, and they are engaged in a struggle to acquire strong positions in the fortified Presidency of Religious Affairs. Actually, while being one of the carriers of the traditional Islamist "prudence", they are trying to organize their forces through provincial centers, distant from the places to which the security forces and journalists would be capable to reach. Among the institutions they used in order to increase their force the student hostels and clandestine Koranic courses are taking the first place. They are well trained in Islamist rhetoric and doctrine, and its militants, rejecting any kind of acts of violence, are generally committed to organize circles of discussions, publication of books and periodicals. The reviews as Zafer, Sızıntı, Köprü, Sur and Can Kardeş are published by these circles close to the Nourjis, and they publish also the books expanding the doctrines of Said-i Nursi, the founder of the sect, especially his sacred book known as "Risale-i Nur".

3.9.3 The Group of Cemalettin Kaplan

Cemalettin Kaplan is a Turkish refugee living in West Germany, and rupturing his links with his old organization close to the old National Salvation Party, carries out his activities among the circles of Islamists

living in Germany as well as in other countries of Europe. His books, post cards, video and audio cassettes he arrived to diffuse the model of Iran, anticipating a revolutionary condition in Turkey. The theory of "Revolution" of Kaplan is based upon three stages of struggle: the first stage is called as the period of "Medrese" (Religious Education center before the Republican Era) and the second stage is the period of "Tekke" (religious association banned after the republic). During these stages, the Islamists will acquire adequate consciousness of their political power. Hereafter, the Muslims thus trained will pass into the stage of "Barrack" where they will be trained to cope with armed struggles to overthrow the "regime of the devil". Hence, the group of Cemalettin Kaplan, affiliated to violence at the last instance has to be taken apart from other sects and brotherhoods of "Islamic prudence" and "legitimacy" and placed among the terroristic groups.

3.9.4 The Vakf of Islamic Values

To the hundreds of religious charity organizations and vakfs, a new one is added recently, especially aiming to produce public opinion discourses against the abrogation of the article 163. In the pamphlets and communiqués, posted by the "Vakf of Islamic Values", the perspectives revendicating the abrogation of the article 163

are opposed on the basis that some "pro-Iranian" or "radical Islamist" groups intend to mask their political passions under the guise of Islamism are aiming to divide Turkish Moslem people into hostile camps, and on their pathway, they are only prevented to accomplish their ends by the sole existence of the Article 163. "Some pseudo-Moslems are in coalition with communists in order to reinforce the abolition or modification of the Article 163 of the Turkish Penal Code, are also intending to provoke public uprisings disguising as women, to exploit the people's Islamic feelings and to call for religious war (jihad). Today the problem of "turban" of the female students in universities has become the primary object of provocation for those who are attempting to bring back Turkey in the chaotic experiences of anarchy and terror as it was in the recent past..."

According to the specialists, there are new emerging religious groups, consisting in radical Islamists outside the traditional sects and supposed to be involved in "terroristic" activities. According to Uğur Mumcu, these Turkish, foreign or mixed shariatist-terrorist organizations are the following:

Türkiye İslam Kurtuluş Ordusu (Turkish Islamist Liberation Army), Türkiye İslam Kurtuluş Cephesi (Turkish Islamist Liberation Front), İslam Devriminin Acil

Mücahidleri (Mujahids of Urgent Islamic Revolution), Türkiye İslam Kurtuluş Birliği (Turkish Union for Islamic Liberation), Dünya Şeriat Kurtuluş Ordusu (World Shariatist Liberation Army), Evrensel Kardeşlik Cephesi Şeriatçı İntihar Mangası (Shariatist Sacrifice Team of Universal Brotherhood Front) and lastly Evrensel İslam Kurtuluş Savaşının Türkiye Mücahitleri (Turkish Mujahiddin of Universal Islamic Liberation War). To these must be added some small groups of adventurers, like the group of Ak-Doğuş (White Resurrection) which is a youth group aiming for armed struggle for inciting Islamist revolt. Outside their names, there is little evidence about the existence and strength of these organizations, nor is it hopeful that authorities are really informed about the context of their activities and aims.

3.10 The Distribution of Moslem Population

The places and regions where the Islamists (as political parties or brotherhoods) were mostly powerful have ever been the most backward regions of the country. The eastern Anatolia, as the majority of the electorate of National Salvation Party and Welfare Party comes from there, is evidently the first geographical region where the Islamism and popular religion are the most developed. This situation also explains the inherent relation between Kurdish independence movements and

the activities of religious sects as Nakshibendi and Nourjis.

The second important region for the Islamists is the Central Anatolia, surrounding the capital of Turkey where the Welfare Party has won the one of two municipal administrations it gained during the last local elections. Konya (the other was Şanlıurfa) whose mayor was arrested for a short period last year for making a declaration expressing that "he was not an 'Atatürkist'" is first and foremost the "capital" of all Turkish Islamists, where the centers of the oldest brotherhoods were established, as well as some sacred places for Islam and what is more important, a university center. There are many other regions and provinces where the Islamic movements and organizations are segregated: the province Yozgat is controlled by the neo-fascist, nowadays "Islamist" Nationalist Work Party, and at Denizli, the activities of Nourjis and Suleimanjis are exceeding ordinary limits, through clandestine Koranic courses.

In urban centers, on the other hand, the segregation is more completed: sometimes we have territorial Islamist organizations within some districts, as Keçiören in Ankara, or Fatih in Istanbul where it is impossible to eat something in the streets during Ramadan, or selling and consuming alcohol drinks. These

regions and districts are in general "gecekondu" districts, populated by migrant people from the East and from the countryside, working in small industries and artisanry.

In the case of the Sivas events, the "extreme-rightist" provincialism, charged with hate to modernizing values which have largely failed in their task of "transforming the life" played an important role. Most of those who participated to the revolt were provincial artisans, grocers, butchers and small commodity producers, as it is reported by the journalist Ruşen Çakır. It should be added that such a perspective of violence only arbitrarily includes Islam as a primary motive, but rather Islam becomes the occasion of the explosion of the feelings of resentment, strongly lived in these regions.

3.11 Islam Against Capitalism

We can easily say that the Islamist thinking never attempted to construct a comprehensive theoretical perspective for "Islamic economy" as it is observed by Samir Amin. Hence, for its largest part, the "broken image of the Islamic World", as depicted by Turkish Islamist author Ali Bulaç, is due to the essential division of the Islamic world between the religious orders of Shiites and Sunnites, each one being re-defined in a given position with respect to the basic economic systems

of the world, notably the "Western capitalism" and "communism". Today, two economic systems are observed in this broken world of Islam: the capitalistic Islamist countries, largely based upon a state capitalism directly led by the huge occidental campaigns and firms, though some tensions exist between the native capital and foreign capital, as it is the case of United Emirates, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; and other group of Islamist countries, equally governed under shariatist rules, while denying the impact of what they call "Western Imperialism", as an image of "devil", reigning over these pseudo-Islamist countries. Among the latter we may cite the Iran and Libia. Another group of Islamist countries, like Syria, Egypt, North African belt countries, and in a sense Turkey are not "shariatist" countries in the fullest sense of the World, as they are either based upon "laicist" or "semi-secularist" types of state or claiming to be the part of the Western World, as it is the case with Turkey. However, in these countries, including Turkey where the 99 % of the population is Moslem, the Islamist and even shariatist revendications are continually ascendant since the occurring of the "Islamic Revolution" in Iran.

The lack of a proper and a well-grounded "economic theory of Islam" doesn't mean that the Islamists are not confined in theorizing and criticism in

economic terms. This lack is evidently the result of the doctrine of "Vahdet", the "Integrity of all spheres of life" both vertically and horizontally; that is, the union of all Islamic countries and the government of all spheres of life in accordance to the basic principles of Islam. Since a distinctive and isolated "economic theory" cannot be constructed by rupturing with other spheres of life as the political and the ideological, and for the basic reason that the political as well as economic life had to be governed through unchangeable, stable Islamic principles, all attempts to manage the economic life in shariatist Islamic countries had to adapt with some distortions of both spheres the economic practice of capitalism or Ba'ath socialism to the basic premises of the Islam.

Hence, today in Turkey, we can observe no clear-cut economic theories coming from the Islamists, while there exist a continual criticism on the part of this movement addressed to the economic structure and actuality of Turkey, especially on moral and ethical grounds, against the western "liberalism" ad "atheist" communism. In the recent declarations of the business organizations as TŪSİAD and Chambers of Commerce warning the government against the "irtija" (motivated especially after the murders of Professor Muammer Aksoy and the Journalist Çetin Emeç in Istanbul), we can read in between the lines a fear from the discourse on

economic regime of Turkey, as pronounced by some observers, to the economic structure and actuality of Turkey, especially on moral and ethical grounds, against the western "liberalism" and "atheist" communism. In the recent declarations of the business organizations as TÜSİAD and Chambers of Commerce warning the government against the "irtija" (motivated especially after the murders of Professor Muammer Aksoy and the Journalist Çetin Emeç in Istanbul), we can read in between the lines a fear from the discourse on economic regime of Turkey, as pronounced by some and not coming from the Lordship of God. Similarly, the social-democracy and socialism are also accused by not being faithful responses to the mentality of heavenly justice as generated from the God. However, behind this "moral" opposition of capitalism, there is no a common agreement between Islamists concerning the State intervention to the private entrepreneurship and capital. Some are arguing that the injustices created by the difference of wealth between different categories could be solved by the distributive activity of the Islamic State, since it is based upon the heavenly order of the Justice of God. But many of the respondents to the poll carried by Gencay Şaylan are not opposing the sphere of "private enterprise" and "property", in spite of their radical standpoint in terms of the opposition of the established

order, and despite the evident fact that the "market mechanisms" are introduced by Western capitalism.

3.11.1 Islam as Capitalism: An Alternative?

We have observed that the "distributive sense of justice" inherent in traditional and popular Islam lacked a comprehensive economic doctrine, in the sense of organizing the production and consumption patterns. But this sense of justice, whatever naive, or marked by other ideologies than the Islam, has to set up some limits to the mentality of the "wild capitalism", and this, whatever eclectic and even opportunist in its nature, must be embedded within a discourse which has to remain distant from the pure liberalism and social-democracy as possible.

The "industrialism" pretended by the National Salvation Party in the past has failed; but this failure was also a victory for some individuals or families who had close relations with the Arabian capital during the years the party controlled the financial contacts of Turkey with Middle Eastern countries. First and foremost we can give the example of Özal's family, rich in "petro-dollars", and profiting from their relations with the Islamic international capital centers in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait on Emirates. Without doubt, the period of Özal's governments have brought a new "Islamic economic theory" in Turkey,

where the interest-bound capitalism was extremely developed (so as to become one of the major causes of the high inflation from which Turkey suffers still today), where the synthesis of the economy and politics has been transformed into the synthesis of the "American way of life" with "US patented Saudi capital" as observed by Uğur Mumcu famous columnist from Cumhuriyet -which, in fact proved to be a double failure since on the one hand the "American way of life" could never been established in Turkey, and the Saudi capital has preferred to subject Turkey into a kind of unequal exchange, exchanging its political, shariatist organizations with Turkish "industrial products" on the other.

3.11.2 The Finance Organizations of Islam

As observed by many historians, and theologians, the Islam does not condemn the mercantile activity just from the beginning of its history. The family of Mohammed was a merchant family, the "gentile" of the Arabia, and the prophet was more interested, in teaching his religion, with the Jewish than the Christians. Through mercantile activity, the Islamic countries pretended always to become "Welfare States", unlike the Christianity of the Middle Ages, but since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, beginning after the XVIth century, this claim has been achieved only by a small triangle around the oil reserves

of the Middle East. And, these wealths are under the strict control of the West, while the only wealth persons have always been the "few" in the countries of the triangle. It appeared since the fall of the regime of Shah in Iran, that any attempt to leave this state of affairs would lead to the complete dismissal from the world.

Turkey has never been a rich country, compared with other Islamic countries, while being an attempted member of the Western world, unique for the Islamic countries. Or the patterns of economic dependence to the West are equally valid for Turkey, but not on similar forms and grounds as it is the case with the other Islamic countries sharing a similar position. Unlike the "oil producing" countries, the importance of Turkey has never been derived out of its natural resources, nor its territory as such. Turkey was seen as a country whose "geo-strategic" importance was high, not only for the "containment of Soviet Union", but also for playing an important role in the direct occidental control over the important economic centers in the Middle East.

Today, we see a version of Islamism -while others seriously opposing the capitalistic norms as carriers of the interests of western imperialism- which adapted itself to the actual capitalist conditions, through "private banking" performed without "interest-bound capital".

Too much was said about the infiltration of Saudi capital into Turkey through some finance organizations like Faisal finances, or Al Baraka. It is sufficient here to remark upon the fact that through a new legislation brought by the government in March 1990, Turkish Islamist vakf-tutors will be able to construct their "private finance" organizations, while banking is forbidden for other sectors of economy.

3.12 Some Observations on Islamist Parties

One dimension of the greater visibility of Islam in Turkish politics and society since 1946, involves a reaction toward the secularization program of the Kemalist elite, and a search for a redefinition allowing more freedom for those who see Islam as a way of life. It has been suggested that the "Great" and "Little" traditions have changed their meaning in the contemporary Muslim world: what was once the Great Tradition, part of which had to do with Orthodox Islam, has now become the Little Tradition as a result of its replacement by secular Western thought. Following this lead, it could be argued that what has been depicted as the "resurgence" of Islam in contemporary Turkey is, at one level, the reassertion of an historical and cultural consciousness by individuals who are unassimilated into the modernist center, and for whom the new "palace culture" is an anomaly.

At a second level, the apparent revival of Islam in contemporary Turkey is a reflection of social structural differences. Here, again, it is less a question of purely religious concerns than the expression of economic discontent through religion. The appeal of the National Salvation Party to a sizable sector of the Turkish electorate is a case in point: the NSP appeared on the Turkish political scene as a neo-Islamic party on a platform of retraditionalization in sociocultural life along Islamic principles. Within a very short period, it was able to get its message through to the electorate, emerging from the 1973 elections (condemned by the 1980 military regime's leaders) as the third major party with 11.8 percent of the total vote (today, though maintaining the same geographical disposition, the Welfare Party is slightly below the 10 percent, necessary for the access to the level of representation in National Assembly). Although this percentage dropped to 8.6 in the following elections of 1977, its relative strength compared to other minor parties enabled it to participate in three coalition governments between 1973 and 1978.

The ideology of the National Salvation Party was a continuous of at least one century of debate over Islam and the West. The controversy on this issue was fought between the Islamists and the "westernists" at the

end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. The westernists argued that both western technology and civilization had to be adopted if the Ottoman Empire was to modernize, with the implicit assumption that the two were interrelated; the Islamists, on the other hand, wanted to keep Islamic traditions, while only adopting the technology of the West.

Like its predecessors, the National Salvation Party has found its ideological register on the same plan, defined by the axis, polarizing in its extremes the westernism and modernization through preserving the Islamist "substance". According to this ideology, also stressed today by the chiefs of the Welfare Party, a genuine incarnation of the National Salvation Party, the decline of the Ottoman Empire had been the outcome of rejecting Islamic civilization in an effort to westernize. . According to the NSP-PP, the grandeur of the empire during its periods of strength had laid in its moral and intellectual excellence, both of which derived from the Islamic faith. The modernizers of the nineteenth century had failed to see this source of eminence, unwittingly seeking the solution to the problems faced by the empire in Western civilization; the westernization process, however, had created a nation which merely imitates the West in both technology and culture. The creativity needed in science, social studies, and the arts, to become

-as was stated by the NSP slogan- "a great Turkey once again"- was possible only if the nation searched for its roots. That is to say, the precondition for Turkey to become a great power was a return to Islam and to the civilization it has created.

Once this precondition was met, according to the NSP, rapid industrialization would follow. Indeed, the NSP put great emphasis on industrialization, which was the second major component of its ideology. Or, today, when taking refuge on rather "defense" and "reorganization" grounds, the predominance of "industrialism" is not evident for the Welfare Party, while it continues to figure out in their program. However, one can easily observe that the past program of the NSP had never established concrete remedies and well-defined perspectives for the industrialization, failing to spell out a comprehensive economic plan, while its leadership continuously promised industrial advancement if the party came to power. During its partnership in three different coalition governments between 1973 and 1978, the NSP claimed to have started a new drive for industrialization: its leader, Necmettin Erbakan, still the president of the Welfare Party after 1987, attended opening ceremonies for several industrial complexes, which were much publicized in the party daily Milli Gazete although ridiculed as fictitious by

the rest of the press -since most did not appear in the accounts of the State Planning Organization.

Under the political conditions of the seventies, the National Salvation Party attempted to establish an interesting symbiosis between industrialization and culture by offering Islam as a psychological mechanism to ease the burden of rapid industrialization: it argued that Turkey would accomplish industrial growth without, however, passing through the traumas brought by the capitalist model, with its inherent materialism. In this context, the party spokesmen tried especially to appeal to the "little man" seemingly caught between big industry and organized labor. The party propagandists repeatedly emphasized the economic difficulties of underprivileged groups within the framework of a poorly operationalized concern for social justice. For example, Erbakan would appear on television with a shopping bag, take out its contents, tell the audience the outrageous price he had paid in sum, and point out that what he had there was sufficient only to feed a family for the breakfast. Indeed, the party's stand on the issue prompted a number of secular intellectuals to overlook its Islamic aspect and accept the NSP as the best candidate for a coalition with the left-of-center Republican People's Party in 1973.

In the absence of a comprehensive and reliable survey data on the electoral basis of the National Salvation Party, it is difficult to make a definitive statement about the characteristics of the NSP voters. The result of the 1973 and 1977 elections show that the NSP received the highest percentage of its votes in either the least developed, or the most rapidly developing , areas of the country. In the former, individuals who voted for the NSP likely did so as a result of the party's appeal to traditional-Islamic sentiments; in the latter case, however, the NSP vote probably represented some form of protest by marginal individuals who had lost their former place within the economy -small traders, artisans, small shopkeepers, and the like.

The religious dimension in party politics also includes the role played by brotherhoods, orders and sects in the crystallization of votes around parties that appear to defend Islam. The brotherhoods remained active despite the fact that they have been outlawed since 1925; there are no systematic studies of the brotherhood network in republican Turkey, and information on their strength, the manner in which they function, and the nature of their following, remains rather sketchy (still today, when we are constantly speaking about the rise and resurgence of the Islamic movements and sects) as it is mostly based on a guesswork of rumour.

The closer relations between the party and the sects were especially condensed in the past -before 1980- with the linkages of voters transferred by the age-old Nakshibendis. Erbakan himself and other leading party officials were known to be among the followers of Sheikh Mehmet Zahid Efendi, a Nakshibendi leader in Istanbul. Although the connection between the NSP and the sect of Nakshibendi was not documented anywhere, for obvious reasons, it was widely rumored that the electoral strength of the party in eastern Anatolia, and its organizational network, owed much to its close association with this brotherhood.

The picture emerging from the above discussion, about the past experience of the first Islamist political party of Turkey seem to suggest an increasing significance of Islam in Turkish politics even before the military takeover of 12 September 1980. However, on the same context -that is, before the intervention of the military- there is little ground for arguing that the Islamist party would suggest a real and meaningful alternative to the "démarche" of Turkish political and economic life in seventies, and yet the NSP soon saw its votes dropping seriously in the elections of 1977, and that another party of the extreme right, the neo-fascist Nationalist Movement Party also increasingly benefited

from the propaganda activities among similar sections of population, the "little man", have seriously profited from this failure, through more active politics on the registers of "traditional cultural identities" melted together with Islam and "Turanism", appealing also its militants to the violence against the "communists". Or this ability have never appeared for the National Salvation Party, due to the excessive prudence in politics, inherited from the strict clandestinity of the Islamist tradition.

3.13 The Conversion of Extreme Rightist Movement into Islamism

The NMP was established in 1964 by Alpaslan Türkeş and his gang who were victorious in the general congress of CKMP. Türkeş was tried in İstanbul Martial Law Court in 1944 for a case of "Turanism-racism" and was condemned to 9 months of prison in accordance to the article 141 of the Turkish Penal Code. This sentence was broken later by the Military Cessation, and Türkeş and his friends were liberated.

Alpaslan Türkeş who was tried at the court as brigadier-general, had later entered into political arena after being demoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel by the 27 May 1960 military coup d'état. He became a member of the National Unity Council and a councilor of

Prime Ministry. But he was soon dismissed from his posts; by a coup de force organized within the committee in 13 November 1960, Tūrkeş and his friends were dismissed and send to overseas diplomatic posts.

Tūrkeş carried the task of councilor in New Delhi Embassy of Turkey until 1963 and he returned afterwards to Turkey; in the full charge for establishing an association with his friends he was arrested in 21 May 1963 as invoker of a coup d'tat. After evidencing that he betrayed his "revolutionnary" comrades, he was liberated in 1964, and he gained victory over the CKMP General Congress against his rival Ahmet Tahtakılıç. The name of the party was soon transformed into Nationalist Movement Party. With Tūrkeş there were also some familiar figures of old adventures of Tūrkeş: Mustafa Kaplan, Rifat Baykal, Ahmet Er, Fazıl Akkoyunlu, Dündar Taşer, Numan Esin and Muzaffer Özdaş. And the same year, those exiled by the 13 November coup de force, like Orhan Kabibay, Orhan Erkanlı, İhsan Kabadayı and İrfan Solmazer also participated to the party. On the other hand Muzaffer Karan among the 14's became a member of the TWP and elected to the parliament.

With the name of the party, the ideology of the party was also reshaped after 1963. The "national-socialist" ideology was affirmed as the official ideology of the

party. By this time, Türkeş came to be called as "başbuğ" (Führer), while a law enacted at the time of Atatürk banned the use of the title "başbuğ".

The party accelerated after 1969 its organizational activities. By the activities of Rifat Baykal, the leadership established in many provinces a number of "commando camps", providing para-military training for a section of the youth while on the other hand establishing "legal" associations as ÜGD or Ülkü Ocakları. The Party soon became preoccupied with the working class sectors and erected the MISK, as opposed to Dev-Genç and Social Democratic Associations as well as the DISK.

After the Kahramanmaraş events of the year 1978 the Martial Law was established. In place of the ÜGD whose open activities was in difficulty in Ankara, there have been established the Ülkü Yolu Derneği. The MHP accelerated also its activities in Europe, where there exist a considerably high reactionary potential to the base of the Party. Enver Altaylı was charged by the activities of the party in European countries.

Altaylı was among the 1400 students banned from Military School in 1963 for the trial of tentative to revolution. He terminated in 1968 his Law study in Ankara Faculty of Law and was employed by the MIT in

works related to Soviet Union since he knew to speak the languages of a number of Moslem nations in Soviet Union.

Altaylı has later gone to Germany for his graduate studies, and in addition to his works with the MIT, he was also charged by Türkeş with activities of organization in Germany. The personality of Altaylı largely influenced also the character of the abroad activities and organization of the Nationalist Movement Party.

When the abroad organs of the Party were closed down by the Constitutional Court, all partisans were canalized into the "Avrupa Demokratik Ülkücü Dernekleri Konfederasyonu" presided by an actual Mafia leader, Lokman Kondakçı. Afterwards Musa Serdar Çelebi was brought to this post. This man was for a time tried as being one of the participants to the attentate to the Pope with Mehmet Ali Ağca, and was later acquitted. After his acquitment, he break down his relations with Türkeş and his movement.

The abroad relations of the MHP were constructed by the MIT member Enver Altaylı. The primary relations were established also with the BND (*Bundesnachrichtendienst*), the German Intelligence Service. Among the dossiers of MHP and Ülkücü Kuruluşlar Trial

in Ankara Court of Martial Law, there are documents concerning the relations and contacts between Dr. Kannapin, the Turkish envoy of BND and Enver Altaylı. Altaylı was informing his chief Türkeş in a letter written in 9 February 1976 about his foreign relations in the following words: "Dr. Kannapin will be in Köln the 4 May 1976 and will introduce me to the President of the BND." Altaylı, together with an ancient Azerbaijani prisoner of war, later on working with the SS, Dr. Kengerli in the German Embassy have invited Dr. Kannapin to North Cyprus, in response to his activities of "support" to the organization of the Party in Germany and in constructing its relations with the Federal German Union of Workers. Kengerli has played an important role in transferring to Türkeş the reports prepared by the Turkestanese people under the auspices of the CIA.

To a Bank Number to the name of Türkeş in Germany Köln Deutsche Bank, many neo-nazi movements of the world, including Jacob Pffersich in US National Fascist Party, CSU in Germany some modest amounts of money were sent in the help of the party.

As another figure important in the organization of the Party base in foreign countries the rich businessman Murat Bayrak should also be cited. He was at the same time a member of the central committee of

the party. Murat Bayrak have quit Turkey after 12 September, lived in United States and later on in Germany. He instituted there a party called as Islamist Democratic Party and supported Cemaladdin Kaplan, pro-Iranian Turkish Mollah known as "Kara Ses" (Black Voice) in Turkey. Hence today, the Nationalist Work Party, as the continuation of the neo-fascist movement of the past, tries to conceal the distance between itself and the masses, more and more converted to Islam, by bringing about new "characters" from Islamist ideology, while carrying also its "clandestine" relations -as it has the habitude, unlike the Welfare Party and prudent Islamists of the order- on national and international grounds.

A second dimension of the nationalist Islamism appears especially with ethnic solidarity associations, controlled by neo-fascist or Islamist movements, if not by the state. The political conjuncture created by the events of Bulgaria, Western Thrace and Azerbaijan have brought many important occasions of survival and propaganda to these associations.

An evaluation of the rise of a nationalist "Islamism" was made by Dr. Nur Vergin from Bilkent University (Administrative Sciences Faculty), where she was trying to observe the new "social-psychological" context that emerged after the rise of the events of Turkish

refugees from Bulgaria; as well as and on a more explosive a scale during the events of Azerbaijan, on the ground of some forms of "nationalism" in Turkey: "The so-called religious explosion observed in Turkey, and the rise in the motives of religious identity of masses are in fact the expression and the crystallization of the national sentiments. This is nothing but a nationalism that is able only to manifest itself on a religious register and codes of sentiments."

However Mrs. Vergin assumes that this new "social-psychology" of the Islamist-nationalist ideas and sentiments is rather a projection of the national feelings into the well-established Islamic cultural codes, while having on the other hand a "transcendental" validation. But what are these "codes" or rather what we may call "themes" that are supposed to articulate the nationalism with the Islamic "culture", and "transcendence"? The problem is far more complex, as manifested by Mrs. Vergin herself, who expresses her fear from the development or explosive manifestation of some "rigid" and even "pathological" defects of this nationalistic-Islamist "expression of feelings". She states that the religious variations of Turkish nationalism may be a "paradoxical" incarnation since the emergence of the events of Bulgaria. While the fear of Dr. Vergin is limited only to the possible -and probable- transformation of this naive

nationalism (assumed to be healthy in its actual appearances) into a rigid doctrine of vengeance, into an authoritarian, repressive and aggressive chauvinism.

However, she opposes the idea that there is a possibility for this transformation, observing that this kind of developments had never been gained importance throughout Turkish history, even during the period of Independence War, in the sense that they acquired the dominant positions among the political factors of Turkish Republic.

According to Dr. Nur Vergin, despite the works of the refugee associations that purported evidently to secure their closer relatives and family groups, the event of Bulgarian Turks emerged fully as the problem of Bulgaria, not of the Turks inhabiting Bulgaria: "The Bulgarian factor in Bulgaria is dominated and outmoded by the recent developments in Soviet Union, and felt the excessive backwardness their people live in comparing their position with those of other countries of the Warsaw Treaty. They felt themselves inferior to their "Big Brother" Soviet Union on the basis of the lack of self-esteem. On the other hand, the same Bulgarian factor also felt itself uncomfortable face to the ethnic groups of Turks inhabiting Bulgaria, who lived in fact under conditions of peaceful co-existence with their Bulgarian

citizens. Hence, the Bulgarian administration became more and more engaged to show its teeth to those, it had long to bring into a dominated position in the past, but that it failed until now..."

The identity of Bulgarian Turks: The problem of identity cannot be explained by mere ideological concepts like "substance", "essence" of a metaphysical order. The problem really appears in the concrete threats over the "identity" itself: there is nothing metaphysical in this. The dislocations and the induced disintegrative mechanisms over the national identity could lead to some "schizoid" or other psycho-pathological dysfunctions: in the past we have observed how the Cretan Turkish communities have preferred to accept to live an "émigré" life in their motherland, while the fate of Turkey was not yet revealed during the First World War. This occurred at the moment when they saw their cultural and ethnic identity being under threat, and that their long-standing cultural domination in the country had gradually declined; they migrated to Turkey leaving behind themselves their farms, homes and works.

However, the experience of the migration of Bulgarian Turks has brought also some unhappy results for both nationalists and Islamists of Turkey, especially those who were the allies of the order, when they took

leading positions in the propaganda activities and campaigns, in parallel to the activities of the Government, which tried to use the events as a manifestation of the strength of Turkey they claimed to create. Or, on the basis of the cultural integration of the refugees, as well as the failure of the attempts to provide them with appropriate jobs in the respective fields of employment they enjoyed in Bulgaria, the Islamists and nationalists too felt uncomfortable with the results of the returning back of the Bulgarian refugees. In other words, we can say on this basis that the emigration of Turks, whether it be motivated by nationalistic or religious purposes, when brought back to its "social psychological" instances has not to be necessarily motivated by an excessive repression on the part of other cultures or foreign forces (like other nationalisms as in Greece or some Middle Eastern countries, or by communism in Bulgaria or Soviet Union). It is sufficient for them to have the feeling of losing their cultural, and religious identity, to choose the way of migration while not seeing the concrete consequences. But it should therefore be added that, also, they tend to return back to their former conditions when not finding jobs, well treatment, and failing to be adapted to the conditions of their motherland.

One can also pose the question why the migrants failed to be adapted into the life conditions in Turkey, despite all efforts claimed to be fulfilled by the government as well as by their "relatives", assumed to be associated in the Associations of Turkish ethnic groups, like the "Solidarity Association for the Turks of Western Thrace", or for the "Vakf of Azerbaijani Culture" etc. Or these associations were established on a double purpose: not only to maintain the religious and national "substance" of the immigrants as Turks and Muslims, but more meaningfully, to protect their formed cultural identity they enjoyed in their old countries, like "Bulgarian Turks", "Azerbaijanis", "Cherkesses" or "Turks of Greece". Their primordial aim, in the past, was to preserve not only the religious and nationalistic sentiments, which were enjoyed evidently by the immigrants in Turkey, but also, and more importantly the rights of their people in Turkey, which could appear unimaginably ruinous for them if they failed to be adapted.

Or, the last experiences after the events of Bulgaria, and especially the manifestations organized by these associations on the occasion offered also by official reinforcement of the government, during the year 1989 when the two such events exploded for Bulgarian and Azerbaijani Turks, have deliberately shown that the

fundamental functioning of these associations have largely been transformed. They were either the "pro-government", rightist associations linked sometimes to some extreme-rightist movement, deployed either by the State or some circles or political parties, inheriting also the messages from the past ETKO (The Liberation Army for Enslaved Turks) terrorism, under the auspices of the neo-fascist Nationalist Movement Party, or some interest-bounded groups, trying to acquire legitimate positions in business life, focusing in the opposition of the segregationism in this field. Hence, we see the like associations absolutely unsuccessful in carrying out activities for the rehabilitation of their conraces, migrating from Bulgaria; and this by the single reason that they tended to evaluate the basic motives of the migration the "religious and nationalist essence". This diagnosis has been rejected by the fact that more than the half of the refugee population (exceeding 250,000 people according to official records) returned back to Bulgaria. On this account we may say that the heavy burden of "nationalism" and "Islamism" was essentially insupportable for the refugees who were not even in a position to find jobs adequate for their educational level, and the life conditions and payments they enjoyed in their native country.

3.14 Islam and the Press

The Islamist groups active in Turkey are conducting their political struggle and activities generally around press organs of various kinds, and various objectives, whose subjects are ranged from religious education to political debates, from "Islamist science" to humour. The journalist from Cumhuriyet, Cüneyt Arcayürek sketches out the following Islamist newspapers, reviews and magazines that are actually in publication:

1. Zafer (Victory): The review Zafer, published by some circles close to the brotherhood of Nourjis, has the objective -defined by the editorial- of establishing an "Islamic discourse" based upon scientific principles. These "scientific principles" are nothing but the data given by the Islamic theology, though on a sophisticated debate. According to the numbers published by Cumhuriyet at the beginning of 1987 it is distributed on direct charges or in kiosks by 10 thousand numbers a week.

2. Sızıntı (Infiltration): This weekly close to the Nourjis, appearing as a magazine of sciences and "opinion" (naturally Islamic opinion) was recommended by the Ministry of National Education to the schools and university libraries until the year 1987. According to some observers, its tirage attained 500 thousands during this

period. Its actual number of exemplars is around 80 thousands a week. It became known especially after the initiative it took during the "creationist criticism" against the "atheist Darwinism" which was taught in the schools, and for a period, the Ministry of Education answered to the "anti-evolutionist" campaign of the review, sending an edict to all secondary schools for including "creationism" among the "scientific theories" in biology courses, stating a serious scandal within the government as well as in the press.

3. Sur (The Fortress): This monthly review published by a circle close to the Nourjis is distributed by post. It has 20 thousands exemplars in month.

4. Can Kardeş: Can Kardeş is the children-magazine of the Nourjis. The subjects appearing in the review are some generic themes about the Islamic moral and religious education of children (at the stage of primary school), together with comics including such subjects as ancient Islamic "mujahids", heroic romances and novels.

5. Mektup (Letter): The review for women published by circles close to Nakshibendi brotherhood. It attained 30 thousands exemplars in 1987. It teaches the place of women in Islamic community, her role as "wife",

as "mother" and the moral agent of the Islam in the house. It carried an active contribution to the "turban revolts" of Muslim women.

6. Altınoluk: A monthly publication of Nakshibendi brotherhoods, based upon actual problems of daily life. It attained 25 thousands exemplars in 1989.

7. Islam: The monthly press organ of the Nakshibendi, which is the most influent and active. It attained almost all circles of the sect with more than 100 thousands exemplars. The political, economic and social issues are discussed.

8. Aile ve Kadın (Family and Woman): The monthly "family and woman" review published by the Nakshibendi; developing the themes on similar grounds with the review "Mektup".

9. Köprü (The Bridge): A review of literature and arts (Islamic poetry in predominance) published by a circle close to the ideas of the Nourjis, with 5 thousands exemplars a week.

10. İlim ve İnsan (Science and Man): The scientific magazine published by the Nakshibendi; around 5 thousand exemplars in month. Such themes as "the

miracles of the Koran", the conversion of occidental scientists into Islam etc. And other scientific vulgarizations of the kind...

11. İnsan ve Kainat (Man and the Universe): A philosophical-theological magazine of the Nakshibendi; distributed among closed circles, problematizing the fundamental dogmas of the Islamic doctrine and philosophy.

12. Öğüt (Council): A political and doctrinaire review close to the old sect of Kadiris appearing with 30 thousands exemplars in a week.

13. İcmal: A political, moral and doctrinaire review of the brotherhoods close to the Kadiri sect, appearing with 70 thousands exemplars in a month.

14. İmam: A review published by some circles close to the ideals of Khomeini and Islamic revolution; its publication is not regular for obvious reasons.

15. Ribad: An Islamist magazine published and distributed exclusively in Konya with 20 thousands exemplars a month. It is the most well-known and influent Islamist review published in local centers.

16. Mektep (The School): A review on educational problems published by the Nakshibendis, 5 thousands exemplars.

17. Tavır (Attitude): A review on Islam and arts, published in Istanbul by an Islamist circle close to the ideas of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, an Islamic poet and thinker dead three years ago.

18. Girişim (Enterprise): A review published by an independent Islamist group; radical in its doctrine and oriented towards Islamist activism. Apparently, they are focused upon the problems about the Kurds (it should be said that they might have close relations with Kurdish movements not opposing the Islam), the Middle East problems etc. 7 thousands exemplars a month.

19. Yazı (Scripture)

20. İktibas: A political review published by an independent Islamist group; 7 thousands exemplars a month.

21. Türkiye-Çocuk (Turkey-Child): A review for children published by the brotherhood of Isikchis.

22. Doktor: A review of medicine (traditional) published by the Isikchis. Charged by traditional therapeutic methods used by Turkish people in Anatolia.

23. Made in Turkey: A review and touristic guide published by the Isikchis, especially for the foreigners (after the rise in the number of Arabian tourists in Istanbul).

24. Kitap Dergisi (Book Review): A book review published by "Birleşik Dağıtım" (United Publications) discussing over Islamic publications of any kind, book reviews, periodicals and public debates over Islamic issues. The review appears since January 1990.

25. Dış Politika (Foreign Policy): A review published by a mixed group, open to all voices of the Islam; focusing upon the international problems of Turkey and Islamic countries.

26. Panel: A review on politics, public opinion and economy, including the actual political issues, appearing weekly.

27. Türkiye Günlüğü (Turkish Agenda): A sophisticated and intellectualist monthly, focusing upon cultural issues, as well as political, artistic and general

problems, carrying out campaigns on ecological problems on an Islamist fashion. Open to the center-leftist opinion, and anti-modernist, radical and even anarchistic tendencies.

28. Bizim Ocak (Our Home): The review of the Islamist wing of the Nationalist Work Party; very active and radical in its Islamism, refusing the synthesis of the pure Turkish nationalism with the Islamist ideals. Carrier of various public debates over the new Islamism of the party.

29. Dönüşüm (Transformation): A shariatist review published in Doğanhisar, a province of Konya whose population doesn't exceed 10 thousand people. Only an example among innumerable reviews and books published in provinces where the Islamist sects and groups are active. For instance, a review of literature was appearing during the period 1988-89 in Pötürge, a small province of Malatya, developing on a very sophisticated intellectualism the Islamist themes in world literature and culture. These examples show that the list of periodicals we gave here are far from being exhaustive before the huge majority of "provincial publications" of the Islamists.⁶

To these, must be added a huge number of video and audio cassettes, post cards, posters and pictures on Islamist themes, carrying out messages from the leaders of the brotherhoods (especially from the

Suleimanjis and Cemalettin Kaplan, a brotherhood leader who lives since 1980 in West Germany).

We can add to them a huge number of daily newspapers, the Yeni Nesil (New Generation) appearing as the press organ of the Nourjis with 8 thousands exemplars, and the Milli Gazete (National Journal) supporting the Welfare Party, while it was in the past the organ of the National Salvation Party (30 thousands exemplars). The newspaper Zaman published by a group of Islamist intellectuals separated from the "Milli Gazete", under the leadership of the Islamist thinker and journalist Abdurrahman Dilipak (11 thousands exemplars). The most important daily newspaper published by Islamists is the Türkiye (Turkey) of the sect of Ishikchis, close to the Nationalist Movement Party in the past, having schismed from the party politics today to a more or less evidenced degree. It attains 100-150 thousands of exemplars in a day, making out of this journal one of the most influent press organs of the Central Anatolia and other urban centers.

The excessive political prudence of the Islamist sects and currents is reflected in the fact that their "media" are constrained within the limits of the "press" and "publications", whose number increased especially after 1983, in parallel to the "Koranic courses" and the

attempts to restore Islamist parties after the gradual passage into the restricted democratic order. This does not mean that the Islamists, while being constrained within small circles of "publications" are not politically effective, or not being overtly engaged in political activities. The fact that the total number of Islamist publications in a month exceeds one and half a million as well as the number of Islamist newspapers, journals, pamphlets, declarations and periodicals can show how they are influent over large masses in both metropolitan areas and the countryside.

The reviews and newspapers published by the Islamists are in general controlled by diverse Islamist institutions, "religious sects", named or un-named movements, circles etc. They can cover either the mere "official" policies of a sect, or the publications for indoctrination of people according to the Islamist principles of life. There are even "Islamist scientific periodicals", or "Islamist touristic guides", the latter published in Arabic, Turkish and English for the tourists, opposing the status of "museum for Saint-Sofia" etc. There are also some Islamist reviews addressed to the family life, educational life, to the teen-agers, philosophy, theology and natural sciences. Their effectivity was even supported, until 1987 by the Government, if we recall that the review "Sızıntı" (Infiltration) was recommended by

the Ministry of Education to the secondary schools and universities (this review does not figure in the list of "Recommended Books and Periodicals" of the Ministry after the fall of Adnan Dinçerler, the author of an "Islamist-laicist" scandal in the debate "Darwinism and Creationism" which exploded in 1986-87 period). In fact, all these events appeared in continuity, if not the realization of, the will expressed by Tayyar Altıkulaç, the President of Religious Affairs in April 1979: "The State is a means for maintaining the religion"

3.15 The Archaic and Modern notions of "Islamic State"

The notion of "Islamic State" originally appears as a "moral state", which is not conceived within the context of politics, in the sense that the people and groups are represented, or a ruling class ruled the country. Its base is nothing but the "Islamic community" bound by primordial moral relations to the God, thus not conceiving of a ruling elite, or monarch. Almost all Islamic countries, however, from the beginning of its history lived under despotic and monarchic regimes, where the sovereign power owned all means of life and the living beings themselves as the representative of God. The law was based upon the rules of Sharia, and justice was distributed on the basis of the rules derived out directly from the Koran and the "hadiss" which are the

"deeds of the prophet". The Islamist jurisprudence, in its archaic form, remains based upon the decisions of the "kadis", who distributed justice as working as the theologians. For the Sunni orthodoxy, the exegesis of the rules were banned, while for the shii version of Islamic jurisprudence, the "mollahs" had the right of exegesis over the Islamic rules.

This archaic form of "Islamic State" survived in its different forms and versions all over the history, including the case of the Ottoman Empire. The modern notion of "Islamic State", on the other hand, is not developed as the result of a debate or evolution inherent to Islamism, but as a result of the "modernization" and "westernization" movements developed in Islamic countries since the nineteenth century. As a result of this, and also under the constraint of the subjugation to the western colonialism for a large period, the "modern State conception" of Islamism was in fact an hybrid form, eclectically bringing together the western and traditional institutional forms. This bewildering version of "State conception" led to authoritarian-bureaucratic elitist states, to monoparty regimes, and sometimes violent dictatorships in the model of Ba'ath. The nationalistic forms, appearing as against all Islamic norms condensed around the notion of unity and integrity, meant in fact a significant switch from the "old Islamic wisdom of State" of the past into

a sphere of "aggiornamento", absorbing modern notions about political forms.

The problem of Islamic State appears on two distinct grounds today: the first in the context of "shariat" rule, equally applied to various Islamic countries ranging from revolutionary Iran to Saudi Arabia, from Libya to Indonesia. A certain "secular" dispositive exists for all these rules, in the sense that the "sharia" has become only a part of a larger context of power, produced within the struggle between modernization and traditionalism, incarnated in the state apparatus assuming "modern" forms. Only in Iran, the sharia seems to reach an absolute power, giving us the second dimension of what we call "Islamic State". The same sect of mollahs, too powerful in Iran from their social backgrounds, and who denied in the past the "republican regime" as against the Sharia, today became the founders of the "Islamist Republic", a new notion and mode of power as succeeding a revolution, and denying for all "non-Islamic" institutions -as possible- as to be banned and reduced to nothing. During the days of Islamic revolution, Khomeini himself appealed for the interdiction of all organizations and institutions not adopting the rules of Islam.

In countries which were not experiencing the excessive power of Shiite mollahs as the "judges of truth",

the rule of sharia is not transformed into a regime like Iran, whatever authoritarian in its essence. And in countries like Turkey, rich in secularist tendencies while the greater part of the population is Muslim (almost the 98 percent of the total population) while there exist many tensions between the Islamists and traditionalist on the one hand and the ruling authority on the other, a sophisticated system of mutual sacrifices, concessions, holds of positions and sometimes relative ruptures of connections. In other words, Turkey appears as a "pervert" case among all Islamic countries, while others too have tried to construct similar systems of "security belts" against Islam and against Western colonialism at the same time (as it was the case with Nasserism and Ben Bella) which have not achieved their purpose and came to their ends. Even Turkey, having a closer dependence over the West, both economically and politically (if not talking about the military), does not ever arrive to a position to establish its total and calm integrity, and her democracy is ruptured every ten years during the last forty years period.

Or, is it possible to have an Islamist-democratic regime? In an article appeared in a moderate Islamist review, "Panel", the actual democratic conditions of Turkey could no longer be maintained if the isolation from the West will appear as a general outcome of the recent

transformations (the failure of Turkey's application to the European Community, the dramatic change in the East etc.). In an "isolated Turkey", the democratic regime could not be maintained since this regime, according to the observer from Panel, was imposed on Turkey by Western world: "It is significant that today, even those who oppose western mode of pluralist democracy are struggling for "democratic rights". And we may say that the rise of the Islamic movement today is also partially an outcome of the adequate conditions brought by democratization..." According to the same observer, the Welfare Party would reach in a possible general elections an electoral base of 15 percent, and to this must also be added the votes controlled directly by greatest brotherhoods as the Nakshibendi and Nourjis as another 15 percent.

Hence, the Islamist journalist from Panel tries to develop a counter-argument against those asserting that the "democracy" was not convenient for Islamists. According to the author, the Islamists who attained such an adequate position for the elections cannot oppose the democratic order on behalf of an authoritarian regime. But this rather "instrumentalist" approach does not entail the fact that the Islamists reaching the power -or developing their strength in the field of politics- would overthrow the democratic regime on behalf of an

authoritarian Islamism. While the author stresses that the "democratism" of the Islamists is not only a tactical disposition, but a long-term strategic object of interest.

Following this line of reasoning, the author tries to develop what he calls "the new conditions of Democratic Islam", rejecting both the perspectives of self-isolation from the West (causing the rapprochement of the rulers to the Muslim masses, creating harms for the development of Islamic consciousness), or adopting an Islamist line similar to those appearing in Middle Eastern countries. Or these kinds of Islamisms, whatever their revolutionary pretensions cannot be introduced to the Islamic traditions in Turkey, and what they call as "revolutionary Islamism" is nothing but some intricate political disputes and interest bounded activities at the level of political parties like the Ba'ath, or in Iran, trying to destroy the democratic instances of the society through violence, which is essentially contrary to Islamic principles. According to the author of the article in Panel, the "genuine" Islamism, which could adapt itself to the new conditions of the world appear exclusively in Turkey, not locking the doors to the "Common European Home" and democratic order on the one hand, and the Islamic values and norms, as well as the national consciousness and culture on the other.

3.16 Islamic Organizations Originated in Middle East

In accordance to the official documents the "Islamic Organizations originated of Middle East which are active in Turkey" are the following:

Hizbullah. This Islamic organization was constituted by a volunteer armed troop, part of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, which were send to the Bekaa Valley by Iranian government after the Israeli intervention to Lebanon in 1982. The basic tendency of this organization is a pro-Iranian motivated schiism. The organization based upon a schiite theory of "integrity" of the armed struggle and leadership with the religious leadership, based upon the unitary decision of the religious chiefs or mollahs is governed actually by the Sheikh Suphi Tufeyli, Sheih Abbas Musavi, Sheih Ibrahim Amir and Sheih Hasan Nasrallah.

The armed struggle carried on by the organization is based upon terroristic guerrilla warfare, while on political grounds, its activities are concentrated around the extensive propaganda in direction of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. The armed, terroristic activities of the organization are carried on by a team called as "Kuvvat el Ruum".

Their first armed activities in Turkey have been performed in Istanbul in the form of armed kidnappings. They had been engaged in between 1983 and 1 November 1984 when they were "detected" by security forces to 12 armed theft and 6 automobile theft, and in one case, they injured a jeweler in his shop, for the aim of armed theft. Pursuing the terrorists, security forces have found four revolvers and a "Sten" automatic weapon. The 14 persons detected as members to "Hizbullah" were arrested and tried, consequently being sentenced to imprisonment. It is asserted that Iran sustains the organization effectively in financial and logistic supports.

In the official records, it is asserted that since 1989, the organization entered into a period of recuperation, but not attaining a serious "massive" support among radical Islamic groups. However, Uğur Mumcu the journalist from Cumhuriyet, a specialist over terrorist organizations believes in that it is a too much complicated an issue to decide upon the authors of these Islamist activists, since it is impossible to prove the existence of the relations between the "Islamist terrorist organization" and Hizbullah since there are many reasons to believe in that the militants arrested in Istanbul with their arms as "probable terrorists of Hizbullah" would be the members of another organization, referring back to

the fact that the Hizbullah never attempted to attack Turkish people on Turkish territory, and, according to Uğur Mumcu, the Iranians killed in Turkey were probably attained by the "SAVAMAK", the Intelligence Service of the Islamic Revolution.

On the other hand, there exist also some claims that the arrested militants in Istanbul would have some relations with the "Union of Islamist Associations and Societies", established by the ancient vice-president of Presidency of Religious Affairs, Cemalettin Kaplan, the "Black Voice" in Germany. This organization was established in 1985 by Cemalettin Kaplan, Ahmet Polat, Selahattin Yazıcı, Hasan Hayri Kılıç, Seyfettin Özkan, Süleyman Aslan, Mustafa Özçelik, Ibrahim Kaba and Hamdi Ergunlu.

According to the evaluation of Uğur Mumcu, the leaders of this organization, who are all Turks believe in the necessity of an Islamist revolt in Turkey, on the model of Iranian revolution. They have prepared an Islamic Constitution draft, copying directly the Constitution of Iran Islamic Republic, and its leader, Cemalettin Kaplan "imitates" from Germany the vocation of Imam Khomeini when he was finding refuge in France before 1979.

The Islami Jihad (Islamic Religious War). In parallel to the Hizbullah, the "Islami Jihad" emerged first in 1982, aiming to launch and develop the pioneering for the "sacred war for Islam". The excessively closed structure of the organization remains undeciphered on international ground, but their pretensions and slogans, as well as their communiqués concerning their acts of terror and violence are showing that they are, similarly to the Hizbullah organization, a Shiite originated organization.

It is asserted that there are some probable relations between the Islami Jihad and other pro-Shiite armed groups in Lebanon, which are trying to revive the Shiite unity among the Shiite groups in Lebanon, as Islami Amal (Islamic Quest), Islamic Cause Party of Lebanon, Hizbullah and Commandos of Imam Hussain. But the Islami Jihad has to be distinguished from them in its terrorist activism and higher strength, as well as in its firm structure and unity.

The organization first became known by the terrorist activities it was engaged since 1982, on an international scale. In relation to Turkey, the Islami Jihad had published a document in English in 1986, accusing Turkish government by being in complicity with the government of Saddamist regime in Iraq, and that they

would organize some armed attacks in foreign missions of Turkey if this relationships would continue.

Among the two terrorist acts pretended by Islami Jihad in Turkey, there were the murder of Abdūlgani Bedevi, second secretary of Saudi Arabian Embassy to Ankara in 25 October 1988 and the explosion of a plastic bomb in the car of Abdurrahman Ahmet El Shirevi, accounting manager in Saudi Arabian Embassy to Ankara, causing the heavy injure of the diplomat.

Hizb-ül Dava (The Front of Islamic Cause, known also as Party of Calling to Islam). According to the reports of the intelligence services and state authorities of Turkey, this organization was established in the town Necef, in Iraq by the Shiites, to the name of this sacred region for Shiite people, and is aimed to correspond to the "Moslem Brotherhood" sunnite organization. The organization is known also as Party of Calling to Islam, or "El Dava" (The Cause) and remains partially under the auspices of the "Irakian Islamic Revolution Supreme Council). But, in its actions and terroristic activities, while supported partially by the "Council" the organization enjoys some freedom and independence.

The fundamental strategy of the El Dava is today "revolutionary" since it is based upon the ultimate goal of

overthrowing the Ba'ath regime in Iraq and to restore the genuine "Islamic Regime" in Iraq. The organization, while benefiting from Iranian support for some or other political reasons, is affiliated to the Iraqi type of Islamism, mainly in continuity with the Sunni ideology.

In accordance to official reports, El Dava have performed in December 1983 some bomb explosions in metropolitan regions of Turkey, like Ankara, Istanbul and İzmir. The assaults were directed especially to the buildings of some foreign diplomatic missions in Turkey, like Iraq, France and United States. The authors of the acts were arrested and tried.

Hizb-ül Tahrir. Among the most active Islamist international organizations in Turkey the Hizb-ül Tahrir comes together with Hizbullah- unprecedented and the oldest one. The organization was established in Jerusalem in the year 1953. The basic motives of the Hizb-ül Tahrir are mainly political, while its range of activism compounds also some clandestine and illegal activities. The organization is active in Turkey since the year 1962. It was the first organization which published in Turkey the "Islamic State Constitution". In fact, the "Constitution" was brought in Turkey by a Palestinian member of Hizb-ül Tahrir, Ahmed Salah el Ali. The organization was

deciphered in Turkey first by Spring 1967. The leaders and members of the organization were tried and condemned to sentences varying between one year to five years. The organization Hizb-ül Tahrir has its roots in the Jordanian policy of two decades ago: naturally its rival organization is nothing but the Rabitat-ül Alem-i İslamin. However, while the Rabita is maintained by the support of the Saudi dynasty, the Hizb-ül Tahrir has nothing to do with the actual ruling power in Jordan.

Ahmad Salad el Ali was send to re-erect the organization after the arrestations of the year 1967. He managed to recuperate the forces of the organization especially through expanding circles at Konya, Aksaray and Ankara. He brought also some Islamist publications and books with him, to be reproduced and distributed among these Islamist circles like "The Vital Question for Islam", "The Islamic Order", and "The Basic Issues relating the Hizb-ül Tahrir". But the most important document he brought was the "Islamic State Constitution" which is still respected today.

During the reunions the text of the "Constitution" was distributed or collectively lectured, and the ongoing discussions were proceeding in the perspectives of developing a more effective campaign and propaganda. In 12 July 1968 another police operation was made in the

homes of five members of the organization, the responsables being tried and condemned to imprisonment. Following these arrestations another activist Edip Kemal Mahmut was send to conduct and lead the organization's activities in Turkey. This activist was defining the ultimate objectives of the Hizb-ül Tahrir in following words: "The ultimate goal of the Party I am representing now is the re-unification of all Islamic countries, and to put them under the rule of a Khalifate. In the public life under this Islamist State, the shariatist rule will dominate all spheres of life. If the conscience of the shariatist principles are not expanded within the army, it would be ineffective all works and campaigns to establish this regime. The revolution will not be directly performed by the central organization of the Party, since it is almost impossible to accomplish successfully a revolution without the direct involvement and participation of militants who had accepted the basic principles of the Party. The Center of Party remains in secret. We have to make predominant the faith to the Khalifate over the minds of all our militants and symphatizers. If they become successful, they have to transfer the power to us. And if they are arrested, they have not to give information about the place and working of the party center. For protecting the party leadership from these possibilities, the militants have not to know anything about the place of the party center." And a third wave

of arrestations were operated in 1969. The arrested persons were tried and condemned to imprisonment.

In the draft-program of Islamic Constitution prepared and distributed by the organization Hizb-ül Tahrir, we can read the following statements about the design of the future shariatist state in Turkey:

The complete vocation to the Islamic conscience and faith, and the conditions that have been sketched above give the right of constituting political parties to the Moslems in order to settle the accounts with unfaithful rulers of the regime and to seize the state power by the means of Islamic community with the essential recourse to the basic principles of the Law of Sharia. The sovereignty is not possessed by the nation, but by the shariat. And the rights of administration and execution belong to the Islamic community (Ümmet). The election of the head of State has to be delegated as the primary right to the Moslem people. The assembly constituted by elections has to be the assembly of the Moslem union. All adult Moslems, including women can participate to the reunions of this assembly. Moslems of all sexes have the right to elect their President. The base of the State is the essence of Islam. All institutions, attitudes and organizations that are not determined by a close attachment to Islamic principles should be forbidden.

The President of the State is charged by the task of exercising power through the laws and Constitution derived directly out of Islamic principles...The right of jurisdiction is given to the "kadis". In her daily life, the woman can have contacts with the men, by the condition that she covers up totally her body except her hands and face. And in her private life, she may have contact only with other women and those men who are not her "mahrems" (the relatives and affiliates as well as her husband)..."

The organization Hizb-ül Tahrir continued its action after 1980. In September 1985 it diffused some pamphlets appealing for Sharia in some mosques and public places at Çorum and Sungurlu provinces. 42 persons were arrested on this occasion for the crimes of violating the "secular principles" by distributing texts for an "Islamic Constitution".

Rabitat-ül Alem-in İslam. This organization, well-known since the "scandalous" explosion of the news about the delegation of the payments of Turkish imams and religious men working in European countries since 1982 (the public was informed only in 1987) is under the direct control and direction of the Saudi crown. It was established by Sultan Suud of Arabia in May 1962. Its center is at Mecca. The basic motive behind its

establishment was the fear from the Nasserian type of Arabic nationalism, seriously damaging the interests of the Saudi Arabia and other Sultanates of the region. Four official languages are spoken at the Center at Mecca: Arabic, Urdu, Persian and Turkish. It is governed by a Constituent Assembly constituted by 21 persons. There were two Turks who were participating to this Assembly in sixties and seventies.

In the Constitution of Rabita, the shariatist ideas are dominating: according to the "Convention of Islamic Union", published by the organization in 1962 the ultimate goal of the Rabita was to struggle against any attempts to overshadow the Islamic principles. In an article published by the review "The Muslim", appearing in London as the "Youth Organ" of the Community, the relations between Turkey and Rabita were depicted in the following words: "Today the Islamist current is seriously developing in Turkey, among all social strata and throughout all country...There exist an inseparable cooperation for Islamist purposes between young and older generations. They have an irresistible tendency and faith in order to seize the administration of the country..."

This pamphlet published by the Federation of Muslim Youth entailed also the relations and contacts of

the federation with Turkish students, or other rightist organizations in Turkey, as well as with the Presidency of Religious Affairs and the State Planning Organization.

A government authority interviewed by Cüneyt Arcayürek in February 1990 was stating that "the State is informed about 80 clandestine organizations in Turkey, both from the left and the right". Or, after the rise of some new "Islamist-terrorist organizations" since that time, Cüneyt Arcayürek was asking the question "what about the organization unknown by the State?" Related to the murders of Muammer Aksoy and Çetin Emeç, the security officials stated that the "primary order suspects" were "from exterior in origin and probably Islamists". Another governmental authority of the past, well-known for his preoccupation with the international terroristic activities incited also a debate over "Islamist terrorism" developed in the "triangle Libya-Lebanon-Teheran". In parallel to this "elucidation", the authorities seeking some proofs about the authors of the recent rise of "terrorism" have found on their path the militants that are said to be members of Hizbullah, an international pro-iranian terrorist organization originated from the Middle-East.

3.17 Islam in State Apparata

The eminent journalist from Cumhuriyet, Uğur Mumcu observes as an important danger for the political picture of secularism in Turkey the appointment of the graduates from religious schools (Imam Hatip Colleges) in other kinds of employments than religious tasks. In 1989 scholar year, there were in total 282,582 students who continued their education in religious schools and 1277 students in the 9 Faculties of Theology all over the country. Another statistics assert that during the 1985-86 scholar year, 43,713 students have graduated from religious colleges.

Or all of the students graduated from religious colleges and theology faculties were not employed in the fields of religious services and activities which have to be under the strict control of the Presidency of Religious Affairs depending on the Prime Ministry. And, as Uğur Mumcu maintains, the employment gap in this field was filled by the graduates from primary schools. In accordance to the statistical figures, 10,686 out of 50,814 imams and religious officials employed by the Presidency of Religious Affairs are only graduated from primary schools. And only the 6 percent of the total personnel of the Presidency of Religious Affairs are graduated from

superior level of studies. Their number reaches only 2737 persons.

While the religious services and educational activities are transferred into the hands of the primary school graduates, the "preferred" graduates of religious schools and faculties are employed mainly in other fields, especially in local level administrative posts in the government and State, in accordance to the Regulation of Educational Unity.

As a research carried on by Professor Onur Kumbaracıbaşı two years ago has shown, the 41 percent of the students of Administrative Sciences Faculty of the Ankara University were graduated from religious high schools and colleges, and behind this we can detect easily the basic tenets of the central strategy of the Islamist circles in Turkey, which is based upon the seizure of the local level power institutions, as governors and provincial officials. To this must be added that in Turkey, there are only 55 Teacher's Colleges against 717 Imam Hatip Colleges today.⁷

NOTES

¹ The data displayed in this section, concerning the 'map of Islamic movements' in Turkey are reproduced from a previous, unpublished compilation prepared using the texts of the journalist Cüneyt Arcayürek

in Cumhuriyet, on a series on 'İslami Hareketler', 12-30 April 1991; the series prepared by Uğur Mumcu and Gencay Şaylan, published separately in (Mumcu, 1992) and in Cumhuriyet, 30 August 1992.

² quoted in Mumcu (op. cit. pp. 81-83)

³ In this respect, it should be noted how so intricate relationships exist between PKK and the entire topography of Islam in South-Eastern Anatolia.

⁴ The ideology of the Akinjilar (Akinclar) can be referred directly to a confusion between the message of Jihad and the role of the authentic Akinjis (Turkmen nomads) who resided on the borders of the Ottoman territory for pillage and segmented assaults.

⁵ It should be noted that Islamist movements, who suffer from the crisis of adaptation to modern situations of the 'opinion society' are no less moderate and reticent on the platforms of a politics of violence.

⁶ This list is reproduced from Uğur Mumcu, Cumhuriyet, 1991, August.

⁷ op.cit.



CHAPTER IV:
THE PEACE DISCOURSE OF ISLAM

"The Peace is in Islam" (Huzur İslamdadır)

"To live in the Peace and comfort of X"

"...the climate of Peace and security"

Here we have three phrases, each comprehending the word "Peace", whose meanings are strongly determined by the "semantic" deployment of this word, while at the pragmatological level, they are uttered as "order-words", the first and the last one belonging to the political scene, and the second one to the mediatic scene. "The Peace is in Islam" refers to a grammar of order-word, a defined syntactic unity which determines the comprehension and the acceptability on the part of the "pious" hearer. The fact that this statement constitutes an "order-word" is clear, not at the level of grammatical analysis -we yet remind once again that grammaticality is a presupposition- but at the level of the "sense", i.e. the syntax which makes it closer to a command as described by Elias Canetti:

It is the nature of a command to admit of no contradiction. It should be neither discussed, nor explained, nor questioned. It

is terse and clear because it must be instantly understood. Any delay in understanding it detracts from its force and, with every repetition which is not followed by performance, it loses part of its vitality until it finally becomes exhausted and powerless; it is better then not to attempt to revive it. (Canetti, 1973: 352-3)

The syntactic deployment of all phrases of the above, whether they are politically oriented or destined to advertising or promotion (but is it not true for a political propagand phrase too to have a strong element of 'promotion' ?) is formed on a similar ground with what Canetti said about commands: short phrases that are clearly comprehensive, taking their forces in their solidarity with the hearer and the informer who contribute or not to the preservation of the vitality of the phrases. Redundancy as repetition is kept alight, which traces the conditions of the possibility of making and uttering such phrases, and therefore, it is not the channel or the medium which deploys this meaning, but the syntax itself.

However, it is still more difficult to reconstitute the meanings of the elements of these phrases, particularly of the word "Peace", before going into a detailed pragmatic analysis at syntactic, semantic and semiotic levels.

The syntactic analysis could be the easier, if we reflected upon the phrasing regimes involved in the

constitution of "order-words". The syntax of "Huzur ~slamdad~r" combines the word "Peace" as a nominal statement -a Peace which is assumed to be "desirable"- to the predicate "Islam", whose presuppositions are to be discussed for a clear understanding while this is unnecessary -and even undesirable- for the "business" of the statement. Evidently, when we compare it with the syntax of the second phrase, we will see a remarkable syntactic shift in the second, so as to enable the name of the product or service subject to advertisement not to be constituted as a predicate but as the prime mover of the "desirability" itself. It is however clear that in all three phrases, the syntactic unity is constituted on the model of an order-word, a short, brief, abrupt sequence of signifiers as syntactic elements. But this is all we can attain through a pure syntactic analysis, without reference to the conditions of possibility of the "Peace discourse", and to the "semantic" difference which subjects the meaning of Peace into an internal movement of differentiation.

At the semantic level, the word "Peace" obeys to the meaning of the statement. The reconstitution of its "signification", despite the difference do not refer to a unitary meaning of the "word" itself, since the semantic analysis is clearly bound to two levels of analysis, the first, trying to elucidate the meaning of the statement, the second, the meaning of the phrase. It should be remembered that

a phrase cannot be reduced to the meaning of the statement, since it is explained by the conditions of its utterance -the historical conditions, motives and capacities of occurrence- and not even by the approximated "signification" which accounts only for a semantic analysis at the first level. It appears clearly that the second level of analysis requires, like the syntactic one, a reference to the analysis of the semiotic system in which the phrases are pragmatically circulated and concretely uttered.

The reconstitution of the signification of the word "Peace" at the first semantic level, requires no less than a lexical reconstruction of a "semantic network", conveying the first, common sense of the word into difference. Hence, the word "Peace" in "Peace is in Islam" redounds with "Islam", as its condition of possibility, which was already clear at the syntactic combination of the predicate with the subject. It is already part of a semantic network, coordinated by the predominant word "Islam", whose elements refer to the lexical unities commanded by "Peace" on the one hand, and by "Islam" on the other: two groups perhaps are to be distinguished, the first referring to "accord", "harmony", "concord", "armistice" in the sense of non-war situation, or "reconciliation", and the second to the "calm", "composure", "serenity" or "tranquility". The Arabic word "Huzur" refers predominantly to the first group, while its usage in the Islamist discursive "archaism" both of the groups are

involved -the "calm" as living in Peace, referring to a non-war situation, but at the same time to a common-sensical platform deeply involved in the presupposed Islamic customary law, the "cemaat" as the "Umma", the Islamic community. At the level of dominant semantic structure, even the constitutional law of Islam, the "Sharia" is involved in the phrase regimens.

Now, we will proceed -suggestively but still at the empirical level- through a method of eliminating these lexical unities through the inclusion of the constitutive units of the Peace discourse. The evident assumption here is that "Peace discourse" has a narrative and semiotic unity -an open unity which has now an exalted value of acceptability, constituting a semiotic regime of its own. This assumption is scarcely tenable at the present level of analysis, since the "non-discursive implicit presuppositions" have first to be analyzed. The method thereby becomes the elimination of such presuppositions, no longer to reconstitute the "true" meaning of the word "Peace", but to locate it in the context of its non-presence. It is clear that a prospect of "translation" would clarify the fact that a "Peace Discourse" could be immanent to many utterances or phrases in which the word -hence the signification of- "Peace" is lacking. Now this lack, does not mean primarily that language -the propaganda language in particular- "conceals": it would be more convenient to say that language "presupposes" the presence

or non-presence alike of what we have called "collective agencies of language". Ducrot's analysis on the difference between the "implicits" and "presuppositions" made the Austinian issue much more complex. Austin distinguished between the acts of "entailing", "implying" and "presupposing". For instance "All men blush" entails "some men blush". The presupposition of logicity is still involved here: we cannot say "All men blush but not any men blush", or "the cat is under the mat and the cat is on top of the mat", since, according to Austin, "in each case the first clause entails the contradictory of the second". However, it is clear that the act of "entailing" is not an "illocutory", in the sense used by Austin, since it is performed not by the "subject" of the "announce", but by the phrase itself. However, the matter is different in the case of "implying". When I say "the cat is on the mat", I imply that I believe it is, in accordance to Moore logic so that I cannot say "the cat is on the mat but I do not believe it is". At this level, it appears that the illocutory act of asserting and of implying are all the more present. There is a "subjectivation" to the phrase regime on the part of the "subject", a subject of faith and belief in Spinozist language. However, even at this level, we cannot say that the illocutory act of implying was successful, if the intended meaning of the phrase remains uncommunicated to a receiver of the message. I have already ascertained that "communication" as "opinion-making" or even "marketing" were not better concepts than "informing" or "logicity".

Formative of the opinion is language itself, not the "belief" or "faith" which are either the perlocutory effects or "subjectivations" implied in languages. This means that the utterance "Peace is in Islam" entails the negation of the phrase "Islam is War" -to which we can easily oppose the entire discourse of "Jihad" as an integral part of Islam-, and "implies" that the speaker is a "true-believer" (a "mūmin"), but we are still far from grasping the "work" of language involved in the circulation of the phrase. The phrase could be employed ironically, or polemically by someone who protests against the Islam itself, or from a different situational conjuncture, a dying pious person who, at the end, surrendered his worldly life. In the first case, there is no belief, and through this lack of belief at the level of linguistic performance, a more general belief, that of the Islam as a system of values and norms is contested. In the second case, on the other hand, the belief is subdued to the emotive context of a motivational utterance: "I die into Islam..."

The second characteristic illocutory perspective in Austin is that of "presupposing": "All Jack's children are bald" presupposes that Jack has some children, so that we cannot say "Jack has no children and all his children are bald". Shifting our analysis into the level of "presuppositions", we can easily see that the pure involvement in "belief" can explain the validity and acceptability -in the sense used by

Faye- of neither the Islamic belief-system, nor of the "desirability" of Peace. We have shown only the criterion of "contradiction" operating at many levels of pragmatic concepts -"entailing", "implying", "presupposing".

Clearly, the similar case is involved in the second and third phrases too: the "desirability of Peace and comfort", and the "desirability of Peace and security" under a military regime. The desirability is neither implied, nor presupposed in all these phrases. Hence, the "acceptability" of the Peace narrative, its positive implementation, and the subjectivation of the "subjects" to the collective agency of language are not yet explicited on a clear ground. We should therefore transfer the analysis at the level of semiotic systems, i.e. to "signs" referring to "signs" and so on, to infinity. The association between desirability and acceptability is already present at the lexical level, while there is a need for ascertaining the collective movement which can transform the "desirable" into "acceptable". The association between Peace and Islam is made visible already at the level of the form of assertion -a true or false argument in its simplest form- but again, we must refer to the collective agencies which tend to make this connection "acceptable" (whether or not the Islam can give Peace and concord, and whether the Islamic Pax is acceptable or not in the present conjuncture or at this or that moment in history) and "desirable" (whether the people desire or not the constitution of Islamic

Peace, whether the agencies of this desire are passing into a positivity and realization, or whether there are no other desirable means to attain Peace, again, if it is in-itself desirable or acceptable).

This again means that a series of problems is faced when we shift the analysis from the semantic level into the semiotic level. The "syntactic", "semantic" and "semiotic" levels are distinguished "formaliter". But the levels of analysis are to be distinguished at the level of pragmatic determinations, i.e., through the analysis of narrative regimes in which the series of enunciations are concretely phrased and uttered. We have found, in the second chapter the "order-words" as regulating agencies of discourse, and not as utterances which constitute the resulting scenery of speech. Commands "commanded" not only the domain of politics but also of education, family scene and every discursive formation, including the "communicational" and "scientific" domains. In this chapter, I will propose the analysis of the "Peace Discourse", as it appeared particularly in Turkish politics, through reference to the "semantic" origins of the semiotic unity generated by the word "Peace". The problem of translation, however, is important and requires some preliminary remarks. The "translation" is defined by Roman Jakobson as an act of "rewording" -a reformulation at the intralinguale level, through the interpretation of linguistic signs by the means of other signs of the same language or,

at the interlingual level, through the interpretation of linguistic signs by the means of the linguistic signs of other languages. (Jakobson, 1963: 79) Yet there exists another type of translation, important here for our purpose, which is explained by Jakobson as the interpretation of linguistic signs by the means of non-linguistic systems of signs, called as "intersemiotic" translation or "transmutation". The latter traduction, cherished by the art, is a kind of "performance" - not to confound with "performative"- which is, however, a ground network for the emission and transmission of non-corporeal attributes. Translation from linguistic signs into the gestual language or into the language of "images" is a clear example of "transmutation", if we follow Jakobsonian terminology. These "order-images" are no less than "order-words" in their functioning in effect, within systems of "non-discursive implicits". The mysterious sentence in Shatapatha Brahmana, "for whatever food a man eats in this world, by that food he is eaten in the next world" (Canetti, 1971:349) reconstitutes at a mystic level the logic of this transmutation, a "reversal" according to Canetti. As a meaningful transposition into linguistic signs of a religious-mystical belief -the idea of "aeternal recurrence" characteristic of the Brahmanic belief in the doctrine of reincarnation- this sentence makes possible a double transmutation, "the food eating the eater in another life", marking evidently the "taboo" of consuming the "sacred" animals. As to the relationship between "huzr" (Peace) and "death", we should be

aware of their identification in Judaeo-Christian and monotheistic religions: "requiem aeternam dona eis...", the first sentence of the Requiem Mass constitutes an attractive formulation of the identity of a "true" state of Peace with "death".¹ The "requiem" attitude towards Peace is so determined by the emotive, almost mystical world vision that it seems to be destined to make death acceptable, thus belonging to what is called "domestication" or "handling" of death. (Vernant, 1990: 167-8)

4.1 The Constitution of Opinion in Islam

A change in the relationships of forces is directly reflected in the semiotic regimes. I say "directly reflected", but it is only a manner of speaking, as it will clearly appear, with reference to previous chapters, that the two series of formalization, actions and expressions, can intervene to each other not in so far as they "effect" the elements of each other, but in so far as they are redundant with each other. Now, we have to establish, therefore, the connections inherent in the two series, that of action and that of semiotics, on the basis of the implacable rigidity of the "movements". Is it possible to call the Islamism, especially in a country whose 98 % majority of population is Moslem like Turkey, as a "movementé? One would say that the term "movement", inherited from the XIXth Century Europe to designate any political affiliation, applies rather to "minor

politics", if we borrow the term from Deleuze², and with a slight differential shift, to the "minority" whose aims, who knows, is to change the conditions of life and order. Could Islam have never been a "movement" in this sense? We have already stressed the "reactionary" nature of modern Islam, with special reference to an Islamism of Resentment. We also denied that a pure application of the distinction between a VolksIslam and doctrinaire Islam could no longer be legitimized when we face the political mobilization which could transcend the traditional limits. The last reason for denying the application of the term "movement" into Islam is, simply, that such a designation does not exist among the Islamic semantics. Not in the sense that Islam denies the "motion", the absolute movement related to the Holy War, the Jihad, but in the sense that the "Islam" cannot be betrayed to assume a "minor" position. It is known how the Islam propagated into Africa as a huge Empire, how it was "articulated" just from the beginnings to a grandiose State bureaucracy and military apparatus. The idea is no less existing in the Iranian Revolution. The Moslem Community is either a Commonwealth, a majority par excellence, or... is not.

Now, it appears that this "reality" eclipsed as the new "Islamist" function often denotes its title as a "movement". This is the starting-point of the "reactionary" Islamism. A detailed study of the birth of 'Islamism' in

Turkey gives the coordinates of such an adaptation of religious life to a 'movement' whose definition would no longer be defined in any one of the discursive regimes of autochthonous dogmatics.

The presence of a "movement" denotes directly the presence of an "opinion", a collectivity or group to which every utterance, every order word refers, when extracting some preferable traits out of a complex network of situations. And the opinion is no less revealed at every instance of the discourse -if there can be such a coherent or systematic discourse or not. But this is not only "reference" but the deployment of situations, juridical acts and speech acts which becomes important at this instance where the public awareness is subjectivated to order-words, and slogans which have the force, as once reminded by Goebbels himself, the Propaganda Minister of Nazi Germany, of "palpitating the hearth of the metropolis, with the voice of the Nazi propagandists".

However, it appears that Islam as a 'moral order', as a 'utopia' if you prefer, lacks in actuality the power to transcend its essential 'resentment'. Olivier Roy shows us, through a recent history of its development, that Islamism was caught in a network of historical, economic, social and philosophical relations whose successive conjunctures exposed not a 'danger of Islam', nor a 'rise of Islamist

fundamentalism', but on the contrary a project which degraded during the last decade into a simplistic fundamentalism, which is aware at many levels of the fact that it is destined to failure. Roy observes that Islamists do not experience this sentiment of failure in their hope of seizing the political power - Iran, Algeria and many other countries have already experienced this possibility. The sentiment of unreal aspirations are especially relevant in the Islamist 'utopian' project of transforming the society. The author sees the main reasons of this failure or insufficiency in the fact that modern Islam dispossessed largely the rich plurality of its heterogeneous popular wisdom which nourished the rise of Islamic sovereignty since its foundations, until the nineteenth century. The modern Islamism is incapable of understanding the modern world and of accepting the realities of Muslim societies. This Islam of 'resentment' will provide us with nothing but "a moral order after the revolution." According to Roy, "the Islamic model is for the rich of Saudi Arabia: the rent plus the sharia; and for the poor, Pakistan, Sudan and in a close future, for Algeria, it is unemployment plus the sharia..." (Roy, 1992:241)

However, it should be kept in mind that this 'reactionary' Islamism, as formulated by Olivier Roy as a movement captured by the actuality of the world, is not reducible to a 'conservatism' or 'tradition'. Anticipating a

revolution, to attain the establishment of its moral order, it does not tend to 'conserve', but tries to survive as a pure reaction.

4.2 The Structures of Opinion

Communication, the privileged offspring of our modernity, is anchored on opinion. Through its problematization, the opinion evolves and proliferates with its problems, with its questioning, the opinion is questioned. What is opinion? This is the passionate debate of the Symposium of the Platonicians; and not only this, it presents the fundamental issue of Plato's philosophy, when he -it is assumed as such- tries to make a clear distinction between knowledge and opinion, the episteme and doxa.

Demetrius, citing an example from Aeschines: "Against yourself you call; against the laws you call; against the entire democracy you call." Cicero undertakes his work *De Oratore* in terms of speech acts which are not necessarily inherent in discourse. They correspond more to the "perlocutory" function in Austin: *luminibus sententiarum atque verborum*, with the lights of thought and language, one can vary the address. In his dissertation, Cicero outlines these rhetorical figures as the commemoration, dwelling on a subject, driving it home; the explanation, bringing it before

one's very eyes... These two correspond to the "statement" of facts, of cases or amplifying it; the review (*praecisio*), the disparagement (*extenuatio*), are accompanied by raillery (*illusio*); digression (*digressio*), with neatly contrived return to the subject; statement of what one proposes to say; distinguishing it from what has already been said; return to a point already established; repetition, reduction to sharply syllogistic form (*apta conclusio*); overstatement and understatement; rhetorical question; irony, saying one thing and meaning another (*dissimulatio*), a device which, he says, is particularly effective with audiences if it is used in a controvertial tone, not rantingly; stopping to ponder (*dubitatio*); dividing a subject into components (*distributio*), so that you can effectively dispose of them in one-two-three order; finding fault with a statement (*correctio*) which has been made by the opponent, or which himself has said or is about to say; preparing the audience for what one is about to say (*praemunitio*); shifting of responsibility (*traiectio in alium*); taking the audience into partnership, having a kind of consultation with them (*communicatio*); imitation; impersonation (which he calls an especially weighty lumen of amplification) putting on the wrong scent; raising a laugh; forestalling (*anteoccupatio*); comparison (*similitudo*) and example (*exemplum*), "both of them most moving"; interruption (*interpellatio*); alignment of contrasting positions, antithesis (*contentio*); raising of the voice even to the point of frenzy, for purposes of amplification (*augendi causa*);

anger; invective, imprecation, deprecation, ingratiating, entreaty, vowing "O would that..." (*optatio*) -and lapses into meaningful silence (Burke, 1971: 235-7).

What is a "meaningful" silence? It is an anticipation, as exemplified as in the case of a theologian, who periodically interrupted his sermonlike discourse while he gazed into space, the audience gaiting for a marvel - and after a lapse of time, the emotive signs of the next subject to be treated appeared on the face of the lecturer. The marvel is that, gazing the space, he could import his ideas from the heaven. Why they would not bring them, while looking downwards, from the damned Hell? (Burke, 1971: 345)

In Longinus, imagination is praised as the highest mental faculty, since it is identified with the megalophrosyne and imitation. Such a sublimation is a rare exception in Greek and Roman cultures, which preserved to the episteme and scientia the highest value among the mental faculties, leaving imagination to a generic form of the doxa, of the opinion. Does it mean, however, that the debasement of imagination leads to its non-importance? The questioning of the opinion in the Classical culture presents us many difficulties rising from the essentially ambiguous nature of imagination. It is first called in contradistinction with brute sense perception, in that it can "actualize" a non-present

thing -a semantic network connects, among other elements, the imagination with the *energeia*. In Aristotle's classification of the great speech acts, "actualization" finds its place among the greatest figures of discourse, the antithesis and metaphor. Spinoza, on the other hand, cites imagination as the lowest kind of knowledge, before the higher knowledge of reason and intuition. But for Spinoza, as for the Greeks, imagination (the opinion) is the most important figure to be treated in his *Tractatus Theologico- Politicus*, where he sees in it a medium of prophetic vision capable to communicate the revelations of religion. And with Spinoza, we are not far from the Romantics calling for Natural Revelation, attributing a sublime force to imagination and artistic vision.

Spinoza reveals his attitude towards language succinctly in his *Ethica*, making clear that one can not rely upon language and linguistic informations without taking the risks of having "inadexuate knowledge" of whatever matters. Would language be a means condemning us always to a "distorted communication"?. If language were made only for communication or as a means of understanding, as Habermas thought it was (Habermas; 1987: 23-24): Spinoza's position would evidently be that of a modern philosopher of language, that of an analytician who carries out the task of elaborating on language, on utterance and the structure of statements in order to reveal the capacities or incapacities

inherent in language. For Spinoza, however, language is not only a means of communication or knowledge but the only means of conveying the "necessary" inadequate knowledge.

4.3 The Semiotic System of the New Order

The discourses of "New Order" have their root in the recent past, at the epoch when Gorbachev seemed to declare the "correction" of socialism, the so-called Perestroika. The mapping of Perestroika, however, seemed first to be the zone of the "*derevyannyi yazyk*" (forrest language), i.e., the field of "socialist" enunciations which had the force of totalization. This "*yazyk*", far from the Leninistic "*istinno*" of the pre-revolutionary Russia, had the political force of consolidation -through censorship but also a long tradition, literary political and yes "mystical" as observed by Alexander Zinovyev- and immanence as to its form. But the Brejnevian era, an epoch of Soviet "welfare" was at the same time an epoch of decline -economic, cultural and political- which only today we seem to have the capacity of formulating as a "fact". All seems to happen, in this period of Soviet history, to enable us to declare the presence of a "totalitarian language". But the theses of Hannah Arendt, as well as of Leo Strauss -their Hayek-like bias which brought them to the positions of a fiction writer, George Orwell with his influential "*1984*" have an overriding difficulty as in all thesis

of "totalitarianism", which has been contested many times by the critique of Moshe Levin and A. Zinovyev. The attribution of a "totalitarian language" to the Soviet regimes proves to be difficult face to its discourse's essential stability, as it was almost a perfectly institutionalized language, not having a huge distance from Kafka's "machines" set to function in juridical or familial discourses. It appears that the Soviet discourse, its "derevyannyi yazyk" has been rigorously set to stability, enabling the post-Gorbachevians -Yeltsin, the President among others- to produce their effects of "conversion", without disturbing the form of expression: what is right becomes left, and what is left becomes right as if the semantic cadre of the enunciations remains unchanged, immutable in the long run, and translatable to the most "original" discourse of neo-liberalism. During the period 1986-89, the narratives of "conversion" and "translation into new language" (a theme which would satisfy at first sight the proponents of the Orwellian view of the "fiction") accompanied the mise-en-scène of the Aganbegyan Program (an economic program at first sight, but attempting to manipulate "from the above" the production apparatus in its entirety): a language, again, proceeding through series of governmental decrees, having the strong "performative" effect of destroying the old system, while lacking the commands to constitute the "new order". What became at the level of languages a redundancy of the economic modifications with the 'quantifiers' of governmental decrees becomes at the level

of "social transformations" a fusion of "market-liberalism" (or something like that, in the case of USSR and her amorphous successors) with the reterritorialized Russian "nation". It does not matter so much if Gorbachev and his entourage have misunderstood the entire logic of Soviet functioning (as the "agriculturalists", since Bukharin, contributed to the general economic decline by their misunderstandings), or if they have established their "power" within the CPSU since twenty years as a "secret locus"; what is important here is to determine whether the "system", now "vanquished" was destined to its necessary historic end, its "telos". Once more we face the tri-functionality of Dumézil: the powers, their stability is founded upon the Party (the magico-religious sovereignty), the Red Army (the 'controlled' warrior) and the Workers (the elements of now lacking abundance). However, it is not easy to proceed into the analysis of this tri-functional system at a sociological level of study, since these 'casts' were determined to be immanent to a unique Soviet identity.

The theocratic mentality can also be understood better on the basis of tri-functionality. While it is clear that religions had to cut off the boundaries of pre-given formalizations (a flight from the established power), the continuity of power structures was never broken off completely by any historical religion. If we interpret tri-functionality not as a pure formalism imposed by the

researcher upon social reality -whatever its depth- but as a logic of transcendentalism, derived out of the projection of social space unto the world, it could be said that any transcendental religion comprises blueprints of this so-called Indo-European functions. How could otherwise be explained the almost direct passages of Semitic religions into a war apparatus, followed by a State apparatus based upon magical sovereignty and agriculturalists? This was the case of the Mosaic State, which was constituted almost before its foundation as a war machine, the organization of Jewish tribes as a horde. Again, how to explain otherwise the unparalleled efforts of Early Muslims (including the Prophet) to constitute a war machine obeying to the principle of State at the moment of religious expansion (the *Jihad* understood as a war of expansion, not only of the newborn religion, but also of the State). Here is not the place to discuss historical facts under moral judgments, or to reveal the intolerance of a religion with reference to a series of historical acts of violence. But it should be clarified that, like many monotheistic religions, Islam is also inscribed into the register of historical formations which claimed all stages of development -heterodoxy, oecumenic Empire, modern nation-states- as its own, through passages operated between the famous three functions of Dumézil. In his study on archaic Turkic and Mongolian religions, Jean-Paul Roux invokes the cadre of Dumézil's tri-functional analysis as available for non-Indo European societies (Roux, 1984: 41).

4.4 Özal's 'Vision'

The Özal period, if there is any, is conventionally determined on a chronological line which began with the first elections after the military intervention of 12 September 1980, and ended by, paradoxically, his rise to the post of President. The chronology betrays comprehension, even of a figure or a personality of so higher caliber that one is led to discredit any chronological ordering which tends to situate such a complex phenomenon as "Özal Vision" within a semeiotics of names, elections, successions, declarations and events. This Vision is certainly captured by a past, which is so recent that it would be convenient to trace it back to its origins. And at this origin, there lies also an 'originality' for Turkey: Despite his old age, and a much more older "ideological" background (he is an adept of the Nakshibendi brotherhood, a member of a conservatist family of a great provincial center in the mid-East, Malatya, and the elder of Korkut Özal, a deputy and cabinet member of National Salvation Party, whose political carrier, unlike Turgut, was interrupted by force of the military rulings during the parcellization of parliamentary system. In short, he merits the attribute Young-Conservatist, if we understand by "youth" a generation whose passage from bureaucracy into politics is 'new', that is, depending on the grace of an unawaited, imprevisible event. But this was referring only to the

'origin', and the mediatic amnesia and memory, co-reacting against such an image which establishes nevertheless an 'uprooted' figure, force us, today, to limit this 'personal' references to the family origins, order of successions and ideological backgrounds. What was "young" in Özal has to be searched for in his Vision. This Vision, as I have said above, was "new", not so as much for appearing for the 'first time' (this would make every act a 'new' event), nor for being appended to a totally new ideological formation or *Weltanschauung*, but only in the mediatic sense of the word: the 'media act' today, lies in the novelty, the newness of what is reported. This is its proper nature and a division of labour appears between the strategic instances of information: the radio and TV seek 'newness' and their act lies in the 'priority', since every 'event' is unique and the 'second' is not 'new'. At the second layer, there is the old discourse of journalism, whose 'newness' is, or ought to be based on 'interpretation' and exposition of visions (what the American media scholars were calling "agenda setting"). This explains partly the primary importance of 'journalism' in the rise of Özal's Vision, and the peripheral discourses creating its system of redundancy: pro and against, as they were, economists, scholars, great or newborn figures of journalism play the role of answering, in their fashion, to the Vision, whose enunciation by Özal would have never been possible (since there was nothing, in fact, to be enunciated by Özal, as a person, except the routine declarations of everyday

ministerial practice) unless their proliferating presence. The internal coherence of the Vision commenced to appear only after the electoral games of 1987, where the electoral campaigns unchained the long-standing 'perspectives' of "privatizations". The source of these perspectives was not, evidently Özal and his Vision. Nor it was an essential, 'accumulated' or 'repressed' need of the economic system, which would be in continuance with the "24 January Decisions", on which both Süleyman Demirel (the 'old-conservatist', almost an incarnation of the past) and Özal were claiming fatherhood. However, "the perspective of privatizations", which was, and is still, a "need" or "imperative" (whose ways of success are uncertain) for Demirel and his allies, which they express in unanimity, is for Özal an order-word, a slogan which could create a reaction in chain with a determined, but no less magical causality. It is not an 'end' to attain; it is not a 'means' to the 'ends'. Özal represents the 'warrior", in the tri-partite Indo-European ideology of Dumézil, who constantly conjures the State, its wealth, dominion over the economy and the force of the traditional ideas. And this explains the mixture he curiously formed, during the Gulf Crisis of economic and war motives: the famous "law" of 1 to 3 proportion... Is it a liberalism which corresponds to the "neo-liberalisms" which are so gently said to be victorious at the outcome of a century of war with the planned economy of the 'totalitarian' regimes? Or, we know that the primary concern of liberal

thought was not the conjuration of the economic dominion of the state. Economy was a field of 'testing' the 'too-much-government' of the modern Reason of State. However, it appears that both Özal and the much more sophisticated versions of 'neo-liberal school' in the West restricted the meaning of this 'too-much-government' into an enclosed field of economy (not the 'determining' economy of Marxists, but an even more restricted field of 'viability' of transactions and 'non-interventionism').¹ Özal's attempt to deconstruct -both in act and in ideology- the Etatism of the Turkish State, which remains in its greater part as the classical attitude of the CHP-SHP tradition -and not being exclusive to them, is still inherent in Demirel's perspective too.

However, the dangers of the failure of adhering into the ideology of New Order forced these latter to not to oppose the vision with a frontal attack, but only by labeling it as "unrealistic" and they denounced the excesses rather than its roots and essence. The New Order thus became an order word in Turkey, challenged only by the Islamist tendencies, which are nothing but a version of modernism.

The Vision henceforth came to be victorious over its opponents in the essence, but severely criticized in its details and especially with reference to its ownership. Özal, on the other hand, recognized by his "periphery" as the sole political personality who possessed the necessary "tools" in

this respect -a clear formulation of means and ends, a vision on the perspective of privatizations etc.- declines these challenges in such a manner that his opponents fail almost to recognize their own ideological constraints, the pressures of their audience and so forth.

It should hence be said that Özal and his vision taken separately (as a distinction between an author and his works) are enjoying different intensities of sarcasms and invectives. His "person" constitutes the primary target of accusations and sarcasms, as if his Vision don't matter at all, as part -already- of the everyday practice and life, as if it reached a perfect fusion with the order word of the New Order. Now, it appears that his so-called "personal" encounter with President Bush (how it will be with Clinton?) constitutes in ordinary language an object of "jealous invectives), shared even by the members of his "old" party. This "personalization" of the politics proves to be the fundamental shortcoming of actual government, while it also shows a new manner of doing politics.

We have said that Özal's Vision was new, as it corresponds to the order words of the New political and economic Order. Politically, it is based on a diplomatic interventionism with low costs, pragmatically made proportional to the inherent strength of the country. And economic elements are called to have a determinant role in

the pragmatics of Özal's vision. If he discredits the traditional preoccupations with the "integrity of the Republic", with Cyprus Question and the relationships with Turkic peoples of Asia and Europe. This pragmatics reveals itself as a set of preferences, expressed by Özal himself at many occasions, or made apparent in the writings and messages of his Periphery -the reading of the articles of the Sabah columnist Cengiz Çandar will be sufficient in establishing the fundamental cadre of Özal's messages on these subjects. These preferences are considering clearly the economic understanding of the world, a *Weltanschauung* of the neo-liberal kind, and a pro-american affiliation. At the background lies the discredit launched against Europe. Only Özal perceives that the interventionist diplomacy -and not a real, strong intervention- would give the "message" to Europe: We are part of Europe with Bosnia and Muslim peoples of Albania and Macedonia; and this is a challenge for you since United States will solve the problem in their own interests through Turkey... This message is a double performance, since it incorporates two appeals at once -an appeal to United States in assuming the presence of Turkish soldiers in UN Forces if there will be an intervention to Bosnia, and an appeal to Europe to reconsider Turkey's role in respect to her preoccupation with the South Eastern Europe.

We have already discussed the economic motives lying behind the Vision: Cyprus has not to be accepted as "economically efficient", in the manner to determine the entire problematics and axiomatics of Turkish foreign policy. This is a new age, where market affiliation and the articulation to the world market has the primary importance. African situation is considered -very probably- by Özal as an example of the consequences of such a failure. No one helps without a clear political and economic interest, as it is the case with the Gulf and Somaliland. According to Özal, the task of a foreign policy administration is primarily to emphasize these "interests", not only for the homeland but also for the West - actually United States. One has to make these interests 'visible' and 'indispensable' for the United States, with outlines and emphasis, and this must constitute the fundamental task of foreign policy. The failure of the Demirel Government is to misrecognize this pragmatics.

Özal has attempted to establish a politics of movement rather than stability. He denounced especially, in his fragmentary expositions of the Vision, the "rigidity" and "stability" in traditional politics. The "rest", the "station" is Death.

It is interesting that the Third World versions of modernism traditionally connected the imperatives of movement and rapid change to their political and economic

projects. Nowadays, however, the project seems to collapse entirely. All happens as if the post-modern type of capitalism functions totally on an axiomatics of speed -a 'fleet in being' in the words of Paul Virilio. Just as the producers are losing what they never could attain, the same is the case with the "underdeveloped" countries. It is as such that within the world economic system, the wealth is 'nominally' distributed but that all depends on the speed of attaining them. Differences of speed -as differences of background- provoke differences in terms of development. For the sake of simplicity, the World System places every region, every country on a single continuum of 'development'.

Now, it appears that the Vision adequates itself in such a functioning of the world economy. The reduction of the political relays -the bureaucracy, governmental decisions, laws and especially the Parliament- is necessary in reducing the forces which hampered the rapidity, causing stability, delay and lost. More than a matter of economic efficiency, this is a matter of rapidity in itself. In every decision one has to seek the speed, whether it be an error or a good decision.

The struggle of Özal with the Rest started with his open confrontation of the Armed Forces, which were so determined in the Kemalist rigidity that they constituted the sole obstacle before the Vision's rapidity. At the end, Özal

seems to be victorious: During his last days he overtly challenged and almost ridiculed the ex-President Evren, he effectuated arbitrarily a civil coup de force during the debated elections of Army top officials -Öztorun who was forced, in his turn to leave his post at the beginning of Gulf Crisis... and profiting from the "stability" of the Parliament, he elected himself as President.

His second attack was on the solid Kemalist bureaucracy and its apparatus. In Özal's mind, bureaucracy was however necessary, to represent the force of stability evidencing the need for the search of rapidity. Close-circuiting the bureaucracy -as he does for parliamentary democracy- was the sole way of managing this assault: preserving it, one had to manage its lack of efficiency. Özal's emphasis was evidently on KİT's (State economic firms). At this instance, the Vision is no longer interested with the order word of privatization, but only in giving examples of the harmful effects of too-such-government. His critique of KİT's is not exhausted in the perspective of privatizations but is composed by many substantial elements of the Vision: First, against the wages. The wages are excessive over the total revenues of State enterprises (evidently this is not the case with the huge enterprises like PTT, SÜMERBANK, ETİBANK and so forth). For Özal, the issue is the problem of wages compared with revenues. A double bind is evident here. The critique of KİT's enabled

Özal to criticize the wage augmentations to the name of the entrepreneurial classes. By the same token, he could also discredit the role of the State enterprises in the "national" economy.

The forces against the speed and motion are necessary, as we have said, and Özal himself is evidently aware of the impossibility of privatizing the huge state companies. But Turkish population should be 'educated' in anonymous companies, and the privatization of the middle sized enterprises could play a great role in this respect.

4. 5 Religious Opinion

Modern man's relation to religion is no longer his way of life, not even an autochthonous *Weltanschauung*. The eclipse of the enchantment of the world, depicted by historians and philosophers of the Occident under the bites of modernity (and modernization), piercing traditional societies, transforming them from the inside, seems approved once for all by the declaration God is Dead (of several deaths dispersed throughout Western history) and moaned already by the most requiescent and solemn thinker of piety, Pascal, when he declared that even the Cosmic Order opened before the Newtonian science could not lead man to faith when its 'germs' were completely extinguished. Scientific process was, in a loose but effective manner, linked to the

'disenchantment' of the world, freeing gradually more spheres of life to declare and establish their independence against religion and its millenary institutions. Science was attributed as the ideal culture capable of conducting two complete tasks, the filling of the gap created by the decline of the religious cosmos and the purification of the ground from the vestiges of the morcelled religious claims of the faith. That these tasks are complementary is only a way of speaking, and we are led to assume that the latter determined the former and that, thereby, scientific vision of world is itself deeply interested in destroying the religious language of the world.

The 'Public' and 'Private' concentrate in a fictive polarity (on a continuum that requires the 'normalization' of the two poles simultaneously) two opposed semiotics that are both heterogeneous in themselves. As distinctions of a bourgeois world and culture, they have, however some institutional and juridical boundaries that presuppose a historical dynamics in the form of a semiotic agency rooted deeply in modern social formations.³ Hence, what is important is rather to study the particular semiotic order that serves in the distinction between 'public' and 'private' spheres, instead of relating the two poles at particular and distinct semiotic orders. Social anthropology reports a huge data on the organization of such a 'mixed' semiology, which puts into circulation both the signs of the 'secret' and of

'public', the former deployed in the 'horde'-like caste of warriors, who eat and meet each other behind the curtain, and the latter, by the king as the holder of authority, the marking 'face' is perfectly 'public', seen and heard from everywhere. This does not mean that the warriors' caste puts 'originally' into circulation the 'secret signs' belonging to an autochthonous order of secrecy. The 'public' and 'secret' signs are possible only through the very mixture of the two, independent semiotic orders, that of the 'paranoid'/'despotic' sign regime and that of the 'horde', captured by the 'magical' activity of the State (made corporeal and significant in the body and public 'face' of the monarch). Only in this agency of 'capture' and 'mixture' one could become able to decipher the polarization of the 'public' and 'private' and the determined translation of the 'secrecy' into 'privacy'.(Luc de Heusch, 1966:45-6)

Now, it should be noted that linguists and hermeneuticians failed for a long time in establishing the important role of semiotic mixtures, particularly by the credit they attributed to the 'signifying' process. Or a sign of the 'public' order can 'signify' something for the secret semiotician, while the opposite is particularly difficult. A secret remains secret as it remains hermetically closed to the public. This does not mean, however, that secret signs don't circulate. They do circulate in their proper context, within secret societies, military castes, in Bedouin communities⁴, not

as rumours or rehearsals, but with the same clarity and openness as the masked, informal and public signs. of the State discourse.

There is a special use of language, which might best be described as "paranoid" and which is an integral part of the religious thought and practice. We can depict it in Boğazköy's "our language", through which it is possible to demarkate between two different universal uses of sign regimes, the religious and everyday uses. That the signifying process operates differently in religiously programmed "sacred" languages -the "writing", whatever its ordinary, economic or intellectual purposes, had first to come into being strictly as a "magical" practice- is known since many years to anthropologists and linguists. Or, to become sacred, a text must first be hidden from the public. Its "truth effect" is produced out of this hiddenness. Thereby, one has to believe less to the really "agnostic" truth of the content of religious narrative, than to its "context", the codified way in which it is uttered and circulated as order words.

The head-cover, not being, however, an indispensable part of the Islamic habits of wearing, is universally constituted as a symbol of female Muslim identity. But this symbol, before its inscription in the field of political activity and before becoming the part of Islamic institutional identity, is caught within an agency of the secret and of

the desire. It appears at the intersection of two semiotic regimes, that are the 'erotic' and the 'secret' components of a theme which, before its partial appropriation by the norms of political action, belongs to the nature of the 'secret'. Nilüfer Göle tries to elucidate the sense of privacy that corresponds equally and almost indifferently to both 'post-modern' and 'Islamic' patterns of identification (Göle, 1991). She fails to recognize the universal presence of bourgeois normativity of the 'public' within any kind of 'perceptible' hidden existence. The head-cover translates what is, or has supposedly to remain invisible, namely the 'secret' into the language of the 'public'. What remains, conventionally, 'hidden' is nothing but the 'erotic' component of the desire agenced by the legislative regime of the Islam and of its public admission.

4.6 Foreign word as an Ideological Sign

The foreign word is the "ideological sign" par excellence, in the sense that it enters a network of interpretive relationships before its absorption by a semiotic regime (in our case the religious and political sign regimes), or after its 'externalization' by what we may call 'delocutory effect' in the sense used by Benveniste. The Islamic theology, the "Ilahiyyat" constitutes itself as this very network of absorption, both profiting from the distance of the exegetes

and their language from the 'spoken language', especially during the republican era, and from their "muctehid"-like position in micro-political system of religious sects, brotherhoods and institutions.

The philological curiosity is an integral part of the exegesis. It constitutes even the proper 'faculty' of interpretation and *Verstehen*. The development of modern linguistics as we have tried to outline briefly, was a process that is the outcome of this philological curiosity. The philology itself, on the other hand, sprunged out of the enigmatic causality of the need for interpretation, the "interpretose" of the priest in the words of Deleuze. (Deleuze&Guattari, 1980: 511) It is the merit of Bakhtin to remark on this curious necessity of interpreting the "defunct" (*umeren*), "alien" languages. This kind of priestly interpretance was first questioned on the solid basis of textual critique, in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus of Spinoza. Spinoza contests the 'hermeneutical infirmity' of the "rationalist" and "scripturalist" exegets, and their corrupted followers, overtly designed as the priests and theologians of his epoch and of the past. Spinoza's critical attitude is systematically developed from within the Medieval Jewish traditions of exegesis, through his reproaches launched against Moses Maimonides and Al Faqr, representing respectively the 'rationalist' and 'scripturalist' tendencies or rather, schools.

It would be pretentious to admit the history of philosophy as a progressive and constant strife to reduce, or to extinguish opinion, since as early as Platonic formulation of the philosophy, as we said above, the philosopher had to claim a knowledge which is not that of the Wise Men from the Orient, and an opinion which is not that of a Sophist. Three social types are involved, therefore, in the analysis of opinion: the Wise Man, the Philosopher and the Sophist. The attitude of Plato in *The Republic* towards the Poet, as another type of the Classical Greek Culture, but representing also the heritage of the Archaic periods corresponds to a kind of total exclusion, since the opinion of the poet relies upon a kind of fictive narrative, the relation of a non-real world. This means that so many types of opinion are involved in the pretensions to "truth" that the position of the philosopher too leads him necessarily to a kind of opinion-holder.

The problem of the extinction of the opinion rather belongs to the realm of logic, in the sense that since the Aristotelian "organon", it appears not only as an appendage to the Logos, but also as an agency which refers to the "truth" condition under the form of logicity. If the truth will be, it will be so if it is 'logically' exposed. However, the logical formalization of the truth, consolidated in the form of syllogism and deduction has survived even the attacks of Judaeo-Christian theology adapting itself to the

Christian doctrine with a special supplement which raised logics and syllogism to the mode of the revelation. Logical phrasing of the idea, that is, its form (eidos) was inspired by God, while not necessarily as His Language. The moment of Stoic semiotics is once more, precisely at that point, an important 'mutation' in logics, reducing it to its resting position onto language: the inventors of the concept of 'sign' (semeion), the Stoicians -Zeno of Citium (his birth 332 BC), Perseus, Spairos, Ariston, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes of Babylonia, Antipater, Panaiotios, Poseidonios, Cicero, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius- were living in the period of the commercialization of the Greek (and Roman) world, corresponding to the 'deterritorialization' of the City-State to give way to a universal cosmopolitanism. The sign is revealed as an 'element' at the core of negotiation, of the commercial activity. It is constituted both as the mechanism and unit of exchange. The syllogism answered to a vague need of formalization and regulation of the flow of opinions and exchanges of language. The sign, in contrast, is doubly articulated in every realm of existence on the one hand, and in the mechanisms of language on the other: a barbare invention, if you want, the 'semeion' of Zeno of Citium and the resulting 'semeiotike' as the science of the articulated discourse helped the Stoic to objectify the Logos, making out of it an object, both by systematicizing it and putting it at a distance. This first movement of 'difference' as 'distanciation' placed the sign as object within

a context of double-articulation, on the one hand within the discourse itself as a part of syllogism or logical formalism as Kristeva puts it, and as the mechanism of the relationship of language (logos) with its 'outside' (Kristeva, 1977). Hence, as Emile Bréhier puts it, the semiotic problem is both a logical and gnoseological question. (Bréhier, 1962:172) At the logical level, there is an important rupture introduced by Stoicians in the form of classical (Aristotelian) syllogism: 'if a woman has milk, she has conceived; or a woman has milk, therefore she conceived'. This is the first logic of 'induction' which is conceived by the Stoicians as a 'series of signs' without proper signification. The induction is a "deductive system" which functions with 'terms' in accordance to strict rules.

The Stoic analysis of the rules of the articulation of a "proof" necessitates the demonstration of the "validity" of the "terms" of the induction. According to Stoicians, the "terms" are true because they are 'signs', defined as the necessary relation between the word and the thing it designates. Kristeva sees here the essential manoeuvre of 'induction', the 'induction' of the thing into discourse. (Kristeva, 1978: 274) This 'semiotic' understanding will prevail until the "structuralist revolution" and the *Cours* of de Saussure who intervened with a second semiotic 'mutation' that corresponded to the 'arbitrariness' of the linguistic sign. Or, the Saussurean moment seems to have a serious

shortcoming in coping with the Stoic problem of "concomitance" of the two realms articulated by the sign. De Saussure's conception of linguistic sign as the articulate reference of the signifier and the signified, it is true, lacks in Stoic conception of the 'semeion'. However, the Stoic 'demise' of the "immanence" of the sign in the inner speech (the *logos endiathetos*), or Idea in its Platonic sense developed in Kratylos to achieve a configuration of "concomitance" of the two terms, the object and the voice is undone by the Saussurean formalization of the language as distinguished from the speech. Only the linguistic empiricism of Louis Hjelmslev could include, in contemporary linguistics, the original Stoic problem of "expressivity" in language, i.e. that a term expresses another term through voicing the object in speech. If in modern structuralist linguistics, the sign is the "term" which speech borrows from the language, according to the exact formula of Jacques Lacan (Lacan, 1977: 237-45) in the Stoic-Hjelmslevian understanding, the sign belongs both to the orders of speech and objectivity. This is the first formulation of the possibility of "interpretation" or "translation", which in Latin was originally derived out of "*interpres*", relating to an agency between the two terms, to an "intermediary", to a "medium" or go-between. This is quite characteristic of the Stoician who lived in an age of commercialization of the economy and cosmopolitanization of the civilization: an important moment of passage from the Greek language to Latin, and of several passages from

"barbarian" languages to Greek and Latin, and vice versa. The opinion is once more formed at the level of the "*interpretes*", of "philology" whose priests and negotiators were the Stoicians. The genial movement incited by the Stoicians tended to a totalizing, systematic and scientific agency of "translation" and at its very core, this agency was supposed to translate the "*sistema*", in the sense of the "system of the world".

The Stoicians' discovery of the 'sign' did not occur outside the realm of the opinion, expressed in the context of a philosophical debate between the Stoicians, Epicureans (atomists) and Sceptics. From Democritus to the Epicureans, the atomist doctrine contested the very idea of a systematic totality, or rather, attempted to conceive of the "system of the world" without any recourse to a hegemonic principle of totality. The "*matter*" of the Atomists consisted on infinitely differentiated play of infinite "atoms", and at the level of expression, an infinite variety of "*simulacra*" constituted the articulations of the language. The "poetization" of language in Empedocles and Lucretius -who wrote not in prose but in verse-, as was shown by Kristeva, corresponds to this dynamic infinity, denouncing any systematic "signifying" unity, for these "other postmodernists" of the Hellenistic and Roman period. The "*clinamen*", as the principle of an infinite variation based on the 'smallest deviation' on the trajectories of individual atoms, corresponded to the "*clinamen*" of the

linguistic expression shaping thereby a world of simulacra, a world of slight deviations of senses. The Atomist "network" of simulacra is constitutive of another aspect of the first great "linguistic turn" in history, if the first aspect is that of the Stoicians.

It is in this sense that not only the "structure of the opinion" rests on the linguistic articulation, but also that the shaping of the "semiotic regimes" -the Stoic, the Atomist and the Platonist ones- are developed out of the systematization of a "topography" of language in the realm of opinion. The debate still continues, since the "age of opinion" is co-extensive to the history of the Western Thought.

The Stoic moment, on the other hand, had to eliminate the infinite variation of the "material world" and of 'simulacra', by organizing the chaos through language which is necessarily articulated by the inductive schemes, through relations imposed by a certain discourse, the "sunemmenon", involving the "composite", "conditional" and "disjunctive" propositions.

We have said that the "opinion" was constituted, at the first moment, out of linguistic articulation in the form of the Stoic "semeiotike". The structure of Stoician semiotics is relevant, therefore, to the problem of the "extinction of

the opinion" which shifted from the Platonic conjunction of "doxa" to the radicalization of the propositional structure. The conjunction begins at the level of the doctrine of "representation". A representation is "exempt" of errors since it is independent from sensations. The "doctrine of katalepsis", a Stoic introduction to the theory of knowledge, guarantees the passage from the direct "imprint" of the object on the "senses" (on the mind) into the mental life of a stable Subject. In this sense, Stoicians are to be considered as first rationalists in the theory of language: the order of reasons reflect directly the order of things. Diocles Magnes asserts that "one has to place at the beginning the theory of representation and of sensation, because the theory of assentment, hence the theory of comprehension (*katalepsis*) and of thought which come before the others cannot be constructed systematically without representation".⁵ Through this formalization of the representation, the System of Stoicians attempts to "grasp the past and the future in the world of the present", as formulated by Goldschmidt. Through such overtures, the Stoic Wise Man becomes a decipherer of signs, a divine man or the priest of "interpretation". This moment or rather turning point is operated in a passage from the "conditional" propositions to "conjunctive" propositions, as Marcus Aurelius clearly formulated: "The logical passage from conditional propositions into conjunctive propositions figures out the cosmological and theological passage from linear time to a cyclical destiny." A

new semiotic order of the Eternal Return seems to be reformulated on a solid ground by the Stoic semiotician.

Through this work on language, the Stoician could create and reformulate new semiotic regimes which are those of theology, morals and physics. The Stoic ethics is constituted at the moment of subjectivation to the destiny (eternity) practiced incessantly by the Stoic Wise Man in the matrix of being present. The Stoic-as-semiologist provides the base of this anthropomorphization of the destiny: "There could happen to man anything which is not part of human destiny"; this means that "accident" or "miracle" don't exist, in morals as well as in semiotics; "the universal nature could bring nothing to you which would be insupportable on your part". (Guillermi et al., 1948: 53) The same system of world is the basis of the duplication between the "microcosmos" and "macrocosmos", since "it is the work of the great artist to have enclosed the totality into a signifying space. The Wise Man is at ease in his existence as God is in the continuity of centuries".⁶ The Stoic subject passes into what Heidegger calls as "subjectivity", i.e. the emptying of the interior, the constitution of the subject as a Person, the constitution of an intelligence devoid of passions.

The Stoic moment is thereby the first great "extinction" of the opinion, keeping the subject distant from solidarity with the person, as the "actor" is not solidary with

his representation. However, this very moment extinguishes not only the opinion but also the "philosophy" as the "creation" of concepts to pave the way for a radical development of "science". From the very beginnings, the semiotic plane of science displays a solidarity and affinity with the structure of the opinion, in the sense that they both assume a propositional-logical form and exposition. The scientific proposition "the water boils in 100 centigrades" is closer to the simple factual proposition "Napoleon is defeated at Waterloo" and to the simple opinion-proposition "X believes that..." than to the exposition of the philosophical concept. If the scientific propositions are endowed with the characteristics of referentiality as "functions" (a scientific reference could only be valid if it assumes a kind of "functionality"), the opinion has to be inscribed in the order of the social immanence (the non-discursive presuppositions and implicits of Ducrot).⁷ Thus, in the field of opinion, the subject as deprived from its interiority, is no longer solipsist nor empirical, but transcendental. In the field of science, the subject is translated as the "epistemic subject", the knowing subject, while in the realm of "public opinion", the transcendence of the subject is translated from its self-exposure to the principle of identity: "I, as a woman, I believe that all men are liars". There is here a double play of identification, exposed at the level of discursive presuppositions, "I am a member of the group 'women'" and non-discursive presuppositions or implicits, "I appeal all

women to believe as I express my belief concerning the men". The problem of identity depends on the semiotic paradigm of the opinion as a whole, whose general pragmatic formula are those of "X believes..." or "I appeal..."

4.7 The Logic of Peace

The challenge of Clastres, against the Hobbesian understanding of Peace constitutes an important moment of the deployment of ethnological analyses of the so-called 'universal' institutions -politics, State, social ties... The privileged place assigned to 'savage warfare' in the work of Clastres has the irresistible argumentative force similar to those of Rousseau against Hobbesian arguments on Peace: notably that human societies are involved in warfare not only as a result of 'egoistic' processes, but also as a fundamental political device for social integration. Like the Greek 'poleis' who secured their internal stability only by assigning a privileged place to the function of war, the 'primitive' warrior communities are paying homage to this function as a proper means for avoiding the consolidation of power. This war is not, evidently, comparable to the modern war conditions based on the idea of 'total war', whose reality came into being only in the twentieth century, suddenly shifting the variables of war to the dimension of a damned logic of destruction. Warfare was forced to find out

new forms, in which its non-destructive element has to be re-channelled: a cold war occupying the major part of our century, the alimination of police states in search of social and economic stability and the development of new and much more intricate repressive apparata. It is evident that the period of rising Islam coincided with the adoption of these new state apparata, especially in Arabic countries (under Ba'ath regimes) and the so-called Islamic Revolution in Iran. From these apparata, a wide range of ideological formations emanate: a modernism and secularism which could often be assimilated to 'revolutions from the above', seeking to eliminate not only the community logic of Islam, but also the longstanding state traditions in the Orient. The eminent example of this development is the Kemalist state of Turkey. Secondly, we may observe the emergence in the sacred lands of "petro-states" if I may term them as such, adopting the Sunnite Sharia, and partly the modern logic of capitalism. Thirdly, the recent emergence of Islamist movements, partly under the moral influence of Iranian revolution, or rather under the deeper -political- influence of Israel-Arab conflict: these are adapted to a troublesome international condition in the region, emitting reactionary ideologies in rupture from the essentials of the Islamic tradition.

This study is concerned with the theoretical outline for further possible studies capable to decipher the "semiotic

orders" of traditional and modern societies, with specific references to the constitution of semantic regimes, of which neither "modernity", nor "capitalism" as orders of actuality are not immune in terms of the forces they have to rely upon. I tend to define a "semiotic order" both as a device or method of this deciphering practice (an hermeneutic tool) and as the immanent structures of such non-discursive regimes, as social structures, institutions, social formations and world views, or in their concrete examples as capitalism, work, religion, family settings, education, structures of opinion, media etc.

A "semiotic order" can be "non-discursive" if we try to make visible the "presuppositions" collectively accepted which have their roots in the groundwork of the 'social' - studying language in its 'social context' in the terms of William Labov (Labov, 1979: 180-2)- and, as the other aspect of the same problem, admitting the institution of the 'social' as language and through language. The "Huzur Discourse", which I take as an example of such a "semiotic order" enables us to discover -or uncover- the structures of the "opinion" and of capitalism, religious modernity and capitalist market situation on the one hand, and of the interrelations and articulations between them.

The "Peace Discourse", irrelevant in its present form to such other systems of semiotics as "nomadic", "epic", or

"belligerent" (If we are today so far from the assumption of "noble savages") coordinates and codifies at the syntactic level the "order-words" of the actual possibilities of Peace - contemplation, communication and reflection necessitate a situation of Peace- adapted by each collective regime as economy, religion, politics to their own realm, through a series of successive semiotic readjustments. On the one hand, it is an "already-there", a "presupposition", since it is semiotically outside discourse. It is non-discursive in so far as it is a semiotic regime which codifies the conditions of the modern capitalism -freeing itself virtually of the 'contradictions' after the pretended collapse of socialism-, of modern family life and its architectural forms (psychoanalysis is a kind of familial normativity, though with different organizations of signs than the modernist Bauhaus project), of the mediatic opinion (circulation of order words and centralization of the information). The "Peace", at the age of a frozen "cold war", or nowadays, at the uncertain epoch of "electronic war" which was witnessed during the Gulf War is still more stressed as the presupposition of life. The "New Order" whose tendencies and attributions are still unknown would certainly be that of a "Peace" which could best be adapted to the exigencies of the three organic regimes, market exchange, opinion and communication. Hence, three levels of sociological analysis are to be connected to each other in analyzing the Peace Discourse: a sociology of languages, a sociology of communication, and economy.

The best "empirical" work which has connected adequately a sociology of language with economy was the "*Langages totalitaires*" of Jean-Pierre Faye, where the "order of speeches" was treated in a relation of concatenation with the "order of economy", in the political-linguistic realm of the Weimar Republic, until the rise of Nazism.(Faye, 1972) The author was tracing a "history", a "narrative" history of both the evolution of economic structures (with strong 'magical pretensions' on the famous "Schacht Experiment", and of the "order-words" shaping the territory of the fascist regime) and of political structures of Third Reich. Faye explains himself more clearly in the introduction, exposing a theory of 'narratics' where he points out on a 'duplicity' of language: the theory is based on the irruption of narratives in history, defining two series, the series of historical events and the series of historical acts. Faye invites us to see the fact that history is nothing but narration, "a reporting language". (Faye, 1972: 3) But there are certain narratives, appearing where two series converge, intersect each other and shift the ordinary process of history on a totally different plane: a word doing business is uttered, would say the pragmatist thinker J.L Austin (Austin, 1966). Or, again, the content of the act lies in the utterance, would say a Stoic thinker.

NOTES

¹ It comes sometimes that the 'demonic element' is asserted to be absent from the religious belief system of Islam. (cf. Mardin, 1992) This does not mean that Islam is totally deprived of, at least when we think of Muslim heterodoxy from this essential logic of transmutation: to be eaten by the food..

² cf. Foucault's analyses on the "genealogy of liberal thought", through its British origins, and contemporary German and American followers (especially the Chicago School). Foucault shows that it is necessary to accept "liberalism" as a governmental technique for reducing "too-much-government" at a higher cost, rather than a "historical universal" or "spirit of the age", having its origins in the philosophical discourse of classical political economy. *Résumé des cours*, 1. 1991.

³ Althusser reveals the foundations of a theory of subjectivation related to the bourgeois 'juridical' distinction between 'public' and 'private': this distinction is not a foundation but presupposes the bourgeois formalization of law and of the juridical position of the subject in bourgeois society. cf. L. Althusser, *Idéologie et appareils idéologiques de l'Etat*, in *La Pensée*, 1969, III.

⁴ Ibn Khaldun opposes the 'secrecy' of the nomadic hordes of the Bedouine culture to the public openness of the urbanity. He even relates them into the semiotic ordering of mixtures, the lost of the 'asabiyyah' of a 'publicized' dynasty of nomads when they capture the rule while being captured by the State. The analysis of this double and reciprocal capture would be very significant in producing a valuable context for the study of the corresponding orders and of their particular 'mixtures'. cf. Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*...

⁵ in *Ap. Diogenes Laertios*, VII, 49, in Goldschmidt, 1969:60.

⁶ Seneca, *Ep.*, 53, II.

⁷ Deleuze and Guattari, in their *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* show that while all types of propositions (the judgment of the opinion, the assertion of a fact, or the formulation of a scientific principle) have the value of informativity, the logics, the religion and science differ from each other in the realm of the opinion. (Deleuze&Guattari, 1991: 77-79)

CHAPTER V:
THE SYMBOLIC STRUCTURES OF ARCHAISM AND
CAPITALISM

5.1 Beyond use-value and exchange value

The archeologist Lorna Marshall decided to present to the Bushmen of Kalahari some New-York made simple jewels and shells, each of different size and shape...to some years later, to find them in astonishment as "used" for various purposes, even for the ornaments weared by the most distant relatives of the initial community: the shells were widely diffused, beyond all purposiveness of reserve to appropriate them for oneself, circulating inside and around all kin groups of the community.

What is more interesting for our purpose here is that the structure of this circulation of gifts, as noted by Lorna Marshall herself expressed a system of diffusion and distribution far more beyond the reach of a simple donor-receiver relationship. The gift circulation was not at individual level, as between atomized individuals or even restricted kin groups, but defined and marked on the basis of community. Long before this observation, the "*Essai sur le Don*" of Marcel

Mauss emphasized this totalizing character of the gift-exchange, whose medium was not easily conceived as the spheres of economy, *judicium nexus*, or political premiums taken separately, but that these spheres were all involved in the process. The gift, in other words was a "total social phenomenon" in that its political, juridical and economic dimensions were not easy to isolate from each other.

A similar observation, however disputable in Malinowski's essays, was reported by him in his work "The Argonauts of Western Pacific" in connection with what he has called "Kula exchange" binding not only a small tribal community but a series of communities on the largest scale of the whole Western Pacific region. The Trobrianders, as observed by Malinowski, were engaged in long navigational expeditions enduring sometimes several months under difficult conditions, apparently to exchange what they were calling "*soulava*" and "*mwali*", necklaces and bracelets with their individual partners living on other islands, sometimes distanced by 1000 kilometers. While during the expeditions the barks were also filled with goods of exchange, yams or crops as well as other handworks, the economic interpretation of this long heroic expedition was blocked by the size of the parcoured distances, since making more than 1000 kilometers was more than absurd in order to barter some goods with others, in that the expedition was essentially "uneconomic" in the eyes of Malinowski.

However, any attempt to explain what was the essence of this multifaceted phenomenon whose levels, if there are any, could not be explained through our conceptions of economics, politics or societal thinking, failed if they are committed in a judgment based upon a reduction. On the basis of these observations, the "total social phenomenon" of gift can be opposed to what we have called as "generalized exchange" not dominated by the "exchange-value" but defined at the level of symbolic structures that marked the so-called "primitive" societies to their territorial unity with nature, where everything had to rest in its own place, in its own location, including the social body and individuals, which were at the same time the "things". There are many instances, where, in the so-called "primitive laws" that the community enhances to the "things", animated as well as unanimated, to become an integral part of the community/territory. The things are treated as parts of human beings, as well as the human beings being parts of the things themselves. As stressed by Roman Civil Law, the code of the "person", under the authority of the "*patria potestas*", the tools, cattle, house, wares and other things are equally subjects to the "authority", not distinguishing in principle between things and sons, wives, slaves or servants. The things, as parts of family and of tribes (in the context of more "primitive" societies) are parts of the survival of the community itself: hence Lévi-Strauss is able to reconstruct schemes of exchange (what he calls as "generalized exchange") on the basis of "symbolic structures" supposed to rule the exchange of

things, circulation of women, and communication through symbolic usage of language. All these are admitted as "exchange systems" obeying to the laws of language (Lévi-Strauss, 1967, Ch. 2)

It is necessary here to explain this transfusion of concepts as "symbolic" and "real" in the following, overgeneralized argumentation. The territory of the primitive community has not to be treated as "animized" through the beliefs of the community, but it must be thought that the undifferentiated unity of the territory and the inhabitants (defined through kinship and alliance relations) not necessarily involving the myths of "noble sauvages". It is possible, unlike the interpretation of Lévi-Strauss, who admits the "symbolic structure" of the exchange as a pure, but empty "form", to reconstruct the primitive disposition of things and valuables as obeying to the laws of a "desiring production", as Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari have put them in their *"L'Anti-Oedipe"*. Since Godelier, in his *"L'Introduction Générale à la Critique de l'Economie Politique"*, we ought to become aware of the fact that the course of development of the occidental world has been a "unique" phenomena, which arrived to break down and cancelled the "territorial machinery" in which primitive communal life has been involved on the basis of a "codification of productive capacities" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1972: 166). Hence Kula exchange could be accepted not as an "exchange" obeying neither to the laws of "use-value" nor those

of "exchange-value", but admitted symbolically and really (there are no clear cut distinctions between the two under the restrictions of communal integrity of physical things, territory and community) as "production". But the lack of the "principle of utility" (in the sense that "primitives" were not governed by our categories of "utility-exchange-production-consumption" chains but by their "desire" undifferentiated from their productive forces and activity) entails that the "territorial machinery" of kinship based societies had not their origins on the basis of "exchange" but the "gift" and "theft". As depicted by ethnologists, as well as by Fustel de Coulanges, last century, in his "La Cité Antique", early or the most primitive forms of "exchange of women" were not taking the form of "exchange" properly, but admitted either as "theft" or "gift", from one household or moiety to the other (Fustel de Coulanges, 1922: 83-8). There are also many reasons to believe that the context of "economic" exchange also is equally formulated on a similar basis. But why "things" must circulate not as "exchange of equivalences" but take the form of "gift" or "theft"? It is not by the nature of "primitive exchange" that we could understand what happens when the products of primitive, communal work are "exchanged", but through reference to the nature (in its literal sense) of the Land, object of common property, as an undivisible, but factually divided "Ground" of the primitive community.

As Lewis Mumford puts it, the "territorial machine" was the "first form of the society", admitted as a "megamachine" since the whole community is constrained and embedded within it (Mumford, 1966). This "megamachine" was conceived as a combination of solid elements, having each their "specialized function" and functioning under "human control" to transmit a movement, a common work, or to perform a work, to produce things and human bodies as well as to reproduce its units and the whole of the social machine (Mumford, 1966). Hence the social machine was compact, specified in its elements, without any "metaphoric sense" as stressed by Deleuze and Guattari. Or, how an "exchange" in its proper sense should be articulated to this megamachine, since all its parts, as well as the "things" produced are integral parts of the machine? Nothing more troubling would be the exclusion of them (even a single "thing") from the productive machine.

Hence, this productive social machine had to codify all "flows" of things, symbols, movements "inside the primitive, territorial machine" as parts of the social body: the flow of women, men, and infants (birth, death, marriage and work), the flow of "flocks", or even of "sperma" -following the example given by Deleuze- to constrain the "demographic state" of the community, the flow of all things and the universe. This codification, as demonstrated in the "Primitive Systems of Classification" by Mauss and Durkheim was just from the

beginning a "cosmic world", to which every new object, must be articulated, integrated, not necessarily through "assimilation". There are many instances, in recent history, that the colonialist "missionaries" were accepted as "priests" and "magicians", fully "legitimate" in their practices, while their aim was to absorb the colonized to Christianity. There was a restless, but unsuccessful attempt on the part of the "primitives" to accept Christianity as a pure "magic" procedure among the other, native "shamanistic" methods.

What is more striking, is the example given by the rituals set forth in order to codify the "flow of time", both personal and communal; what has been called as "Rites of Passage" by Van Gennep's excellent study. For the individuals, a series of "rituals" were communally undertaken to block the individual past, in order to secure the communal "presentness", the identity of the social machine through time. The integral unity of the communal machine was preserved by a simulation of the "brotherhood" segregation, through constituting sub-communities (the bachelor long houses as it was the case with the Trobrianders, as well as other communities as Iban). As observed by Jacques Lacan (Lacan, 1982: V) a "brotherhood", via a "communal sub-group", detaching itself "partially" from the community was only possible through "segregation", through "absolute or simulated separation". The segregational rite of passage, named by Van Gennep as "rites of separation" consisted in a series of "recodification of the subject's life",

wroking through life-cycles, determining the passage from infance to adulthood, or to the married life. What was important is that all "seggregations" (seggregation into bachelorhouse, into family, or into work-teams as observed by Marshall Sahlins in his "Stone Age Economics") were attempted to be performed "ritually" in order to re-integrate the newly formed groups into the communal machine: the territoriality of the social machine must work upon individuals; during rites of passage, an individual is strictly defended to be in some, specified places, or constrained to be located at given places. Hence, the "seggregation" was not real, at the level of "separation from the community", but an integrative procedure that cancels the "hazardeous" flow of individuals, that would destroy the village community and its physical unity with the "Ground".

Meyer Fortes observe that "the problem is not that of the circulation of women, since women circulate by themselves; she is not necessarily disposed or constrained by others, but the juridical rights on progeniture are fixed to the profit of a predetermined person" (Meyer Fortes, 1966: 43). Hence, the "exchanging subject" cannot be easily defined because the primitive societal machine is not properly designed for circulation, exchange and the flow of "things and beings". The "embeddedness" of the society cannot permit to the transgression of the limits required by the "exchangist conception" of society. Deleuze asserts that the "primitive social

machine" would rather be a milieu of marking, inscribing things, nothing remaining in an haphazard exclusion from the inherently codified conjunctions of the various aspects of the communal life. Or, this does not mean that the "primitive society" is "cold", in a constant restlessness through time. They had their history of their own, a narrative history, as well as an "unconscious" which is not at all instinctual, that is "irresponsive" to the life conditions. There are constant struggles of checks and balances, through which the territorial machine, the distribution of wealth, the circulation of women and the exchange of things are re-integrated. The kin groups are the grounding formulations of the flows of any kind. There exist a communal appropriation rather than (and as opposed to) the exchange, for that being able to exchange, presupposes to "own" on an individual basis the things to be exchanged. Or the "primitive individual" is not a "subject" having the control and the right of investment over things; as there are rituals where "individual organs" are invested on communal basis; the societies of initiation (bachelor groups or even the married) through rites of passage, are "composing of the pieces of bodies, at the times sensual organs, anatomic bits and pieces; they are invested in a series of strictly codified interdictions; not to see, not to speak; it is an enjoyment of an organ collectively invested, appropriated and shared. The enigma of the "partial object-organ", elucidated in general by Lvi-Strauss in the last part of his "Anthropologie Structurale" (concerning the body without organs and the Chinese and North-Western Coast

iconographic data of "split" body) ascertains the fact that the individual "does not dispose on a private basis even his organs as well as his/her body". As stressed by a Gourmanche narrative, "when the mouth was dead, other organs of the body had to be consulted in order to decide upon whom will be charged for the funerals..." The modern reinvestment of human body, on the other hand tended to the "privatization of human body", at the disposal of a unitary principle of body and soul, the inextricable reality of the "person". The "phallus" was only disposed as "signifier" as soon as a patrimonial "family complex" has been engendered, the organs and their "phallic government" were re-shaped within nucleic family relations, the Oedipus, as asserted by Jacques Lacan, and Gilles Deleuze.

As far as we are concerned in "exchange" and "in things", in the restricted sense, then, these "things" don't exist under "territorial megamachines", there is no a "person" who disposes and invest them, "as opposed to" or "outside" the community. The enigma of the Kula is not therefore the enigmatic, and perplexing extension of "exchange" but the strict codifications and strategies, enabling the "gift-giving and receiving" individuals to reorganize their "place", sub-divided within communal, as well as extra communal interactions through the play of constant changes, disinvestment supra-codified again by the integrative re-investment. The famous "potlatch" of the American Indians, investing the "honour" of

the "chief" (at the same time the community) represents the limits of the "gift", of "responsibility", of "expectation", of "anticipation", but by no means "utility" (reduced to nothing since the waste of goods transgressed all limits of utility principle) as the basis of our conception of exchange and "market-situation". The gift, which was the "total social phenomenon" par excellence was a kind of "theft" from the collective social body, from the territory of the social machine (there are many reasons for giving here the example that for social machines, the stones, and wood as "natural" things can be appropriated by other groups only by the means of "gift" or "theft", both marking a "transgression" of the social integrity). The Kula codification, therefore, had to invest the "honour" of the individual and of the community, together with the "thing" to be exchanged: the "soulava" and the "mwali". The system has given all chances of "creativity" to the gift-givers and those who expected, the circuit being re-defined at each particular moment, at each new act of "gift" where the status and position of the "players" are continually changing. This meant also the challenge over the exchange, surcoding the "flow" of things, through the continual modification of the political, economic and social position of the subjects.

Hence, the "exchange", in its proper sense, does not refer to the pre-etatic societies since the "flow of wealth" in the form of "exchange of the equivalents", as based on the "use value" and "utility" principle depends upon the State, who,

as stressed by Engels, "subdivided not the people but the territory" (Engels, 1981: 56). By this movement of the State, the territory was arbitrarily subdivided and the "community" had to respect to the sur-determination imposed by a "higher" thing, a "pseudo-territorial" arbitrary codification. The problem of "residence", which is not at all "natural" but "utilitarian" and "exchangist" became possible only after the State administration was introduced, cancelling or subordinating the old, societal "megamachine", breaking down its old structures of "kinship" and "communal appropriation and investment of things, flows, organs and productive capacities of the social. The despotic machinery of State administration transformed the old community into seggregationary "flocks" sometimes re-organized under despotic authority as "slave communities", or "army machines", uncontrollable by the means of the old seggregational systems (kinship, relations of blood and affinity etc.). The new territorial machine, that enabled the exchange, and even the flow of communities was constructed by the State, the segments of which not being controlled by the space of old communal machines but by the "residence obligations" imposed by the State. For instance the fall of the City-State as the unitary horizon of political life, at the Hellenistic period was the evident result of the uncontrolled flows and circulations of goods, an exchange-system and market categories through which, the mercantile classes (out of classical citizenry) had controlled "trade-routes" not being controlled by City-States political structures. In other words, the State was established

only after a "threshold" when the primitive territorial machine has lost its strict control over the codification of exchange, of production, and of the flow of things. The merchant classes which were strictly excluded from the inherent structures of "freedom" and "citizenship" of the "polis" have gained in collaboration with the "despotic" authority, the State apparatus or Alexander the Great, the control over the "basic needs" of the City-States as well as of village communities. The stage of market-place, was thus transgressed, to give way, within the bodies of Empires, or World Markets (under the conditions of modern capitalism) to the bombarding of the old communities deprived of their control over the codes of exchange, with the so called "market principle", the commodification of all possible things...As far as we are concerned in the reading of history with the concepts of "classes", the classes have to be conceived as the products of an immanent movement of "decodification", as opposed to the strictly codified "cast systems" and "servile regimes", where the status of slavery for instance would not be easily challenged. The appropriation of the social body by exchange structures has been realized only through the "segregation" of individuals, to constitute possible grounds for brotherhoods (just remember that the Christian "cosmic" brotherhood was first realized by expanding through slaves, challenging the "cast" categories, and the "statutory" dispositions of servility) and they required also that the old communities, whether city states or vilage communities have lost their control over an enlarged "world", not categorizable on the

basis of "gift" or "Kula navigation". It might be that the Trobriand navigators would be treated as Argonauts; but they were by no means "expeditioners" like the Conquistadores, or the merchants as carriers of the "law of value and exchange" of our modern times.

5.2. The Image of Technic

In his essay "*Les dieux*", Alain says "the scale draws the picture of man". Part of the aesthetic experience, the aesthetic object is made for human body and "solicits its usage by the body".(Dufrenne, 1953: 567) That the fabricated object, the object of '*aisthesis*' canvasses the organism is shown, particularly for the "instrument", by André Leroi-Gourhan (Leroi-Gourhan, 1965, II: 129-137). The primitive forms of the 'tool' are strictly subordinated to the organic operator. The technical environment is primarily a space whose a priori dimensions are the sight, the apprehension, grasping, moving etc. And the interesting book of Friedmann on "The Human Problems of Industrial Machinism" (Friedmann, 1956: 77), the re-introducing of the organic into the technic is one of the most exciting problems of a recent actuality. It might be that today we are far from experiencing this exigency, having nothing to do with the problems of 'images' or 'simulacra'. But a comment of Georges Canguilhem on the book of Friedmann shows the importance of the issue, which submits itself to Alain's remark:

a new technology is needed to re-adapt the technic to the figure of humans and "this technic appear to Friedmann as the scientific discovery of purely empirical procedures through which primitive populations have attempted to adapt their rudimentary instruments to the organic norms of an activity which is simultaneously efficient and biologically satisfying, where the positive value of the evaluation of technical norms is sought in the attitudes of working organism by struggling simultaneously against all exclusive subordination of the biological to the mechanics." Canguilhem, 1947: 129)

Is it possible thereby to design a phenomenology of 'modern' image, the content of the plane of the 'videosphere' of Debray, which would make dependent the eye to the dimensions and internal traits of a picture, the steps to the scales of a cathedral? How it will be possible once more that the verse disciplined the voice and intonation? The conditions of the answers have been the objects of many phenomenological analyses by Dufrenne, Merleau-Ponty and Péguy in the past, just before the establishment of the domination of the visual image which tended to extinguish the last reminders of the 'functioning' of the artistic work.

However, such a negative definition of the world of video, the 'videosphere' cannot provide us with answers to the problems of the technical perfection of the image without graphism, of the voice without poem and of the 'tool' without

'organism'. It should first be asserted that many steps forward in reducing the distance between biology and mechanics have been taken during the development of modern industrial design. However, these steps were taken at the expense of biology, trying to adapt it into the requirements of the machines. The medical space, for instance, is not adapted to the biological functions of treatment, but on the contrary, human organism is adapted to the functional space of medical discipline (Foucault, 1975: 171-7). The allowances of the so-called 'post-fordism' do not put out of sight the image of the work by installing it in the realm of the triad information-communication-research. This triad itself conveys human organism into servility to the 'cloudy' agencies of capitalist capture.

The technical realm of the Home is evidently the best example of this mechanistic undoing of the biological life. As we have already stressed, the Bauhaus project inspired Japanese pupils of Mies van der Rohe to shift the 'traditional' Japanese house into a plane of mass production, which is not related to the 'rest' but to the conditions of 'work' itself. To disallow the access to the street was the primary aim of the 'modernist architecture' and the 'post-modernist architecture', by itself, adds nothing more than 'ornaments' to the project: the recognition of the primordial images of 'excess' as nothing more than a simulacrum. We are far, still with post-modernism, from the epochs when ornaments (especially in Oriental architecture) gave

shape to the architectural design and to the elements of construction. Part of the semiotic structure of the Home, the ornament which was superseded as the paradoxical 'kitsch' of the mundane life world by modernism - we saw the excesses in Nazi Germany and the mass production in Japan, is re-introduced into a non-mundane life world, attempting to reshape the postmodern world city from the inside of the house.

The "modernist" adventure of city architecture, it is known, has been strongly influenced by the political processes during the nineteenth century. The Hausermann Project, which reshaped the entire urban structure of Paris -the greatest conglomeration of the epoch- was effectuated with implications charged with motives of avoiding the construction of barricades on the streets, enabling the Communards of 1871 to control the city as a whole, though in a quite different manner than a police or army force. They were urban militia, who invented a domination of the masses as a "projectile", a mass in movement, on an urban texture which had its origins in the Medieval town structures: The installation of the Cambrai Commune at 1077 constituted the Medieval origins of "urban freedoms" before expanding in process to all commercial cities. This process was that of the establishment of the bourgeois power -with the so-called "communal revolution" especially affecting the France. Virilio even proposes to connect this process already to the "national liberation war", since it

opposed on terrain an autochthonous population to a military occupation coming from the East, and seeking to restore and consolidate its dominion.¹ Taking its roots from this political process of "urban liberty" -which is, indeed, "collective"- the modernist urban planning and architecture was never detached from these inherited forms of fortress texture. In the bourgeois world, the urban houses was rented to the price of gold, and the windows and façades opened on streets were considerably taxed. The logic behind this taxation was the traditional motives -essentially bourgeois in kind- of negociation and information. Virilio observes that the vitrines of Dutch prostitutes inherited the ancient bourgeois "bow windows", enabling a panoramic vision of the spectacle in the street, and information about what happens out there, who comes and goes. But this spectacle is reduced to movement, to circulation, so profoundly assessed by Lewis Mumford as the "pilgrim's progress", a movement of procession which is simultaneously movement, travel and progress towards perfection, itself based on the Medieval heritage of pilgrimage. (Mumford, 1966: 34)

This process made out of the street a new "litoral" and out of the house a port of transport, providing the cadre through which the importance of social flow could be measured. The house was measuring itself to the street and circulation and the proprietor had the chance to foresee the events and the life. The gates of the city and customs, on the other hand constituted restrictions, and served as filters against

the flux of passengers, goods and migrants. Around the cities, the "congolains" of the American slave, the bidonvilles, favellas and "gecekondus" of migrant populations, but also the caserns, the prisons and hospices were formed. These places served as milieus of "domestication", if we adopt a definition of the term given by Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire: "Domesticating an animal is to habituate it to live and reproduce in the residences of men or around them."(Virilio, 1976:7) It becomes thereby necessary to make a distinction between the "right to residence" and the "right to city". As the animals, the proletarian masses constitute a danger in themselves, charged as unknown, unpredictable and ferocious, so that they can be admitted only as "domesticated", grouped and residing around the domicile of "men", under their care and glaze.

Since Baudrillard called the post-modern condition as a 'society of spectacle', we are no more aware of how the spectacle is organized than to its consequences, which are truly observed by Baudrillard and his successors. How the organization of space, its phenomenology should be treated when, as Bourdieu says, even a petty-bourgeois refuses "to be pinned down in any particular site in social space".(Bourdieu, 1979: 78) The image of the 'marginal' of the 'excluded' cannot by itself determine the capacity of movement denied by the Home to the collectivity.

It would be easy and simple to rely upon the 'videosphere' in order to construct the inherent relations between the Home and Spectacle, if we do not know that pre-modern and pre-capitalist societies have already established an order of spectacle at the spatial 'center' of the Polis, which is nothing but the commemorative place organizing the spatial distribution of the cercles of private houses, the 'oikos', which are brought in resonance at this very center of the public.(Vernant, 1988: 34-5) Much have been said, on the other hand, on a contemporary decentering of identity, which would lead, according to a formulation of Habermas, to the development of more universalist identities and to the subsequent creation of public spheres.

When the revolutionary discourse at the periphery (the colonized regions of the world and those which attempted to join the developments of advanced capitalism) began to anchor its order-words against the imperialism, a totally new conception and insight of 'interimperialism' was launched at the center, in Europe at the eve of War and Revolution. The period 1905-1914 saw a proliferation of new theses and evaluations on imperialism: the author of a book on modern diplomacy, the "Armée nouvelle", Jean Jaurès left us his non-theoretical reflections of the future deployment of international capitalism. He explained that industrial and financial modern capitalism has created between various countries a network of

beams of relations which could constitute "a beginning of a capitalist solidarity... a principle of an economic expansion without territorial, industrial and douanial monopoly."² The basic reference of the Discours was evidently to the rudimentary theoretical study of the liberal economist J. A. Hobson in his "Imperialism, a study" published in London, at 1902: a theory whose great lines could be determined by the term "interimperialism". The same line of observation traversed also the entire Marxist discourse of the epoch, starting by the "Finance Capital" of Hilferding, to pass in the pamphlets of Kautsky, to reach a violent end-point by the "Imperialism" of Lenin, who severely criticized the chain of development of the theory in Marxist writings.

Now, the meaning of the question is more than a possibility of observation, at the modern capitalism which dispersed the industrial monopolies at the periphery, while preserving the financial activities and centralized information and research at the old manufactorial center. The semiotics of capitalist solidarity never reached the old presupposition of a *Bürgerlich* public sphere, nor an organic solidarity anticipated by Durkheim. Many treasons are to be replaced in the historical development since the beginning of the debate on imperialism: the confusion of the term with the Stalinian affirmation of "socialism in one country". The Muslim periphery was already apt to conjure up the newborn socialism as a variety of imperial domination, in a discourse represented by

Sultan Galiev, the friend and close colleague of Stalin himself. The conditions of the validity of the term - once absorbed into the '*derevyannyi yazyk*' of the Politburo and Pravda- was further confused, by the steps taken first in the Soviet engagement in African and Asian countries -while denying the Trotskyist perspective of World Revolution- and afterward by Sino-Soviet conflict whose ideological dimensions, I believe, have been decisive in the actual collapse of socialist world. If today, the wording of 'imperialism' remains reserved only to the fundamentalist- Islamist discourse with its due force, the confrontation of liberal and revolutionary languages today cannot give us a possibility of reconstructing the semantic chain connecting the axiomatics of capitalism and market to the word imperialism.

The pride of capitalism lies in its actuality: a constant reference of the Financial Times language to the passages from the 'planned economy' to 'market' -a yet uncertain transition- and its difficulties whose fundamental 'cause' (it should be understood as 'responsibility') is, in a way, the entirety of forces which challenged so far the capitalism.

NOTES

¹cf. (P. Virilio: 1976: 78): "The guarantee of urban liberties was first the reorganization of the ancient gallo-roman site, in accordance to the formula of "château fort" (the fortress), that is, the construction of these unconquerable fortresses which had nothing to feel themselves in danger face to war machines in usage at the epoch. However, what was permanently dangerous for them was the surprises and stratagems coming from the outside, from the exterior, from afar, together with nomadic masses." P. Virilio, *Vitesse et politique*, Editions Galil, e, 1977, p. 19.

² cf. J. Jaurès, Speech to the Chambre, 20 December 1911.



CHAPTER VI:
OPINION AND IDENTITY

Attacking the problems embodied in twentieth century life, social scientists were forced to forge a new field of study, that of 'public opinion. They accepted as feasible to make statistical inferences about the behaviour of pluralities and to discover some regularities in mass behaviour -the masses which have, until nineteenth century, been deplored and denounced as to their 'irrational' behaviour by thinkers and philosophers. This gived birth to large projects in exploring mass conduct, the motions of multiplicities which could never be reduced to the sum total of individual acts. But so much so that the perspective of these researches were determined by scientific and positivistic principles, the theoretical categorizations of mass behaviour suffered from a substantial insufficiency, if we except some important works: the analyses of Gustave Le Bon, of Gabriel Tarde, the important works on mass phenomena, notably by Ortega y Gasset and the *Masse und Mächte* of Elias Canetti. I have doubts about whether mass behaviour research programs, whose financial deployment is symptomatic of their importance for governmental purposes, have taken into account the proper importance of these researches.

Here I am not willing to go into the details of these theories of mass conduct and the specific problems they create still as burning questions of our modernity. I will only try to develop some themes which are inevitable in treating the formation and structures of opinion. This would encourage the scholarship which pretends to study the 'opinion crisis' of Islam as part of its political crisis.

There is Spinoza again, who lies at the origins of the problematization of mass behaviour. Before his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, the theme of multitudes and of the properties of their conduct were treated only in terms of sovereignty, i.e. the problems they created for the Prince. Machiavelli and Hobbes have developed a detailed analysis of these problems, of Medieval origin, but which came to a point so important in Sixteenth and Seventeenth century Europe that they caused many troubles for the traditional power structures. In TTP, Spinoza attacks the problem of multitudes from very different angles, in order to combine them as a sufficiently developed understanding of mass behaviour in history. A wide semantic network defines the broad field in which the Spinozist analysis is deployed: *vulgus*, *turba*, *multitudo*, *plebs* and *populus*. (cf. Balibar 1985, Giancotti-Boscherini, 1970) No less than his predecessors, the theme of sovereignty seems to remain intact. Nevertheless it is relativized and reformulated on the ground of a new optics: as Balibar observed, Spinoza places an infernal

ambivalence to the 'mass viewpoint' (Balibar, 1985: 354-6). This ambivalence is determined by Spinoza as the necessary result of a *fluctuatio animi* (chaotic oscillations, if I may translate freely) obeying equally to the individual's motives of self-preservation. What matters for Spinoza is not to solve any of the problems related to this chaotic regime of mass behaviour (though tentatives of that kind would appear in some passages), but rather to reconstruct the deterministic processes inherent in chaos.

6.1 The Formations of Identity

Although the title of this section seems pretentious and general, the wide range of problems entitled to influence today's economic, political and cultural life are belonging to a sphere which could be defined as "identity formation". Ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious and national identities tend to acquire a great importance during last decade, and especially following the great collapse of Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Whatever the technical term used for it, and whatever its anchorage -ethnic, cultural or religious- the formation of identity with its political, psychological and sociological dimensions encouraged many works and studies during the last decade. As the reader will travel in some important articles on the subject, at the moment, I will content myself in exposing the possibility of a general

theory of identity formation, which happened to be the tentative subject matter of a colloque in 1989, presided by the French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss with the participation of a number of social scientists, mathematicians, philosophers, economists and even physicists. Such an appeal to a wide range of scholars seems odd in so far as tentatives of multidisciplinary approaches proved many times useless and unprovocative until now, and the subject matter specified as "identity formation" seems as a very particular, dependent variable of thinking about society. Or, a close look to the contributions and interventions to the colloque, introduced by men from various disciplines can bring us a lot about the subject and it can open many lines of study and investigation out of the models conveyed before our eyes as inscribed in different scientific languages -that of "chaos theory", mathematical modeling, psychoanalysis and theory of communication and of narratics.

6.2 The Constitution of Identity

In his article on chaotic tendencies in population movement, the mathematician James Yorke from Princeton applies the rules brought by the "theory of chaos" into the life's "ups and downs" in treating the problem of collective identities. The chaos theory can be defined for the time being as a general theory of dynamic systems. Now a

classical introductory book by James Gleick, "Chaos: Making a New Science" (Gleick, 1987) appears still the most comprehensive statement of the question of chaos in modern science. It states a charge of paradigm, in the sense used by Thomas S. Kuhn, which occurred in the very body of scientific disciplines since last two decades - physics, mathematics, biology, genetics, meteorology, economics and social sciences. A new reading of scientific facts came to be shaped through the works of meteorologists (Edward Lorenz with his famous "Butterfly Effect"), of physicists (Stephen Smale with his "dynamical systems"), of ecologists (Yorke's investigation over the dynamics of population), of informaticians and mathematicians (Benoît Mandelbrot and René Thom) and of geneticists (the "morphogenesis" of Jean Petitot) during the last decade.

According to Yorke, the fundamental idea of the theory of chaos lies in the fact that "small errors are proved catastrophic" in many domains. The idea seems first to be developed in Henri Poincaré's words in his "Science and Method": "A very small cause which escapes our notice determines a considerable effect that we cannot fail to see, and then we say that the effect is due to chance. If we knew exactly the laws of nature and the situation of the universe at the initial moment, we could predict exactly the situation of that same universe at a succeeding moment.

But even if it were the case that natural laws had no longer any secret for us, we could still know the situation approximately. If that enabled us to predict the succeeding situation with the same approximation, that is all we require, and we should say that the phenomenon had been predicted, that it is governed by the laws. But it is not always so; it may happen that small differences in the initial conditions produce very great ones in the final phenomena. A small error in the former will produce an enormous error in the latter. Prediction becomes impossible..." That the very nature of science lies in the ability to predict comes to be challenged by facts themselves for many reasons. And this applies not only to natural but also social sciences which are attempting to use more or less sophisticated mathematical-statistical models. Through this, the scientist learns to omit unpredictable behaviour. The meteorologist Lorenz, despite his reticence in entering into polemics, criticizes this obsession scientists for prediction.

The same problem is again appearing in predicting the behaviour of populations, a question which lies at the roots of the science of demography. The chaos theory, as Yorke conceives it, has brought an alternative way in conceptualizing population and its movements as a dynamic system. At every step, we know that the unpredictable behaviour increases in proportion. The scientist's first

reaction becomes always to omit the unpredicted data as chance happening or error. An ecologist, S. May working on animal populations -with wider applications to more complex human populations- has tried to overcome this "learned omission" of the scientist. His simple model settled on a steady state of population. When the parameter was high, the steady state would break apart, and the population would oscillate between two alternative values. When the parameter was very high, the system -the very same system- seemed to behave unpredictably. The only way to conceive such a chaotic behaviour of the model was to try to apprehend it globally. The logistic equation $x(\text{next}) = rx(1-x)$ gave such interesting results when one raised the parameter that a chaotic behaviour would be produced. Hence, when the parameter "r" was 2.7, then the population would be .6292. As the parameter rose, the final population rose slightly, too, making a line that rose slightly as it moved from left to right on a graph. Suddenly, though, as the parameter passed 3, the line broke in two. The "imaginary" population of May's model refused to settle down to a single value, but oscillated between two points in alternating years. Starting at a low number, the population would rise and then fluctuate until it was steadily flipping back and forth. Raising the parameter a little bit more would split the oscillation again, producing a string of numbers that settled down to four different values, each returning every fourth year. As the

parameter rose further, the number of points doubled again and again. The doublings themselves were bifurcations, and each bifurcation meant that the pattern of repetition was breaking down a step further. This meant that a population that had been stable would alternate between different levels every other year. Now, these bifurcations coming faster and faster -2, 4, 8, 16, 31 . . . -they suddenly break off. Beyond a certain point, called as the "point of accumulation", periodicity gives way to chaos, fluctuations that never settle down at all. Yet, in the middle of this complexity, stable cycles suddenly return, here or there, as ephemereal series, then breaking down again to renewed chaos. A new theory for treating the behaviour of masses and multitudes was born (Gleick, 1987:257).

6.3 Introducing the Concept of Masses

The Concept of Masses - borrowed from Newtonian physics, the mass has a specific affinity with "inertia", a notion which can be defined as the "relative" rest (or 'motion') of a body or of a system of bodies. In one sense, it is related to "passivity", which passes into the language of politics and sociology as the passive conglomerates of human beings. This emphasis on "inertia" and "passivity" passes into the 'critical thinking' about human condition in modernity and contemporary capitalist-industrial societies. Here, the "mass" assumes a 'pejorative'

sense: it relates to a logic of passive opinion, under the guidance of the agencies of power and domination, leaving itself to be manipulated by countless forces of repression, decision-making and guidance. It is a 'degrading' condition of the civil society.

Since the early beginnings of social thought, the 'pejorative' use of the concept of 'masses' was in relation to the public attitude towards "guidance" of reason, of positive knowledge and wisdom. Heraclitus, the Ionian philosopher denounces the "ignorance" and "failure" of the masses in recognizing the way of the "Logos" -of Wisdom and Reason: as if "they" were living in dream, in futile hopes and fears, in vainglory, in a single word, in superstition.

Plato and Aristotle, suggesting the "government" of the "best few" took their position in a similar vein against the "masses" -particularly in their conjuration of the 'democracy', in which the "demos" (the multiplicities) governed. The 'vices' of the democratic regime is amplified due to the vainglorious 'excesses' of the multitude.

The pre-modern thinkers Hobbes and Spinoza had an ambiguous attitude towards "masses" (multitudo). They identified it sometimes with the "vulgus" (the vulgar, superstitious crowds), sometimes with a 'passive' and ignorant population.

At any rate, we can observe here a second attribute of 'masses', in contrast to that of 'passivity' -which is no less 'pejorative': the 'mass' can be very dangerous to the orderly behaviour of social systems -government, sovereignty and the like...

6.4 The Negation of Identity

The *Verneinung*, the concept which entails in Freudian hermeneutics the major series of interpretive presuppositions consists, as far as it is developed in the bizarre article "Verneinung" (negation), is defined as the "procedure whereby the subject, while formulating one of his wishes, thoughts or feeling which has been repressed hitherto, contrives, by disowning it, to continue to defend himself against it".(Laplanche&Pontalis, 1987) It can be expected from such a definition to go forcefully beyond the ordinary linguistic usage of the term 'negation', in which the sense of intentionality is presupposed, instead of the involvement of unconscious processes behind it. In terms of interpretation of meanings, however, an act of negation is possible only in the context of discourse, notably in the 'process of analysis', an exchange of meanings the analysed subject feels uncomfortable at the very moment of uttering it. An act of negation is hence both unconscious and conscious. It is in this sense that Freud discusses in

'*Verneinung*' the processes which can be termed as 'cunning' and 'intelligence', with strict reference to the conscious speech acts and formations of meanings. However, the unconscious factor in the act of negation is visible, since it refers to the very moment of 'repression' (*Verdrängung*) occurring as a result of the trouble felt by the patient. In other words, *Verneinung* is conscious in the sense that the patient is aware of the fact that the 'content' that has been denied 'came to his mind', but it is unconscious in so far as he, by uttering it, tries to 'repress' it. The 'unconscious' factor of the act of negation is stressed by Freud earlier in his discussion of some cases of hysteria: "The deeper we go the more difficult it becomes for the emerging memories to be recognized, till near the nucleus we come upon memories which the patient disavows even in reproducing them."¹ Hence, during the process of analysis, the *Verneinung* brings to consciousness the repressed material: "There is no stronger evidence that we have been successful in our effort to uncover the unconscious than when the patient reacts to it with the words 'I didn't think that', or 'I didn't (ever) think of that'".²

The principal difficulty imposed not only by the process of *Verneinung* during the analysis, but also in the pure analytical hermeneutics of Freud is that it assumes the infallibility of the interpretation of the analysis: If the patient agrees with us, then the interpretation is right; but

if he contradicts us, that is only a sign of his resistance, which again shows that we are right. A riskful hypothesis which would harm the infallibility and truthfulness of the interpretation. Freud himself is aware of the risk, but he only warns the analyst against any ontological attributions (the 'true meaning' behind negation) to such a process, implying that *Verneinung* has only an indicative, symptomatic value, at the moment of the emergence of an unconscious idea, shifting the discussion of the problem into the metapsychological domain. Hence, negation "is a way of taking cognizance of what is repressed (...) only one consequence of the process of negation is undone -the fact, namely, of the ideational content of what is repressed not reaching consciousness. The outcome of this is a kind of intellectual acceptance of the repressed, while at the same time what is essential to the repression persists. (...) with the help of the symbol of negation, thinking frees itself from the restrictions of repression." (Freud, 1925h, 235-6)

Behind all motives of interpretation, the suspicion imposed by any act of negation or disavowal is put in trial. Freud includes the very presence of the "symbol of negation", the "No" with all its epistemological and logico-linguistic manifestations, to the fundamental act of 'repression', a suspicious, illicit 'Yes' that lies behind the "No" actually uttered by the subject. As the interesting commentary of Jean Hyppolite on the text *Die Verneinung*

of Freud has shown, this "No" is inscribed as a mark (like "made in Germany") on the object which preserves its totality and full presence. This object, according to Freud, is nothing but the repressed material of the unconscious. And the only conscious act here is merely the mark "No" inscribed in it.

The first article in Buber's book, the "*Zwiesprache*" (Dialogue) first published in 1929, deserves attention with respect to the theme of the Other, setting the questions of religious disputes and problems of opinion and communication. According to Buber, one of the prominent Jewish thinkers of the epoch, author of the well-celebrated *Ich und Du* (I and Thou), communication is possible in one of its aspect through silence and only silence: silence is the communication between two (or more?) solitary men, whose attitudes seen from the exterior don't betray them, their inner being, except the sense in which they are together, "sitting on a bank, side by side, each impenetrable for the other". Yet a communication does occur between them, and this is quite factual: "Unreservedly communication streams from him, and the silence bears it to his neighbour..." (Buber, 1955:4)

But, what kind of communication is it? To bring about the meaning and form of such a flow of communication, Buber introduces the Jewish character of

such an unintended communication: Jewish people, while discredited for being the deniers and even persecutors of Christ, are yet in a better position to "understand" (*Verstehen*) him, for the sole reason that Christ was a Jew. And yet, they could claim a better position as mediators between the uncommunicating lifeworlds, in a Europe at the threshold of war (either the First, the Second or a possible Third one) and national or ethnic troubles. "...We Jews knew him (the Christ) from within, in the impulses and stirrings to the peoples submissive to him..." (Buber, 1955:4)

What kind of communication proceeds out of this "inner co- understanding" if one accepts this rather barbaric and protestant-like term?

From the rather mystic concept of Buberian communication, we should rather be inclined to demystify the concept, in order to bring forth its mechanisms, so long debated among philosophers of language, linguists and sociologists. One theoretical and practical outlook to the problem comes from a series of works on communication by the Soviet literary critique Mikhail Bakhtin and his pupils, Voloshinov and Medvedev. Central to this demystifying process has been the concept of dialogism and dialogical imagination, presented as a panacea to the mystification involved in the very roots of hermeneutics. The Leningrad School of Aesthetics, as they have called

themselves, underlines the need for de-psychologizing communication, which is not at all an expression of inner thoughts -assumed to constitute the reality of the meaning-, of 'cerebral thoughts' of a subject who communicates his 'monologue'. Or as Spinoza once said, against Hobbes, the pure 'monologue' uttered aloud, in the presence of so many hearers (who become subjects at the very moment of utterance) is only ideologically possible for a sovereign. Hence, to free speech and communication from the constraints of supreme power, assigned to its place by the very activity of religious and scriptural interpretation and exegesis, institutionalized in the priestly function, it is necessary to create a concept of pluri-vocal language. And this is the task of a proper communicative ability of social communication: a dialogical imagination, through which, dialogue precedes monologue, meaning precedes truth, context precedes language...

The second important procedure, through which Bakhtin and Voloshinov have attempted to express the dialogical priority is directly involved in the set of concepts of interest for us: it is the perspective opened by the notion of "alien word". An alien word comes not from nowhere (God, *sui-generis* society or Reason as transcendental instances) but from the Other. Its presence precedes, therefrom its meaning and signification. We are unable to call signification and understanding before what

has been presented to us by the other. Hence, the famous postulate of Leibniz and of the theory of Japhetic language: every meaning is constructed through multiple interpenetration of "alien words" and it continues to be regenerated every moment; there is a constant social interaction within language, a constant struggle between narrative systems, of classes, of generations or age and sex groups³.

In *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, Bakhtin/Voloshinov seem in fact to deny the constitutive role of the 'alien word' as follows:

Thus dead, written, alien language is the true description of the language with which linguistic thought has been concerned... The isolated, finished, monologic utterance, divorced from its verbal and actual context and standing open not to any possible sort of active response but to passive understanding on the part of a philologist - that is the ultimate "donnée" and the starting point of linguistic thought. (Voloshinov, 1973:73)

It appears thence that the "first" language is not a metaphor, whose signifiacnce should be evaluated in itself, but an indirect discourse. Hence, the commentary of Deleuze and Guattari: "Language is not content to go from a first party to a second party, from one who has seen to one who has not, but necessarily goes from a second party

to a third party, neither of whom has seen." (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980, p. 123)

This 'multiplication' of languages, from the standpoint of the statistical nature of the emerging opinion, defines, according to the proper rules of the opinion formation, a chaotic identity. This identity is no less deplorable for those who strive according to the rules of opinion in modernity than for the holders of traditional 'truth' regimes -in our example, the Islamic opinion. The appearance of an Other World, of the compact, or even virtual identity of the Other appears as an irreducible trouble, a trouble which arises when one faces a 'face' at the edge of a specular world: Foucault gives the best example in the introduction to his *Les mots et les choses* with the Borgesian example of 'a Chinese Encyclopaedia' (Foucault, 1966:3) And the exact statement of the problem has been made by Deleuze/Guattari: "China is a possible world, but it only attains reality when someone speaks Chinese, or when someone speaks about China in a given field of experience" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1991: 22-3) This 'field of experience' proves to be opinional, in the perspective of my interpretation of the discussions of the authors, since it reveals a factual relationship, not only between one's self and the Other, but one's relation with oneself.

André Haudricourt directs our attention into our neglect of the "deeper" psycho-social structures in which we are bounded to our nature and the nature outside. Our "social" and "moral" thought is deeply affected by our "nature", which is a "relational" category, inscribed in our relationship to the nature. Social sciences had always the habitude of ignoring these relationships, partially or totally, through the development of the Aristotelian-Cartesian systems of thought, with the exception of some 'challenging' views or moments of Enlightenment. (Haudricourt, 1962)

As Haudricourt argues, human species entered by the "neolithic" revolution into a mutant type of relationship with the world: the domestication of animals and cultivation of plants: "Vis-à-vis the vegetal and animal worlds, by the neolithic, man is no longer singly a predator or consumer, he also assists, protects and coexists longly with the species he 'domesticated'". (Haudricourt, 1962) This amounts to the birth of new types of relationships between man and nature, inscribed also in the relationships between man and man, within a group. However, Haudricourt indicates that the relationships which were maintained during the period of hunting and gathering could not have been completely extinguished, as they appear at the moments of ritual insights during the times of harvest or abatement of animals. These relationships are so deeply inscribed in our psychological make-up that you can observe a child refusing

to eat the animal he nourished at beforehand. In a wide variety of societies, the domesticated animals could not be eaten without ritual sanctioning and ceremonials. However, "the diversity of the vegetal and animal world on the surface of the globe makes it impossible the qualitative identity of these 'amical' relations in all civilizations." (Haudricourt, 1962)

Haudricourt traces the discontinuity of these 'affective' relationships on the West-East axis, admitting the only the China, the Indo-China and Melanesia as the East - with musson raining, an ecological continuity of the geography and climate, with zoological and botanical species specific to the region. The relationships of the agrarian societies with these species are characteristic to what Haudricourt suggest to call as "indirect negative action". In this type of "action", there is nothing of the kind of a "brutal contact in space" nor "simultaneity in time" with the domesticated being. The example he gives from the case of "igname" (*Dioscorea alata* L.) cultivation in New Caledonia, where a "cadre" of vegetal surface is carefully constructed, before placing there the huge semen of the igname. If it is wanted to produce a giant tubercule, one has to manage an empty space which it is supposed to fill. Greater rames will be planted at a distance of the tubercule not to trouble the growth of the plant and later, an inclined baguette is placed to permit the voluble tige issued from

the tubercule to attain the rame. The recolt is performed through digging out with precaution the tubercule, enveloping it with folds; in the case of giant bulbs, one has to open the talus of the billon, gently lying the tubercule onto a bed of very thin foil, embedding it into tresses of foldi of coconut and fixing it on a perch for the transport. The plant, it seems, is extremely fragile, and was catastrophically ruined when the colonialists brought domestic animals, who destroyed the indigenou agriculture. The cramped plant was dying, while contaminating all other igname after its putrefaction.

Haudricourt contrasts to the cultivation of igname the pastorate of mutton and sheep in the Mediterranean. In the Mediterranean regions, one may observe an agriculture "in masses" while animal breeding is constituted on similar grounds with Chinese agriculture. One has to obey to the nature of animals and the tasks of the pastor are so exalted that his behaviour is taken as a model of authority and government: as once observed by Foucault, the sovereign simulated the behaviour of a pastor in early empires. This was just so in the religious culture of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. A pastor governing the souls. This evidently led to a "transcendentalism" in religious and moral matters: a God is modeled as superior to the nature, outside nature (Foucault, 1986). And through the logic of agriculture, men identify themselves with the God, as a

sovereign power over the species, especially plants. The Chinese "God" was intrawordly, not having any kind of supernatural power. His power is nothing but the power of the deployment of nature.

What kind of deep differences of identity are stemming from such a reflection? It should be noted that the Chinese identity, as described by J. Needham and with a specific emphasis, by Haudricourt, is as much constrained by the intrawordly presence of morality. But, since intrawordly meant "natural" -translated into Western terminology- the nature is discredited as a lower level of creature. It is for the same reason that the natural side of man is devalorized before his 'spiritual' part, i.e., the part governed through transcendental sovereign.

What is the 'spiritual' embodiment of the transcendental, if we are to except the 'intra-worldly' religious systems? I would like here to introduce once more the historical opening that is raised in Vernant's work: the opposition between the 'intra-worldly' and the 'extra-worldly', that is, 'transcendental' religions has to be replaced, in order to acquire a deeper understanding, by a second opposition whose character is social, or, better, an opposition which refers to the relationships between the individual and society: while overlapping generally with the boundaries of the previous opposition, Vernant's distinction

between Greek religion and Indian religion, referring to Paul Dumont has the merit of placing the argument at the level of the concrete place of the individual in his society: the contrast between the Greek citizen, whose religious practices (sacrifice and prayer) serve to attach him to the collectivity, and the Indian 'yogi' whose religious practice is based on his detachment from collective life, his family and social group. It is true that the concrete religions are prone always to a combination of these two contrasting forms. It should even be asserted that the great religions are 'conscious' combinations of this kind. The pious heretic of the Medieval era, the protestant believer, initiatic cults or sects, free-masonry and the like -not to exclude the brotherhoods in Islamic tradition-, the heterodox elements of the great religions of the world have aborted any emerging, or competing conception of immanence (Vernant, 1990: 51-6)

6.5 The Trifunctionality of the Political Space

Since 1938, Georges Dumézil has tried to establish upon the ruins of the traditional "comparative mythology" a new manner of studying comparatively the religions of Indo-European societies, through successive approximations, drafts and provisory syntheses.

The central conception of the ideology he reconstructs is that of the famous "three functions": the order or the crises of the world, the happy or unhappy actions of Gods and men, translating the harmonious or conflicting play of the three great hierarchized functions: the magical and juridical sovereignty, the physical force, and fecundity. These functions answer to three elementary needs that the archaic societies satisfy -unconsciously in general- while the Indo-Europeans, just before their dispersion, extracted out of these three functions a philosophy. This philosophical heritage, from India to Italy or Ireland, from Scandinavia to Greece and to Caucasia, was contested to disappear only after thousands of years, while having at least some remnants permitting us to retrospect their pre-historical prototypes -theologies, mythologies and homologous institutions.

However, not only religions exposed the ideology of the ancestors. The literatures also were engaged in transmitting these prototypes, especially the epic and their continuance, the history.

In three societies, it sustained great oeuvres, the two scientific, the one popular: the Indian Mahabharata, the Table of Origins in Rome, and the Ring of Narts among the Ossetians of Caucasia. The philological analysis hold here by Dumézil allows the deciphering in these three

cases the old tripartite structure, while the different articulations of the three levels of the structure, on the other hand, clarify a number of particular modes of thought, a number of plays of concepts whose combination defines, in each case, a single significant totality.

In the first volume of *Mythe et l'épopée*, Dumézil attempts to show that the ideology of three functions (magical and juridical sovereignty, force and fecundity) -a characteristic of pre-historic Indo-Europeans- survived for a long time among most of the societies that derived out of them, dominate some of the great epic works produced in this family, particularly in the Indian Mahabharata, which was a transposition of a too ancient mythology that developed the cosmic conflict of Gods (grouped around the boss gods mastering each the three functions) and of demons.

In the second volume, Dumézil attempts to approach another type of problems. The three episodes of the immense poem are analyzed, and for each part, it is shown that they continued a narrative which has been already constituted before the constitution of the national Indian identity.

The first essay clarifies the parallelism of a Scandinavian hero and an Indian hero, Starkadhr and

Çiçupala, within the play of rivalry of two antagonistic gods. Born as monsters, their life willed with series of adventures like that of Heracles is scanded by crimes whose number was imposed by the divinities. After the last crime, both of them are decapitated by the antagonist divinity and at the instant of this violent death, transforming their hostility into love, they are rooted in the murderer-venger.

The second essay, limited to India and to Iran, poses a great problem: the traditional history of Iran, before the Achaemenideans, and notably of the dynasty of Ravi or "Kayanid" kings that occupied a great place in Shinimah, conserves probably the memory of the events and facts, or of authentic reigns, or whether it is a historicized fable. The most illustrious Kayanid, Kavi Usan, with his almost Indian homonym, the mythical Kṣvya Uçanas, is engaged in skepticism. Dumézil shows that the first in the type of sorcerer, the other in the type of a king, presented several correspondences.

The third study relies India to Ireland. The Indian king Yayāti, the ancestor of the Pândava and one of the first supreme kings of Ireland have similar relations with their children: they have to defend themselves against their revolting sons, and both of them are supported by their devoted daughter. The Irish daughter goes into an

incestuous prostitution with her brothers to make them impotent before the battle, and the Indian girl, to save her father, infanted from four different kings four sons, future kings, each marked by one of the functions. In addition, Medb, the daughter of Irish king, too close to MádHAVI, her Indian homologue, confers the kingly power to her successive spouses, imposing unto them the trifunctional condition of being and resting "without jealousy, without fear, without avarice". One can depict here a pre-Indian, pre-Irish, Indo-European theory of chances, risks and conditions of a good exercise of sovereignty.

Out of a prehistoric literature are surviving, therefore, diversely evolved fragments among the Indians, Scandinavians, Greeks and Celts. This is a unique situation in the literary history, that of being able to pursue, during several thousands years, and among societies without communication, without contact, the divergent careers of a common literary tradition.

In the third volume, the subject matter is the Roman history of the first centuries -from the mid VIIIth to mid IVth- that appears today as a romanesque oeuvre in the precise sense of the word, supposing the authors, plans, procedures. This oeuvre, to which the Annalists were oriented each for their own cause and in accordance to their preferences, has been constituted between 350 and

275. What were the materials, facts and the role of imagination in this history? Leaving aside the pre-Etruscan royal history, treated in the first two volumes, comparatively with the oldest myths of pre-Roman, Indo-European societies, Dumézil attempts here to take into account only the mythology of the Vth and IVth centuries.

One of the most spectacular episodes of the famous war of Romans against the Etruscans of Veies, the Albin lake before the Caniculum, producing a ruinous river, is an ancient myth of the Neptunalia (23th of July), clarifying the function of Neptunus: Neptunus is the form incarnated in Rome, of the same Indo-European god, incarnated in turn among the Irish as Nechtan (Nept-o-no), the possessor of a redoubtable -exploding- pits, which, in a day of fury and rage, produced the river of rivers, the Boyne.

Camillus, victorious over Veians, over Brennus and several other rivals, is, according to the tradition, is devoted to the Princess Aurora. Or, an attentive reading of Plutarchos shows in fact that this goddess, with her theology, rituals, her character opposing to that of Fortuna, dominated the life of this hero, that is to say, it furnished to the constructors of the "Life of Camillus" a large quantity of traits, and even of episodes, through which it

becomes henceforth difficult to pretend to know authentic facts.

The third part clarifies another procedure which has been largely used to reconstitute the life of the three principal heroes of the IVth and Vth centuries. Coriolanus, and Publicola: several episodes of the first two biographies and, with significant distortions, of the third, have been derived out of the Indo-European framework of three functions (the sacred, the physical force and abundance), which appears with the triad Jupiter-Mars-Quirinus sustaining the primitive religion of Rome.

Through the two appendices, Dumézil tends to expose the actual state of the researches on Mater Matuta, the goddess Aurora. Another one emphasizes, with confrontation to the Bible, in what sense one could say that the ideology of three functions characterizes the Indo-Europeans.

The significance of Dumézil's work, and of his doctrine of "tripartite division" lies in the exposition of the great chain of social being.

To amend the so-called "loss of reality" with utopia; to repair the project of "modernism" with continual references to the past, to the horizons where the terms

"the end of history" are pronounced with a delay of two centuries, all these refer more to a semiotic order whose major presupposed instance is that of signification: a sign referring to another sign and so on to infinity; or as supposed by Kristeva, there is nothing which prevents us from saying that there is no difference between an infinite regression of references between an infinity of signs and a total reference of all signs to a major sign, which is the Infinite, the God, the Logos, or an origin. This major sign is what is called as the Signified. And again, there is nothing which prevents us from saying that this major Signified is the Signifier of everything, the creator of the Verb, or the major mystifier of every experience. It may be spatial as the Face, or emotive as the Faith: Pascal notes that faith into a system of beliefs cannot be converted by the instance of "doubt" as was the case with the work of the intellect. The belief function operates in the mode of "I know that...", a certitude which refers more to an absolute intuition than to the Cartesian certitude of the world. Or the signifying regime organizes the totality of signs under a single guarantee, provided by the thinking subject, doubting cogito...

Spinoza forces us to think, together with Leibniz, in the modality of "possible worlds", with the astonishing assertion that "something which is thinkable is not only possible but in the power of existence"

The theses of universalism, developed at the level of the so-called "science of communication" especially by German scholars as Jürgen Habermas and Karl Otto Apel are welcomed by the Islamists, especially those who entered into Western academies in order to carry out their researches in the make-up of Muslim religion. In Turkey too, the "Muslim intelligentsia" strives to dissociate such an universalist doctrine from the monopoly of the left. What is the impact of the idea of universalism in an epoch of pretended 'Islamist Renaissance', mated by the so-called Islamic fundamentalism? Is it purely a 'strategy', ideological and doctrinaire in kind, to affect the cultural attitudes of the modern world toward Islam? Or is it a subtle shift of interest, first revealing its necessity in the mentalities of the Muslim intellectuals: a necessity which is the conclusion of the fact that they have realized that they could retain their power in the modern world only under the conditions of their participation to a general consensus? I think, both of the attitudes are valid, and do coexist in the make up of the actual Islam. Such questions sincerely debated over and over again among Islamist circles are proving this fact: what will be the attitude of Islam towards modernity and the projects of modernization? Is there a capacity (and thereof necessity) in Islam to be reformed? What are the attitudes to be adopted towards the great project of Enlightenment, so wildly criticized until

very recently by the influensive intellectuals and scholars in the West -Foucault, Lyotard, Deleuze and other 'post-structuralists'? Is there a basis, which would be universal, to contract and agreement on at least minor democratic premises with the secular intellectuals, the State, and popular forces which are not properly Islamists? Are there means to develop in the opinion a consent about the presence of Muslims, in media, in press, in academic and State apparatus? These questions define the cadre of debates both among the Islamists, and among non-Islamists, in the sense that they are equally part of the worried questioning in the West, and in laicized Muslim countries like Turkey about the so-called 'rise of Islam'.

Freudian analysis implies the existence in mankind of deep instincts of an anguishing, irrational force. At the first half of our century, marked by two most destructive wars in human history, as well as the rise and fall of fascism, this irrational, obscure force was often linked to the conditions of masses. The Spanish philosopher, Ortega y Gasset warned in his *Revolt of the Masses* against the emergence of mob rule, against "the accession of the masses to complete social power". In this historical context, "the multitude has advanced to the footlights and is the principal character. There are no longer protagonists. There is only the chorus."

This genealogy of problem of masses lies back in times as early as the French Revolution. This warning was made by the counter- revolutionaries as De Maistre, De Bonald, Gentz, and taken up again and again by the anti-liberals like Nietzsche and Spengler. Their warning was, as it appears today, more against the danger of fascism than against 'liberalism' which was enchanted, throughout the 19th century, by the universal progress and equalization of mankind.

The political rephrasing of this warning was a general criticism of the "rule by the average man" or the supremacy of ignorance over instruction and of numbers over knowledge. It was often coloured by slogans against the "peril of rising proletariat and of threatening socialism."

Another phrasing comes from, earlier, De Tocqueville who, through an ambivalent sentiment of political uneasiness, remarked on the 'irreversible' progress of the democracy, the blunting of the extremes and the emergence of the 'average' multitude.

Socialism of 19th century helped the development of a proletarian *prise de conscience* as formulated in the slogan: *Alle Räder stehen still, wenn Dein starker Arm es will* ('All wheels will stop when your strong arm wants them to'). It seems that, while the 'mondain' individual

faced the metropolitan trouble, so well described by Simmel, only the proletarians could escape such a 'shrinking' through the reorganization of proletarian masses in communal and cooperative forms of existence. The trade-unions and Socialist oligarchies were developed on the basis of such a privilege enabling this 'awakened people' to rationalize the mass situation.

Our century, on the other hand, awakened from this dream of 'rationality' of masses. The people, the multitude were no longer 'rational', as they appeared in the expressly misunderstood books of 19th century naturalists, Darwin's *Origin of the Species* and Ernst Haeckel's *Riddles of the Universe*. Thomas Mann, the liberal writer applauded them as the "last bulwark and genuine heir of a middle-class civilization" when fatal attack upon it was taking shape with the rise of National Socialism.

Gabriel Tarde's "admission" in modern (or post-modern) thought seems to that of Spinoza, as one of the founders of "ambiguous thinking" and as a "writer of the unbalanced". Again, like Martin Buber and Georg Simmel, he appears as a long forgotten figure, who is invited to reappear in the actuality as an important position, as the figure of a task which has to be revised -in our case the task of undoing the "structuralist" tradition, whose roots

goes back to Durkheim (Tarde's major opponent) in sociological thought.

Tarde's admission, until now, into the so-called social theory was inaugurated -often without clear reference to his name- by the American sociology who opposed the "grand theory" perspectives of their time - ethnomethodologists and interactionists. Or his name, involved in the articulation of a distinction between sociology and psychology, took also the ambiguous position of a "social psychologist", as asserted by Serge Moscovici, i.e. a theoretician who is located between two newly shaped spheres of objects, the social reality and the individual reality, the former marked by the sociology of Durkheim and the second, fin-de-siècle psychology whose components were behaviorism and introspection.

Tarde's complexion he propounds in his "Les règles de l'imitation" reconstitutes the premises of the Baroque thought as a means for reconstituting the intuitive perspectives of continuity: it is a thought on multiplicities and of multiplicities, and not of ordered cosmos, of social classes and other molar entities. The fundamental rule of this thought has long before formulated by Leibniz, the baroque philosopher par excellence, in the forme of a distinction between two types -or rather, senses- of multiplicity. The first sense of multiplicity refers to

collective totalities; it is adopted by the 'nominalists' whose reductions led to the failure of the concepts of totality and multiplicity. Leibniz's argument tends to distinguish between two types of attributions to "collectivity": sheep are collectively members to a flock, but men are reasonable animals each for his own sake. Both conceptions refer to a collectivity, but one is distributive, while the former is collective.

6.6. The Chaotic Identity

The study of the so-called "fragile" dynamic structures -unfolding the structures- which led to the emergence of a theory of chaos was first being developed in early 60's by mathematicians like James Yorke, and lastly, the French mathematician and philosopher René Thom attempted to formulate the epistemological background of the theory. According to Thom, the use of the term "chaos" was, however, inadequate, since "it must be reserved to systems whose behaviour can defy all kinds of description". Or, the systems studied by the theory of chaos "as the systems of Anosov... are explicitly described and in addition, they are structurally stable". (Thom, 1986: 19) All that appears in the theory of chaos is that ontological rule concerning human reason, which haunted the founders of modern rationalist philosophies, notably Spinoza and Leibniz. This rule, which finds its soundest formulation in Bergson's

works is the following: the opposition between the chaos and cosmos, between the order and confusion are mere human figments, since they obey to the mechanisms of alibi, through which one seeks always an order to ascribe to natural and social phenomena which is only a partial, "subjective" order, while one finds there another order set by different sets of rules. The chaos is nothing but this "second" order. Hence, the theory of chaos had the merit to save us from the total extinction of rationality face to the irrationality of masses and mass phenomena. In a series of works, inspired from the Leibnizian and Spinozist models, Gilles Deleuze evokes the dynamic models of Baroque philosophers, whose rationalism lies in the non-substantive forms of existence: the Monad of Leibniz and the corpora simplicissima of Spinoza⁴. It would be a mistake to confound these non-substantive principles with the Principle (with a major 'P') of Western metaphysics -the Arkhai, the Logos, the One, the Idea, the Essence and so on... The monad of Leibniz tends to become a "pure multiplicity" whose substance and form, unlike the Atomon of the traditional philosophy, is undefined, or rather, a fictive, incorporeal attribution would make them a "substance-form". Spinoza goes further in the direction of de-substantialization: corpora simplicissima are without form and substance since they can be distinguished only through their motion and rest, their speed and slowness. Hence for Spinoza, "bodies are distinguished from one another in

respect of motion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in respect of substance". Hence, the One Substance of Spinoza should be taken as the totality which is necessarily affected through processes of "imitations" and "individualizations", since "A body in motion or at rest must be determined to motion or rest by another body, which other body has been determined to motion or rest by a third body, and that third again by a fourth, and so on to infinity".⁵ In the Baroque physics (which do not exclude the idea of a "social physics" as a dynamic theory) bodies agree between themselves in several aspects, while differing in others, always with reference to motion and rest, quickness and slowness. This idea cannot be reduced to the Derridean theme of "difference", since it belongs to the order of "strong thought" as a principle of reason, and not to the reconstruction of "differences" neglecting the "immanent idea".⁶

The theory of chaos teaches us the idea of a body, of a concept, of a plane and of a nature without any reference to a sui-generis, transcendent instance or substance: nothing but folds and foldings, imitations, contagions and 'viral' existences. Every structure is 'open' and this 'openness' is not that of an infinite play of textualities and of de-construction, which rests upon the activity of interpretation and dissecting of major themes, but that of the plane of immanent ideas.

6.7. The Opinion as Constitutive of Identity

The opinion is expressed as a tentative to constitute a generic subject, speaking in the name of a group, preferably political if the ideology of opinion has already invested the field of politics. Through such an expression, the opinion do not appear as related to the 'truth' (it is not the "episteme" if we adopt the terminology of the Greeks) but even the expression of the 'truth' has to obey to the principles of opinion, i.e. the emergence of a generic subject claiming right over his/her discourse. Such a semiotic regime dislocates all pretentions to truth narrative, just as the Ancient Greek holder of the "episteme", the philosopher, had to "propose" it to the middle of the society of citizens in order to get its acceptance through discussion -endless discussions in reality. Hence, the semiotics of opinion has to be translated into the order of power, instead of a vague conception which some have called a 'social construction of reality'.

The modern religious discourse, or more precisely, the religious discourse which obeys to the requirements of modernity's semiotics of opinion is, perhaps, equipped with the markers of power, in the sense that it is able to transform its discourse about the 'absolute truth' -in the

form of the Logos of God- into statements of opinion, into expressions of claims to right, and into a rhetorics of persuasion. Such a mediatization of the religious discourse, which has been the outcome of the process of secularization of the public sphere during the pre-enlightenment period tends to reduce the efficiency of the autochthonous magico- religious setting of the interpretative semiotics of religion - mainly of the priestly classes. Through this transformation, the priestly class is transformed into a clergy, which no longer pretends to interpret the truth of Scripture, but reduces its task to "represent" the interests of religious institutions, the God, the Church, Christ. That these series of transformations are peculiar to Christianity, in the course of XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries does no mean that the recent transformations of Islam cannot be taken, at least partially, into account in a similar way:

The title *What is Structuralism?* was, during a long period, applied to so many studies and researches that it would be convenient to ask the same question in such a presentation. It can be defined, on the "survol absolu" of the history of structuralism, as the method which imposed itself onto human sciences in a century of immense progress. Its scientific vain, tested in the works of linguists since the paradigmatic revolution of Ferdinand de Saussure, has been exalted especially with the work of Claude Lévi-

Strauss, French ethnologist, who did rise it at the level of a philosophical current.

What was the significance of this "linguistic turn" in the history of human sciences? The shift occurred especially in the field of language. Until Saussure, the greatest schools of philology and linguistics, as those of Meillet and Vendryès, sought to explain the evolution of a language by linking it to that of the society. Saussure cut off the relation of linguistics from the problematization of genesis and evolution. He tries to reverse the relationships between the system and history. Within language, he distinguishes between the 'langue' as the set of conventions that are adopted to permit the exercise of language and the speech (la parole) which is this exercise itself. The object of linguistic science is a system of signs, issued of the mutual determination of the sonore chain of the signifier and the conceptual chain of the signified. This system is structure. The signification of a term is not defined in relation to an object, but in relation to other words of the language. This means that signification is differential. Applying this type of analysis to anthropology, Lévi-Strauss conserves the anti-historicist spirit. Structuralism is a combinatory which operates without reference to history. It differs, however, from all theories of form. Formalism and structuralism are separated in reason of their differing attitudes they adopted towards the concrete.

In contrast to the formalism, the structuralism rejects to oppose the concrete to the abstract, in order to privilege the latter. The form is defined by a matter which is external to itself. The structure has not a distinct content: it is itself the content, apprehended in a logical organization as the property of the real. In this sense, the structuralism, issued however of formalism, is opposed to its origin. A little structuralism distanced from the concrete, it brings much back to it. The savage mind is not prelogical, but quite logical. It is the thought which operates on the first level, that of the concrete, it is the science or the "logic of the concrete".

Lévi-Strauss applies his method first into the analysis of kinship systems. Just as the language, in fact, the kinship system is established not at the level of the terms of nomenclatura, but as couples of relationships: husband-wife, father-son, brother-sister, maternal uncle and son of sister. Agains, just as language, kinship is a system of communication. It is not spontaneously developed from a situation of fact, but as an arbitrary system of representations. It is not a biological modality, but a system of alliances. The rules of marriage assure the circulation of women within the social group and hence replace a system of consanguin relations of biological origin by a sociological system of alliances. Kinship is therefore a "language", since it assures between the individuals and groups a certain

type of communication. That the "message" is here constituted by the women of the group which circulate between the clans and not by the words of the group circulating between the individuals don't alter at all the identity of the phenomena considered in these two cases. The language is exchange, communication, dialogue. The same situation is valid for marriage. Exchanging the signs and exchanging women, are comparable phenomena, to which one can apply the same structural method. The incest prohibition is the fundamental rule which makes the man born into cultural life. In effect, this is par excellence the famous "rule of gift" of Mauss. It forbids spousing with the mother, sister or daughter while obliging to give them to others. "There is more in exchange than exchanged things". There is reciprocity. That is why every marriage is a dramatic encounter between the nature and culture, between alliance and kinship. "The emergence of the symbolic thought would expect that women, as words, are to become things that are exchanged between them. It was in effect in this case the sole means of transcending the contradiction which made the same woman be perceived under two incompatible angles: the proper object of desire on the one hand, and hence exciting the sexual instincts and instincts of appropriation, and subject on the other hand, perceived in itself, of the desire of the other; i.e. the means of tie in alliance." This is language no longer

in terms of meaning, but in terms of code. It is the prototype of every organization.

The same method is also applied to the study of myths. According to Lévi-Strauss, human intelligence is one. The mythic thought is not a prelogical thought, but a logical thought at the sensible level, a classificatory thought which utilizes empirical categories (raw and cooked, fresh and purrished etc.) (Lévi-Strauss, 1980: 278-9).

Out of historical monographies, intending to show how archaic traditional societies are said to be transformed, both internally or externally -or rather within a genesis that absorbed the two dynamics in its body- we can derive out only a shortsighted vision as knowledge adaptable to historical generalization. This is truly the case when Marx was intending to show the so-called "primitive accumulation of capital" outside the logical context and theoretical articulations of the *Das Kapital*. Here once more, we can see a shift from the field of historical laws to the field of historical narratives and to the recount of events.

That history is mainly a descriptive science has been a long debated fact, while its "narrative" character was being challenged since the time of Hegel, Lessing and Herder. The problem of historiography with Nietzsche and even with Weber is how to reintegrate the body of

genealogy, which has always been closely dependant to psychological and ethical visions to the series defined as the network of knowledge by the history. In other words, the remaining question was to conceive of the "internal dialectics" of a genalogy in the context of historical description. This problem was reverently discussed by Weber in his *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, not so long on a theoretical ground, but as a mere problem of explaining the development of religion on the basis of "resentment" ethics of the chattel classes, while there was many accounts, in terms of historical documentation, that the oppressed expressed itself mainly by a limited number of tools (this was also an idea of Nietzsche) among which resentment was playing an important role.

However, if as observed by Paul Veyne, anything was historical, the History as such does not exist, and we have to find a substantial place to the genealogical conception of history as an integrative part of the historical discourse. The problem of "datification", once and for all the most intriguing question in historiography, can reveal the fact that, as remarkably grasped by Lévi-Strauss, the dates, periods and events are belonging to a variety of species, not in the context of a ruling body of "historical laws", but as parts of series that are to be reconstructed by the historian. This problems, while seeming "internal" for the practice of historiography, is indubitably imputable to

another historiographical question, that of tracing back the fields of lacunary knowledges about the past, as with the "history of climate" genially developed by Le Roy Ladurie, or the "history of energy usage", of Fernand Braudel to form a global and if wanted, general history, which would still remain unmotivated by the search of "historical laws".

The figure of history, and its narration is henceforth capable to constitute ethnic, national identities, which, nowadays, prove to be no less capable of being catastrophic. It is the power of language, permeated in social structures, that guarantees the foundations of identity out of a chaos, susceptible of destructive, negative forces.

6.8. The Uncanny Identity

In a short article entitled *Das Unheimlich* (the 'uncanny'), which invites numbers of his followers who seek to interpret it, Sigmund Freud presents a German language game belonging to the order of those which have long since been invoked proudly by Hegel, a linguistic, semantic phenomenon through which the word *Heimlich* (the homely, domestic, familiar, private) comes closer in one of its senses to its antonyme, the *Unheimlich*, passing through rather strange semantic moments, as habitual in German language: "*Heimlich=Unheimlich*"; the 'homely'=strange,

uncanny... In the words of German Romantic, Schelling, the *Unheimlich* defines what is manifested while it has to remain secret, private or imperceptible. Thus the 'uncanny', the 'strange', the 'alien' inspire the sentiment of the "return" of a once repressed familiar presence, the one which has been domesticated once with "repression" (*Verdrängung*): the "return of the repressed".

The idea is nevertheless ancient. In the Book IV of his *'Historia'* Herodotus relates the interesting histories and customs of Scythians, strangely victorious over the giant armies of Darius, the Persian king: "We, the Greeks, are proud of our antiquity, while the Scythians are venting to be the youngest of peoples". It is through the mirror of Scythians that the Greeks have to conceive and understand their own institutions, customs and culture. The idea of "mirror" is inherent in the orientation of the Greek individual, who could never confine himself (or herself) to a 'consciousness', to a state of thought 'internal' to the person, a given experience of the self. Thereby, for the Greeks, this mirror effect was an inextricable function in the constitution of identity. It should also be remembered that for the Greek, the word translating the *'Unheimlich'* was nothing but 'xenos', literally meaning 'foreigner'.

Concerned with the development of his 'Idea', Hegel seems to attribute a great importance to a category

defining Western identity: to-be-at-home-with-the-Greeks. The category was supposed to fortify the Occidental identity, the European wisdom, by exalting the forces of the *Heimlich*. The comfortable, homely 'prosperity' of the Lowland protestant bourgeoisie was destined as the aim, the final and inescapable result of the entire history despite so much religious wars, poverty, and revolutions.

When returning back to the Rome, the crossroad of civilizations, we can observe the identification of the *Heimlich* with Peace (*Pax Romana*) which rested on Roman sovereignty, the imperium. This was until the Unheimlich forces of Oriental religions, Mithraism, Zarathustra and the Cult of Isis came to invade the imperium.

The Christianity established its Heimlich world in the City of God. The Heaven, the Dome of the God, and the Rome transformed into Church define the boundaries of the Heimlich, of the Home. Through this, the 'intimate' relationship with the God is established.

Following the overwhelming years shaking the Islamic Oecumen, Ibn Khaldun opposes to the civilization of 'badiya', to Heimlich urban civility the powerful 'asabiya' of the *Unheimlich* Bedoins, constituted by unobservable networks of socius and associations. These relations are really based on different rules, that the observer fails to

recognize in unwritten laws, in unobservable phenomena of alliances and filiations. What makes Ibn Khaldun a truly social theoretician was his brilliant awareness of the importance of such immanent, Unheimlich and unobservable relationships in social bodies, as opposed to the openness of the public rule and authority. You were in the second subjects of a public sovereignty, as you obey to an almost transcendental power, while in the former, you directly become a rod in the chain of the social machine. Here, the strange fusion of the *Heimlich* and the *Unheimlich* is felt.

At the end of his essay "Strangers to Ourselves", with reference to Freud, Julia Kristeva suggests the problem of Unheimlich as the fundamental problem of Europe and of the entire Occidental civilization. The Unheimlich reproduces itself in the very social logic of identity formation -rich with political, sociological and psychoanalytic data- with reference to mostly 'modern' problems of racism, xenophobia and ethnic dissent. The foreigner appears as the 'return of the repressed', of what one is and recognizes in the mirror of the Other his own Otherness. According to Kristeva, the question of xenophobia would only be settled when each one will recognize himself as a foreigner. She observes that the xenophobic attitude is reproduced linguistically by the question in the form of 'how it comes that he speaks my tongue'; again, a second question comes,

'how it comes that he can do my job', and more, 'how it comes that he is like a man'?

6.9. The Homely Identity

Peace is related to 'home'. Its semantic constitution is that of a 'reterritorialization' of the homeless, the 'wild', 'revolutionary' discourses. Immune against the diseases of modern life, the fragmented and parcellized destinies, the 'home' is constituted as the place where the 'escape' enters among the abilities of individuals. The 'home', the 'oikos' is for Greek religion the 'first' circle of the possibility of individual's life, the second being the 'polis', englobing the 'houses'. (Vernant, 1990: 235-7)

The 'housing', which involves the 'mass production' of 'houses' is the real 'infra-structure' of modern capitalism. However its logic passes through a mixture, bridging between the Japanese single 'house', in whose semiotic order the element of urbanism is totally absent, and the Bauhaus project, which has to be located at the core of 'modernist' architecture. The curious interest of the representatives of the Bauhaus project, and of great figures of architecture of the epoch between the two wars -as Mies van der Rohe- towards the Japanese house was a double-bind, asserting no less the dimension of a mass production of houses for the

working classes -the Haussmanism being an ever present 'core' element- as the strategy of the axiomatization of the 'right to the house'. The Bauhaus project, in fact, has an ambiguous relationship to the 'right to the city'. In other words, its axiomatics rests on a mediating space between the 'rights to have a residence' and 'the right to the urban', the latter based on the tradition of the *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*. The lack of 'urbanism' of the Japanese house lies, in a way, at the root of the interest of the holders of the Bauhaus and of 'modern' architecture: a 'house', whose space is closed onto itself, all lines and movements tending towards the 'functions', inherent to the 'micro-machinery' of the central 'room' -the '*shinshin*' model in Japanese tradition- and in which, the access of the 'home' life is totally denied for the street. In the Western version of Japanese 'house', the 'shinsin' variation, the 'modernist' Weltanschauung is so strong that it is no longer a perspective of a 'home' shaping the architecture, but the opposite, the architectural model shaping the life in the home.

The 'Public' and 'Private' concentrate in a fictive polarity (on a continuum that requires the 'normalization' of the two poles simultaneously) two opposed semiotics that are both heterogeneous in themselves. As distinctions of a bourgeois world and culture, they have, however some institutional and juridical boundaries that presuppose a historical dynamics in the form of a semiotic agency rooted

deeply in modern social formations.⁷ Hence, what is important is rather to study the particular semiotic order that serves in the distinction between 'public' and 'private' spheres, instead of relating the two poles at particular and distinct semiotic orders. Social anthropology reports a huge data on the organization of such a 'mixed' semiology, which puts into circulation both the signs of the 'secret' and of 'public', the former deployed in the 'horde'-like caste of warriors, who eat and meet each other behind the curtain, and the latter, by the king as the holder of authority, the marking 'face' is perfectly 'public', seen and heard from everywhere. This does not mean that the warriors' caste puts 'originally' into circulation the 'secret signs' belonging to an autochthonous order of secrecy. The 'public' and 'secret' signs are possible only through the very mixture of the two, independent semiotic orders, that of the 'paranoid'/'despotic' sign regime and that of the 'horde', captured by the 'magical' activity of the State (made corporeal and significant in the body and public 'face' of the monarch). Only in this agency of 'capture' and 'mixture' one could become able to decipher the polarization of the 'public' and 'private' and the determined translation of the 'secrecy' into 'privacy'.

Now, it should be noted that linguists and hermeneuticians failed for a long time in establishing the important role of semiotic mixtures, particularly by the

credit they attributed to the 'signifying' process. Or a sign of the 'public' order can 'signify' something for the secret semiotician, while the opposite is particularly difficult. A secret remains secret as it remains hermetically closed to the public. This does not mean, however, that secret signs don't circulate. They do circulate in their proper context, within secret societies, military castes, in Bedouin communities, not as rumours or rehearsals, but with the same clarity and openness as the masked, informal and public signs of the State discourse.



NOTES

¹ S. Freud, *Studies on Hysteria* (1895d) G.W., VII, 402; S.E., X, 178-79 b.

² Freud, 'Negation' (1925h), S.E. XIX, 239.

³ In the microscopic arithmetics deployed by Leibniz, there is a determined place for language as a combinatorial series of multiplicities. In his *De Arte Combinatoria*, he extends the analysis towards systems of articulations and propositions to convey a proper analytics of statement (consisting in the meeting on a linguistic plane of multiple multiplicities). One could notice in his tremendous ability to construct his theory of linguistic combination the role of his interest in the 'alien word', particularly, the Chinese. For a more detailed analysis see Serres, 1982: pp. 186-193.

⁴ In *Spinoza et le problème de l'expression*, Deleuze studies the "metaphysics" of Spinozist physics where the "agreement of bodies" coincide with a "physical contract", whose social expression constitutes the Spinozist doctrine of "social contract" (Deleuze, 1968). A social contract cannot be explained without reference to a spatial-physical contract between individual bodies and the rules of their concatenation. In his *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie* (Deleuze & Guattari, 1991), with F. Guattari, Deleuze invokes the Spinozist logic of "plane of immanence" enveloping the infinite motion of concepts (the immanent 'ideas' of Spinoza or the 'clinamen' of the Epicureans) as a major problem in philosophy and of its horizons. In *Le Pli* (Deleuze, 1990), invoking the continuities of contemporary thought with the Baroque -the return of the theme "one has to constitute a body"- he elaborates the Leibnizian thematics of "infinite intensities" in action as a folding-unfolding processes - a monad as pure multiplicity.

⁵ *Ethics* 2, Lemma 2.

⁶ The "immanent idea" in Spinoza's terms can be explained as follows: "If the human body is affected in a manner which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present to itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to exclude the existence or the presence of the said external body." (*Ethics*, II, P. XVII) Thus, the mind has the ability to regard as present external bodies, by which human body has once been affected, "even though they be no longer in existence or present". We say that this idea, which could only be removed again by the affection of human body by an external body which contradicts in its essence the former one, i.e. removes it on a plane of consistence in the nature. Thus, Spinoza is able to distinguish between the idea of Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul: "the former directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and only implies existence so long as Peter exists; the latter indicates rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature of Peter, and therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body lasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even though he no longer exists." (*Ethics*, II, P. XVII, Scholium)

⁷ Althusser reveals the foundations of a theory of subjectivation related to the bourgeois 'juridical' distinction between 'public' and 'private': this distinction is not a foundation but presupposes the bourgeois formalization of law and of the juridical position of the subject in bourgeois society. cf. L. Althusser, *Idéologie et appareils idéologiques de l'Etat*, in *La Pensée*, 1969, III.

CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION

The agencies of political narratives of modernity suffer since two decades from a nevrotic feeling of insecurity: as to the history, one equally can either take refuge in the historical imagination, or suppress history from the order of the world. This sentiment of insecurity has been determined both to its existence and its ends on an argumentative scale destined to show the necessity of adapting to the world a "weak thinking" (in its Derridean sense), which takes the form of opinion, on the basis of the extinction of the moods of truth¹; the political truth specifically had to become 'relative' both to the subject and to its object. Hence their philosophical forms had to obey to the formalisms of proposition which is not reduced merely to truth-values, but also to an immanent power of argumentation: every movement, whether traditional or modern (or again, postmodern) has to obey to the fundamental principle of opinion on the one hand and to the marker of power at the narrative level: not being only a proposition hence, it is also a performative, that is, a pragmatic use of language, a business of gaining partizans and a constitution of collective agencies of enunciation.

It is through this framework that I attempted to take the narrative examples provided by modern Islam into account: the reformulation of Islamic religious doctrines in terms of a political movement -a foreign topography, an alien word; their disposition under the sovereign power of the society of opinion. The fact that the expression of Islam becomes strongly tied to the rules of the society of opinion translates the doctrine into the language of propositions, whose Fregean formulation gives us only one aspect related to the 'truth values'. Instead, a performative assemblage is at work -act redundant with words- in the politics of language of the Islamists -the media speech becoming the only means of the communication of the sacred message.

The political consequences (no less worth studying) of such a subordination of the 'sacred' into the semiotics provided by the modern structures are to be formulated with respect to a semiotics of capitalism, which is by no means 'scriptural', 'pious' or 'religious'. The semiotics of capitalism is that of illiteracy, as once revealed by Deleuze and Guattari, in the sense that the "writing" belongs to pre-capitalist formations, i.e. the archaic societies and imperial regimes (Deleuze & Guattari, 1972: 233). Certainly, capitalism has need to the written sign, the "money" as its greatest abstraction and to literary production, as a specific form of circulating written signs. The conceptual key to the illiterate nature of capitalism, however, is illustrated with the well-known paradoxical example of

China. Why China 'failed' to pass into capitalism while the "material bases" for such a transition existed, as well as the 'motives' of modifying the political structures? We can observe that the key lies in the relationships between State and commerce. Etienne Balazs notes that merchants were incapable to acquire an autonomy face to the State on the one hand, and to the "money" on the other. He also shows that at the moment when the reserves of metal were sufficient, the State closed the mines, since it was the sole power which controlled the commerce as well as the amount and circulation of money. The merchant was never liberated from his status as a mercenary, as a public employee of the State (Balasz, 1968:229-300). Deleuze and Guattari deduced from this configuration of the relationships between the State and the Commerce that the "role of money in the commerce refers more to its control by the State than its function in trade." (Deleuze & Guattari, 1972:233) Foucault, basing his theory on Will's observations, on the other hand, attempts to show how in certain Greek dynasties, the taxes on the aristocratic classes and the distribution of money among the poor were the means of returning money to the rich, enlargening the system of debts. This process contributed evidently to the manipulation of 'class struggles' in Ancient Greece, through the two moments of 'political-economic' reforms: the Solon reform, and the Cleisthenes Reform.² This "New-Deal" of the Greeks proves that the system of taxation could provide the best means, like the modern American version of the same procedure, for

increasing the speed and dynamism of the business. The resulting formulation, written by Deleuze and Guattari is concisely bringing about the nature of the money in capitalist formations as a sign and abstraction: it is a means of expanding the debts to infinity.

The "linguistic" mechanism of opinion takes the shape of a metalanguage at the level of the formalization of speech phenomena in the social context. The "I" as in the "I as a Muslim" or "I as a woman", concluded by "... I believe that..." is both the "presence" of the "I" in the discourse and its presence "as a member" to this or that group, community or "identity". It is reported speech in so far as it passes into the narrative order of illocution by the segmentation of the self, its division between the "universal" macrocosmos and the "particular" self, the "microcosmos" in the Stoic terminology. It would be interesting to note this sublimated worth of a "declaration", of "saying the truth" through the utterance of identity, either in the form of pretention or self-assertion. One cannot avoid such a membership to a group which tends to be "universal", whenever he speaks or he remains silent. Even the forms of "protest", "denunciation", "invective" and "contestation" in public, despite their pretended originality and idiosyncretic appearance, are submitted to such a presupposition of "universality", betraying the "non-discursive presuppositions" implied in their utterance.

The metalinguistic orientation of any public declaration -at the level of presuppositions- is worth to be analyzed at the level of the system of obligations created by the "collective agencies" of language: On the one hand, the discussion has to be connected to that of what is called "explicit performative utterance". This constituted the field of discussion derived out of Austinian theses by Habermas (Habermas, pp. 38-39). Ducrot refers to this concept as a point of entanglement of various illusions, which Anscombe calls "performative illusion". (Anscombe, 1980, pp. 115-123)

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What is henceforth the infinite debt of the Moslem to God? The statement "We revealed to men all kinds of things and examples in every ways" in the Kehv Sura of the Koran, is

one of the prominent interpretive moments of the Muslim Holy Scripture, where the God or his Nabi (the prophet) declares the style of language inherent in the Scripture. (The Kehf Sura, Ayet 54) The classical interpretation of this metalinguistic remark by the Islamic theologians, especially in the commentaries of Ibn Sinan al-Hafaji, in *Sìrr-ul Fesaha* is that one should first take, from a philological standpoint the fact that the Scripture was revealed in Arabic language, in the cadre of the grammatical rules of this language. Ibn Sinan, however distinguished between the "fasih" and "sejil" statements in the Word of God, making it to correspond to the properties of the ordinary, natural language. Evidently, the "fasih" verb refers to the natural language which is deprived of the narrative, stylistic, in short, the 'rhetorical' usage of language. This rhetorical usage, no less belonging to the natural language than the "fasih" utterances, cannot be totally eliminated from the language of Scriptures: "The entirety of the Coran is not denotative" in the sense that "it would sometimes be efficient to use rhetoric elements since it is, in fact a beautiful language". The exclusive use of the "fasihat" (denotative language) would be itself contradictory to the rules of "fasihat" itself.

To amend the so-called "loss of reality" with utopia; to repair the project of "modernism" with continual references to the past, to the horizons where the terms "the end of history" are pronounced with a delay of two centuries, all these refer more to a semiotic order whose major presupposed instance is that

of signification: a sign referring to another sign and so on to infinity; or as supposed by Kristeva, there is nothing which prevents us from saying that there is no difference between an infinite regression of references between an infinity of signs and a total reference of all signs to a major sign, which is the Infinite, the God, the Logos, or an origin. This major sign is what is called as the Signified. And again, there is nothing which prevents us from saying that this major Signified is the Signifier of everything, the creator of the Verb, or the major mystifier of every experience. It may be spatial as the Face, or emotive as the Faith: Pascal notes that faith into a system of beliefs cannot be converted by the instance of "doubt" as was the case with the work of the intellect. The belief function operates in the mode of "I know that...", a certitude which refers more to an absolute intuition than to the Cartesian certitude of the world. Or the signifying regime organizes the totality of signs under a single guarantee, provided by the thinking subject, doubting cogito...

Spinoza forces us to think, together with Leibniz, in the modality of "possible worlds", with the astonishing assertion that "something which is thinkable is not only possible but in the power of existence". Hence the play of the opinion is introduced once and for all as an aspiration of future: a political utopia, or rather, a utopia expressed in the form of politics.

The opinion here is expressed as a tentative to constitute a generic subject, speaking in the name of a group, preferably political if the ideology of opinion has already invested the field of politics. Through such an expression, the opinion do not appear as related to the 'truth' (it is not the "episteme" if we adopt the terminology of the Greeks) but even the expression of the 'truth' has to obey to the principles of opinion, i.e. the emergence of a generic subject claiming right over his/her discourse. Such a semiotic regime dislocates all pretensions to truth narrative, just as the Ancient Greek holder of the "episteme", the philosopher, had to "propose" it to the middle of the society of citizens in order to get its acceptance through discussion -endless discussions in reality. Hence, the semiotics of opinion has to be translated into the order of power, instead of a vague conception which some have called a 'social construction of reality'.

The modern religious discourse, or more precisely, the religious discourse which obeys to the requirements of modernity's semiotics of opinion is, perhaps, equipped with the markers of power, in the sense that it is able to transform its discourse about the 'absolute truth' -in the form of the Logos of God- into statements of opinion, into expressions of claims to right, and into a rhetorics of persuasion. Such a mediatization of the religious discourse, which has been the outcome of the process of secularization of the public sphere during the pre-enlightenment period tends to reduce the efficiency of the

autochthonous magico-religious setting of the interpretative semiotics of religion -mainly of the priestly classes. Through this transformation, the priestly class is transformed into a clergy, which no longer pretends to interpret the truth of Scripture, but reduces its task to "represent" the interests of religious institutions, the God, the Church, Christ. That these series of transformations are peculiar to Christianity, in the course of XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries does not mean that the recent transformations of Islam cannot be taken, at least partially, into account in a similar way:

It appears that the democratic instance of the opinion is revealed in the increasing sentiment of the democratic exaltation of the media technologies. This increase is revealed in the plethoric judgement of the communal understanding of the logical time required for the understanding and comprehension of the media messages. A series of relaying 'interpreters' are involved in the apprehension of media messages, to restore the identity and the security of the messages and performatives declared in the media. The forms of declaring, asserting and manipulating thereby the opinion are so sophisticated that one may say that the government is no longer a 'real' institution, a 'thing' outside its bombardment of declarations and concrete linguistic operations.

Now, when the Islamic discourse is found to adopt these media technologies, the age of interpretation and circulation of the

Islamic message entered into a new period, and a corresponding new configuration. This new configuration is that of the modern opinion which is always in the search of a consensus, i. e. a 'peace' of minds and beliefs. Believing is redistributed as the incontrovertible instance of the opinion -the strong opinion- differently from the weak opinions of democracy, pluralism and liberalism. If there is a belief to democratic values, it is nothing but immanent to the process of subjectivation to the confrontation of the opinions in various domains of social life; outside it, democracy cannot create the grounds for the certainty of a belief. And it is these motives that I have attempted to cover, at least in fragments, in the present thesis.

¹ It is especially in Lyotard who brings the 'perlocutory' complexes of language into a position of ideality that the 'weak thinking' plays an important role against the 'mega-narratives'. (Lyotard, 1979)

² Cf. Foucault's incisive analysis in his course in Collège de France, held in 1971, "La volonté de savoir".

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